family law jurisdiction Carson City

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The Supreme Court affirmed the lump sum award. The Court concluded that NRS 125.150, subsection 3, provided the authority for a district to set aside the separate property, provided an actual need for support is shown and the setting aside is not used as a vehicle to do equity between the parties. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that the County and the named workers had immunity for discretionary, but not ministerial acts. Acknowledging that the conduct of such an investigation "involves numerous decisions on possible approaches," and that "there may be internal departmental operating procedures," the Court concluded that a child abuse investigation is "inherently discretionary" as it involves "personal deliberation, decision and judgment." The Court also found public policy reasons to shield workers from fear of "retaliatory lawsuits" which could diminish the state’s interest in preventing child abuse, and found the workers and CASA program shielded by quasi-judicial immunity. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that at common law there was no right to seek an amendment of a decree regarding alimony. A decree a vinculo is final, and the jurisdiction of the court over the parties is after the expiration of the term at an end and just as there can be no grant of alimony after such a divorce, so there can be no change in the award of alimony, unless the right to make such a change is reserved by the court in its decree, as it may be, or is given by statute. The Court held that judgment entered with the decree is not a charge against the estate. Courts have gone to considerable lengths to protect former spouses from the effects of members’ post-divorce waivers of retired pay for disability pay, when such waivers partially or completely divested the spouses of sums that had already been awarded to them. The theory applied was phrased differently from one court to another, but was essentially that of constructive trust. Once a divorce was decreed dividing the "gross" or "total" or "all" military retirement benefits, the money awarded to the former spouse was no longer considered the member’s property to convert. If the member subsequently applied for and received disability benefits, or took any other action to redirect money already ordered paid to the former spouse back to himself, he violated the divorce decree. SUP> NRS 123.220 and NRS 123.130 together establish the presumptions that property acquired during marriage is community property, and that property owned prior to marriage is separate property.2 When a spouse uses separate funds or separate credit to purchase property during the marriage, that property generally remains his or her separate property.3 However, where no attempt is made by a spouse to keep separate and community property segregated, so that the properties have become so mixed and intermingled that it is no longer possible to determine their source, such intermingled properties are considered community property.4 Military members accrue thirty days of leave each year. If not used, it accrues throughout service, and is worth its monthly equivalent pay, although newer regulations limit the amount of leave that can be accrued to 60 days, with some exceptions. States vary on whether or not unused vacation or sick pay (and thus, by analogy, accrued but unused military leave) constitutes "property" for equitable or community property division.7 The trial court entered a temporary custody order in favor of the other parent, but stayed the remainder of the case, over the objection of the member and the grandmother, who argued that the stay was "automatic" and prevented entry of a temporary custody order. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that an SCRA stay does not "freeze" a case, leaving it in limbo indefinitely and allowing no authority for the trial court to act. Rather, the court found that a trial court could properly entertain the issue of temporary custody, even if the stay was in place when the issue was considered, on the basis that a child’s life cannot be put in SPAN> 125.460, which seeks to ensure that a child maintains frequent, meaningful and continuing contact with both parents, and recognizes that parents may have joint physical custody without having an exactly equal time share. However, the definition lends itself to vagueness and the Court should give guidance as to when an unequal time share may be characterized as one of joint physical custody. In Texas, a court found that the trial court could neither divide the retired pay waived for VA benefits, nor divide the sums waived under the dual compensation law, in an attempt to comply with the United States Supreme Court's directives in Mansell. Whether States follow a "payment upon eligibility" or "payment upon retirement" rule is another one of those doctrines which is not at all obvious from the label applied by the individual States, but again is usually hidden in their decisional law. Which way the State goes on this question can have a huge impact on the value of the retirement benefits to each spouse. The mother took the children to California after being hit and having a beer bottle thrown at her by her husband (the children’s father). She obtained a temporary protective order in Fresno. The father filed for divorce in Nevada, later obtaining a default judgment, which was granted without a prove-up hearing, giving him all the property, and custody of the children. About 90 days later, mother moved to set aside the default decree, but the district court refused to set it aside or allow witnesses to testify, saying that the mother had not shown adequate mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect, or shown a meritorious defense. A member declaring bankruptcy does not lose the right to receive future retired pay based upon prior or future military service. In cases decided prior to enactment of the USFSPA, an order to pay a portion of retired pay to a former spouse (or a sum of money in lieu of such a portion) was often considered a "debt" dischargeable in bankruptcy rather than a property interest. Since enactment of the USFSP A, courts have generally held awards to former spouses of a portion of military retired pay to be non-dischargeable. The majority of State and federal courts throughout the country have concluded that it is possible to have a valid waiver of a survivorship interest in a divorce decree, despite the naming of the then current spouse at the time of retirement. But this are of the law is - at least - "messy." If there is any way to accomplish it, the plan documents should be changed to specify the intended beneficiary designation. SUP> Such "reversionary interest" provisions are not unique to PERS - the military retirement system has a virtually identical scheme, with the addition of a specific statute that PERS does not have, providing that both the spousal share of current military retired pay and any Survivors Benefits Plan ("SBP") benefits in the spouse’s name revert to the member - they may not be left to anyone by will or intestate succession.2 Case law addressing that retirement system therefore provides an illustration and example of how to deal with survivorship issues under PERS. Second, the court will focus its inquiry on whether the extra time spent with the non-custodial parent results in a greater financial burden on the non-custodial parent and in a concomitant lesser financial burden on the custodial parent. The Washington State guidelines state the