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URESA, jurisdiction of URESA Court and District Attorney limited
Hedlund v. Hedlund, 111 Nev. 325, 890 P.2d 790 (1995)
The parties divorced in California in 1986. The mother was given primary physical custody of their three children and the father was ordered to pay child support. The father later moved to Nevada while mother remained in California. The father fell into arrears in his child support obligation and mother instituted a URESA action in the Second Judicial District Court to recover arrears. While this was occurring, the father had his child support order reduced in California and the parties stipulated his arrears were $6,050. the father paid off the arrears in two years. In exchange for release of mother’s lien against him, husband agreed to stipulate to a Washoe County District Court that he would continue to pay child support of $375 per month. Three months later the Washoe County District Attorney’s Office registered mother’s child support order in Nevada per NRS 130.320 and immediately thereafter requested the court to increase the child support order. The URESA master recommended the father’s child support be increased pursuant to the Nevada Child Support Formula (29%) which would have increased the father’s child support obligation from $375 per month to $900 per month.
The district court judge vacated the master’s recommendation concluding the district attorney had no authority to represent a custodial parent in child support modification proceedings when the non-primary parent is current on child support payments. The Supreme Court affirmed stating:
[c]ontrary to [mother’s] contention, nothing in [NRS 125B.150] grants a district attorney the authority to represent custodial parents in actions to modify the amount of child support after the obligation of support has been established.
Sandra seeks to require Nevada’s taxpayers to provide representation for her in her effort to increase child support benefits. Sandra’s interpretation of NRS 125B.150 would mean an unwarranted expansion of the powers and obligations of the district attorney. Under her interpretation, any parent collecting child support would have the district attorney’s office as a personal counsel whenever she or he wanted to litigate an issue involving child support. NRS 125B.130(3) expressly states that the district attorney renders a public service and represents the state, not the parent or child. It is clear that the public service to be rendered by the district attorney is to ensure that nonsupported children do not become an economic burden on the state. In the instant case, Vincent is current on his child support, and his children are not receiving state aid. Thus, the district attorney’s representation of Sandra constitutes a burden on state resources rather than, as the Legislature intended, a method of relieving the state of such a burden.
If Sandra wants to initiate an action to modify child support payments, she may bring the action pro se or retain private counsel. Id. at 328.
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