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The appellate court restated the question as being the time of valuation, with the choices being the sum the husband would have been able to receive if he had retired at divorce, or the sum payable at retirement. The court acknowledged that the longer the husband worked after divorce, the smaller the wife¡¯s portion became. The court accepted the wife¡¯s position that to "lock in" the value of the wife¡¯s interest to the value at divorce, while delaying payment to actual retirement, prevented the wife from "earning a reasonable return on her interest." UP> When reviewing the language of divorce decrees issued after Mansell (i.e., after 1989), courts (especially in earlier years) sometimes examined the decrees at issue for "safeguard" clauses or "indemnification for reduction" clauses, as necessary indicators of intent to protect spouses from members’ recharacterization of benefits. Where such intent is found, even by implication, the member has been required to reimburse the former spouse for all sums his actions caused to be redirected from the former spouse back to him.1 The Court rejected the father's assertion that the motion to increase was barred by the six-month limitation in NRCP 60(b), and noted that perNRS 125B.145(1)(b), there was no time bar to a review of child support upon the filing ofa request for review. The Court also rejected the father's request that the mother's cohabitant's income be considered. The Court found that the lower court could examine the role of the mother's cohabitant's income in determining the "relative income of the parties" under NRS 125B.080(9). Specifically, a parent's gross income also does not include an adult co-habitant's income. However, both the income of a new spouse and an adult co-habitant's contributions to the household expenses can be considered as a basis for deviation from the statutory formula under NRS I 25B.080(9)(1) (relative income of both parents). As such, a cohabitant's contribution to a parent's rent and other expenses may be taken into account when setting or modifying child support per NRS I 25B.080(9). Until 1989, benefits vested after ten years. Thereafter, benefits vested after five years of service; survivor’s benefits vest upon the member’s eligibility for retirement, completion of ten years of service, or the member’s death, whichever occurs first.3 The parties were divorced October 1990. The mother was awarded primary custody. In April 2000, the mother filed a move motion. The father opposed and a hearing was held. The mother testified that she could earn more money in in New Jersey, working for her sister and brother-in-law’s company as a sales and marketing administrator, and having the potential of qualifying for bonuses and even possibly acquiring a future equity share. The mother and child lived in a 900 square foot trailer, however, if she and the child moved to New Jersey, they would initially live with her sister and brother-in-law in their 3,000 square foot, four bedroom house. The mother testified that she hoped to rent a house. The mother also testified that she planned to enroll the parties’ daughter at a school for gifted children. The mother testified that the school was superior to anything offered where she lived. There was also extended family that lived in the area and there were no relatives where she was currently living. The father opposed the move because he believed that moving the child from regular visitation was not in the child’s best interest. The district court concluded that NRS 125C.200 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found that NRS 125C.200 implicitly restricted a custodial parent's fundamental right to travel and that no compelling state interest was satisfied by the restriction. Because of that the mother did not need the court’s permission to move. The district court also found that even if the statute was constitutional, the mother met her burden for moving. P> This holding has generally been taken as prohibiting a district court from considering fees and costs incurred on appeal, when the question of fees is considered after remand. Amount of benefits payable- includes safeguard against post-divorce recharacterization by Member of retired pay as disability pay. Note that if a specific dollar sum award is made (instead of a percentage), the COLA provision is ineffective. The first paragraph calls for payments of a specific amount or percentage; the second paragraph contains a formula for determining the sum payable when the Member actually retires. 65279;Very few courts have reached the opposite result." Others have reached that opposite result, just to be reversed on appeal or upon narrow findings of special circumstances." In Waltz v. Waltz,3 the divorce decree had awarded the entire military retirement to the husband, but ordered him to pay to the former spouse, by military allotment, the sum of $200 plus cost of living adjustments, as "permanent alimony." This had been done because the military pay system did not allow direct payments to a spouse with an overlap of military service and marriage of less than ten years. The decree had been formulated to make sure the spouse actually received her property award, under the rubric of "permanent alimony" as allowed by NRS 125.150(5). The appellate court restated the question as being the time of valuation, with the choices being the sum the husband would have been able to receive if he had retired at divorce, or the sum payable at retirement. The court acknowledged that the longer the husband worked after divorce, the smaller the wife¡¯s portion became. The court accepted the wife¡¯s position that to "lock in" the value of the wife¡¯s interest to the value at divorce, while delaying payment to actual retirement, prevented the wife from "earning a reasonable return on her interest." Rather, these materials are a smorgasbord of tips and traps culled from materials and experience dealing with the military, Civil Service, and private (ERISA-based) plans, based on the sorts of things that frequently create issues for counsel litigating and drafting orders in pension-related cases, plus some recent developments that not all practitioners have heard about yet. country, then the aggrieved parent’s sole recourse is to file for relief in the courts of the country in which the child is located, if it has jurisdiction, or as a fall back, the local court - in this case, the family court in Nevada. In June 1998, the father was ordered to pay $510 per month in support. The district court also reduced $9,475 in arrears to judgment. In April 2001, the State charged the father with felony nonsupport under NRS 201.020 after he failed to make any support payments as ordered. The father asserted an affirmative defense under NRS 201.051, claiming that he was unable to pay support because he could not secure sufficient employment while incarcerated because he was incarcerated for 21 of the 33 months he was ordered to pay support and therefore was unable to pay support. However, while not incarcerated, the father failed to pay support as well. The father also argued that his arrears did not exceed the $10,000 threshold set out in NRS 201.020, and thus, he was not guilty of felony nonsupport. The jury found the father guilty of felony nonsupport. The district court sentenced the father to imprisonment in the Nevada State Prison for a maximum of 36 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 12 months, but suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for 3 years. In March 1973, the husband filed for divorce. The wife filed an answer and counterclaim alleging that the parties had acquired community property. The husband, in his reply, admitted that allegation and only denied the amount of the balance of the savings and checking accounts. In August 1973, the husband died. The son filed a probate proceeding to determine the status of certain real and personal property seeking to have the property declared to be community property and subject to administration. The district court held that the joint tenancy deeds conveying all the real property involved to the husband and wife as joint tenants, and not as tenants in common, with full rights of survivorship, did not without other clear and certain independent evidence overcome the presumption that such property purchased with community funds was community property. SPAN> 4And only if that other State never acts could the emergency order of this State become a final determination, making this State the Home State of the child.5 bsp; 1. Some indication in law (Wolff) that debt is to be divided equally, but uncertain, since Malmquist held that debt could be divided in proportion to the relative ability of the spouses to pay it - i.e., in accordance with their respective incomes. 1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine the base combined child support obligation using the base combined child support obligation table. You can find child support expert Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Two Carson City civil service retirement lawyer Expert Witness What Almost Happenend to Child Support in Nevada and Why We Still Have to F Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar The Marren and Page Case List City of Las Vegas v Las Vegas Municipal Court Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section VII Back to Basics Overview of Community Property Rivero v Rivero Opinion Pickerings Conclusion The Ten Year Rule child support expert available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. 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