test clearly: As a strategic point, any former spouse facing a challenge from the member to the jurisdiction of the Court to divide a retirement on jurisdictional grounds (as with the Tucker case discussed above) would probably be well-served by a contemporaneous partition action in the jurisdiction of the member’s residence. Both sides would then be faced with an equivalent waste of time and resources (reasons cited by the dissent in Wagner v. Wagner, supra, for why the majority’s reading of the statute was illogical), and might result in a stipulation to resolve the entire case in one jurisdiction, as would have been most reasonable in the first place. The first variable in how the guidelines approach "shared custody" is how the term "custody" itself is defined. First, some states' guidelines define custody in terms of overnight visitation: Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, Tennessee, Wyoming. Second, other states' guidelines define some custody as being with the non-custodial parent a percentage of time: Alabama, Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia. Third, some states' guidelines define custody in terms of a percentage of the year the child spends with the non-custodial parent: New Mexico, Vermont, Wisconsin. Two states define custody as a day. The Supreme Court affirmed the lump sum award. The Court concluded that NRS 125.150, subsection 3, provided the authority for a district to set aside the separate property, provided an actual need for support is shown and the setting aside is not used as a vehicle to do equity between the parties. The Hague Convention addressed the increasing problem of international child abduction in the context of international law while respecting rights of custody and visitation under national law.3 According to its Preamble, the Convention aims "to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence."4 SPAN> Congress may will decide, as it has in the Civil Service and Foreign Service contexts, that more protection should be afforded a former spouse of a retired service member. This decision, however, is for Congress alone. . . . in no area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference than in the conduct and control of military affairs. As early as 1969, however, some States had declared pension rights to be community property, divisible upon divorce. The tide had clearly turned on this question, at least in the community property states, when the California Supreme Court issued its 1974 opinion in Fithian. Pension decisions, at first, addressed benefits which were vested at the time of divorce. Eventually, divisibility was extended to non-vested and unmatured retirement benefits as well. The amounts withheld were based on the member’s pay period and exemptions. This led to widespread anecdotal accounts of abuse by members, who manipulated their tax status so as to maximize withholding and minimize disposable income available for division with former spouses. There has been an administrative ruling from the Comptroller General prohibiting this practice since 1984, but enforcement of the prohibition was uneven, since the pay centers had no uniform policy on how to handle accusations of such manipulation.2 The California Supreme Court adopted the Court of Appeals decision, with a few more changes, as its own. It held that the 1974 case law permitting division of military retirement benefits could be retroactively applied, that actions to partition omitted assets were explicitly permitted under California law, and that McCarty was not to be construed as acting retroactively. Halbrook v. Halbrook, 114 Nev. 1455, 971 P.2d 1262 (1998) The mother had slight advantage in custody time, the child spent 4.25 more days per month with the mother, neither was the designated primary custodian. The mother received a career-advancing job offer. The district court denied the mother’s request to move. In Barker v. Kansas,2 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the tax imposed by the state of Kansas on military retirement benefits paid to retirees, because the state did not similarly tax retirees under the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System. Previously, in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, the Court had ruled that a state could not tax federal civil service retirees if it did not also tax recipients of state retirement benefits.3 Under the standard set forth in Davis, the question was whether taxation on the federal, but not the state, retirees was "directly related to, and justified by, ¡®significant differences between the two classes.¡¯"4 The Barker Court found no such differences between the classes of federal and state retirees. This is an essential concept, which practitioners ignore at their considerable peril in malpractice. As noted at the beginning of these materials, there are malpractice dangers in all retirement-related cases; they most severe relating to survivorship matters. The potential losses to the client are catastrophic, and the resulting risks to counsel are enormous.2 2. Each parent is ordered by the court to assume the child's basic support costs in proportion to the time that the parent has placement of the child. Accordingly, if it is deemed necessary to pick up the child at the time of service of the Petition for Return, to secure the child’s safety during the pendency of proceedings, counsel should prepare and file a separate Petition for Warrant in Lieu of Writ of Habeas Corpus, a proposed Order for Issuance of Warrant in Lieu of Writ of Habeas Corpus, and a proposed Warrant in Lieu of Writ of Habeas Corpus. If the court hearing the matter is unfamiliar with procedures, it might also be a good idea to either flesh out the Petition for Warrant, specifying in detail the grounds under which it may be issued, or file a separate brief on the subject. If fulfilling the Bar¡¯s responsibility requires terminating every mediator and disbanding every panel that is currently engaged in processing fee disputes, and appointing entirely new panels, then that process should be begun, immediately. Culberston v. Culbertson, 91 Nev. 230, 533 P.2d 768 (1975) The parties were divorced February 1972. The mother was awarded custody of the four minor children. In December 1972, the father asked for and received an order to show cause why the wife should not be held in contempt and custody be changed. The district court found that the mother had continued her relationship with her boyfriend and had allowed and encouraged her boyfriend to remain in her home far into the evening and early morning hours. The district court further found that the mother had continually engaged in illicit conduct in her home when the children were in close proximity to her bedroom and that the older children were of a "discerning age and aware that an unmarried man slept in the same bedroom with the mother at times." The record also showed that when the mother’s boyfriend came to the home and left the house at late hours that it disturbed at least one of the older children. Evidence was also presented that the school work of the two older children had deteriorated while they were in the mother’s custody. The district court concluded that the wife was in contempt and ordered that custody be changed. SUP> Also moving in the direction of the California law, intentional failure to disclose a material asset or liability could result in an order awarding that asset in its entirety to the innocent party, or making another form of unequal division of community property.3

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