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The Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the district court must find whether custodial parent has demonstrated an actual advantage for both kid and parent in moving (so far that weekly visitation virtually precluded); if so, then court must weigh (1) extent to which move likely to improve quality of life for the children and parent; (2) whether motive for move "honorable" and not designed to frustrate or defeat visitation rights to non-custodian; (3) whether, if move allowed, the custodial parent will comply with substitute visitation orders; (4) whether non-custodian’s motives are honorable in resisting motion to move, or if intended to secure financial advantage re: support or otherwise; (5) whether, if the move is allowed, is there a realistic opportunity for a visitation schedule that will adequately foster & preserve relation with non-custodian. The sub-factors for determining quality of life improvement were spelled out; financial advantage to move (lower costs); reduction in visitation "not necessarily determinative" and offset by expanded summer visits; that parent had no job waiting not critical; travel expenses ordered shared. For example, suppose parents divorced while a child was an infant, and had joint custody, but the military parent was subsequently deployed for a year or two, and then returned. A court required to indulge the fiction that the absence of that parent "may not be used against the servicemember" would be required to restore joint custody of an infant to a parent who would be a complete stranger to the child, irrespective of the child’s best interest. The Wright offset should take place before, not after, application of the cap. This conclusion supports "the general philosophy of NRS 125B.070, which is to make sure adequate monthly support is paid to our children." a) Where a party has custody or visitation of a child or children for more than 90 days of the year, as such days are defined in subdivision G 3 (c), a shared custody child support amount based on the ratio in which the parents share the custody and visitation of any child or children shall be calculated in accordance with this subdivision. The presumptive support to be paid shall be the shared custody support amount, unless a party affirmatively shows that the sole custody support amount calculated as provided in subdivision G 1 is less than the shared custody support amount. If so, the lesser amount shall be the support to be paid. For the purposes of this subsection, the following shall apply: The reviewing court affirmed the order requiring reimbursement, rejecting the retiree’s argument that ordering reimbursement violated Mansell, and stating that it merely enforced the parties’ property settlement agreement, rather than dividing disability benefits. Since the case involved a post-Mansell divorce, the decree had included an indemnification provision26 because of the "higher standard of clarity" some courts have required of decrees after Mansell to be certain of the divorce court’s intent. However, the court noted that such enforcement of the intent at the time of the dissolution was appropriate whether or not the original order contained a specific indemnification provision.27 Finally, the appellate court noted that "[t]he equity of the result reached . . . is undeniable."28 The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that NRS 125B.070(1) set forth the formula in setting child support. The Court also noted that under NRS 125B.080(6) if a court deviates from the formula amount, findings of fact must be set forth which established the basis for deviation. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in deviating because it failed to set forth findings of fact which provided the amount of support which the father would owe under the formula and the basis for its deviation from the formula when it reduced the father’s child support obligation by $100 and for the complete abatement of support during summer visitation. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the district court must find whether custodial parent has demonstrated an actual advantage for both kid and parent in moving (so far that weekly visitation virtually precluded); if so, then court must weigh (1) extent to which move likely to improve quality of life for the children and parent; (2) whether motive for move "honorable" and not designed to frustrate or defeat visitation rights to non-custodian; (3) whether, if move allowed, the custodial parent will comply with substitute visitation orders; (4) whether non-custodian’s motives are honorable in resisting motion to move, or if intended to secure financial advantage re: support or otherwise; (5) whether, if the move is allowed, is there a realistic opportunity for a visitation schedule that will adequately foster & preserve relation with non-custodian. The sub-factors for determining quality of life improvement were spelled out; financial advantage to move (lower costs); reduction in visitation "not necessarily determinative" and offset by expanded summer visits; that parent had no job waiting not critical; travel expenses ordered shared. 65279;All other jurisdictions have lined up with the national consensus. In 2000, New Mexico verified its 1990 holding in Toupa, supra, in Scheidel rejecting a "federal law prohibits enforcement" argument and noting that there is no analytical difference between a member making a new disability application post-divorce, on the one hand, and increasing an award that existed upon divorce, on the other. That court, like many others, reinvented the core concept of Gilmore: "one spouse should not be permitted to benefit economically in the division of property from a factor or contingency that could reduce the other spouse's share, if that factor or contingency is within the first party's complete control." There has been a large wave of pet custody cases in recent years, and more Courts are starting to realize the value of the emotional bond between a human and their pet. A New York Appeals Court granted custody of a pet cat "Lovey" as a condition that the plaintiff pay all vet expenses. The Plaintiff and Defendant in this case were not married, but were former roommates. When they wanted to go their separate ways, the Plaintiff sought permanent custody of his "property," i.e. "Lovey."1 This legal note is from Marshal S. Willick, Esq., 3591 E. Bonanza Road, Ste 200, Las Vegas, NV 89110. If you are receiving these legal notes, and do not wish to do so, let me know by emailing this back to me with "Leave Me Alone" in the subject line. Please identify the email address at which you got the email. Your State would be helpful too. In the mean time, you could add this to your email blocked list. And, of course, if you want to tell me anything else, you can put anything you want to in the subject line. Thanks. SUP> In Lofgren, the reviewing court did not expressly state a standard of review, except to couch its decision as a finding that the lower court had not erred, and that its findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. Similarly, Putterman did not state on its face a standard of review, but contained findings that the lower court’s decision was detailed and did in fact support the conclusion that compelling reasons supported the modestly unequal division finally reached. While couched as finding no legal error, the analysis and conclusion in both cases were the sort that could be expected under an "abuse of discretion" review. 3,000,000. The husband commenced divorce proceedings. The district court awarded the wife $5,000 in preliminary attorney’s fees, and $47,500 at the conclusion of the case. The husband contested the attorney’s fees award, traveling expenses and costs when it was not shown that the wife was in necessitous circumstances. The Court held that the district court could award preliminary attorney’s fees stating, "the wife must be afforded her day in court without destroying her financial position. This would imply that she should be able to meet her adversary in the courtroom on an equal basis. Here, without the court’s assistance, the wife would have had to liquidate her savings and jeopardize the child’s and her future subsistence still without gaining parity with her husband." Id. at 227. The Court also failed to find the final amount of attorney’s fees excessive. B)A person's eligibility to receive payments under this subsection that is terminated under subparagraph (A) by reason of remarriage shall be resumed in the event of the termination of that marriage by the death of that person's spouse or by annulment or divorce. The resumption of payments shall begin as of the first day of the mon th in which that marriage is so terminated. The monthly amount of the payments shall be the amount that would have been paid if the continuity of the payments had not been interrupted by the marriage. An important consideration in making this choice is the petitioner’s belief as to which court would likely be able to hear the matter in the shortest period of time. Checking the dockets of the various potential courts can help determine which court can hear the matter soonest. It is also wise to investigate the manner in which Convention cases are heard. Federal courts, for instance, tend to treat Hague return petitions as petitions for writs of habeas corpus, a procedure designed to provide virtually immediate relief. The state court must have jurisdiction over the service member by reason of residence (other than because of military assignment), domicile, or consent to the jurisdiction of the court In further exposition, the Court found the child support statutes binding in all cases, with parties permitted to deviate upward or downward from the guidelines only on stated facts which are made written findings by a trial court, and based on the statutory factors of NRS 125B.080(9), which it further found are "exclusive, not illustrative." If the parties are still married, such an agreement could consist of a writing in the form of a property settlement or separation agreement, or even a letter, if the law of the State of habitual residence grants legal effect to such a writing. If the parties are already divorced, such an agreement could be a property settlement agreement (whether merged or not in a decree of divorce), or other document in or outside court proceedings, again depending on how the law of the State of habitual residence treats such writings. It is even possible that such an agreement could be entirely oral, if proof adequate to the court was presented.3 By 1992, however, the court referenced that list as "useful but inexhaustive," Rutar v. Rutar, 108 Nev. 203, 827 P.2d 829 (1992), and two years later supplanted it entirely with a different list of partially coextensive factors laid out in Sprenger. Mter six years of repeated references to that latter list, the court reasserted and expanded the 1974 Buchanan factors list without even mentioning the factors or analysis of Sprenger, in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 116 Nev. 993, 13 P.3d 415 (2000). The court gave no hint as to whether or not the Sprenger factors should be considered outdated, or allowed to continue to stand as an alternative analysis. Determining the member's "Tax Home" for payroll purposes might be useful (and can be gleaned from the box on the Leave and Earning Statement ["LES"] under "state tax"). If the member's claimed tax home is a State that actually charges and collects State income tax, that would be a good indicator of intent to call that place "home" (domicile, in most States). There is little case law guidance as to what would be an appropriate weighing of risks and burdens, or why. Several courts have ruled that the SBP be kept in effect for protection of the former spouse’s interest, using one theory or another, but their reasoning has often been sketchy, or faulty. Fortunately, on this point, PERS has not been stating that such orders are invalid, and has interpreted the statutory provision as only addressing what the system can and cannot honor. Perhaps the clearest expositions of the reasoning behind the two approaches are found in those cases in which a reviewing court splits as to which interpretation is most correct. The By requiring a focus on the practical likelihood of payment of an alimony award, the case is a positive, if small, step in the creation of a law of alimony that serves the goals of predictability, adequacy, and consistency. And there are some us - in contrast to others claiming that such structures "take all the creativity out of lawyering" - who consider that a good thing. Military-related divorce cases involving a court of some other country, as well as the federal and State law applicable to these cases, illustrate the principle of "the danger of unintended consequences."1 Given the enormous number of American service personnel stationed abroad in the past 50 years,2 it seems almost certain that the number of actual persons affected is far higher than the relatively few published cases would indicate. Examining the facts of such a case can be highly instructive.

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