Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and PKPA The UCCJA sets out four grounds for finding original jurisdiction The Parenting Kidnaping Prevention Act addresses the continuing interstate custody jurisdiction problems The Supreme Court reversed. In reversing, the Court noted that unless otherwise provided by law, decree, or agreement, all property acquired after marriage is considered to be community property under NRS 123.220 and that presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence citing to Todkill v. Todkill, 88 Nev. 231, 495 P.2d 629 (1972) and  Kelly v. Kelly, 86 Nev. 301, 468 P.2d 359 (1970). The Court further noted that the opinion of either spouse as to whether property is separate or community is of no weight citing to In Re Wilson’s Estate, 56 Nev. 353, 53 P.2d 339 (1936) and Barrett v. Franke, 46 Nev. 170, 208 P. 435 (1922).  Anecdotal accounts, however, indicate that some trial courts continue to be misled into ruling to the contrary, based upon an overly-expansive reading of Mansell and misplaced concerns about violating the Supremacy Clause, or simply by seeing the word "disability" and reacting without any sort of adequate inquiry into what the law is, or why. For now, the powers that be in the judiciary should give direction to the companies automating court processes to give priority to creation of systems that actually make the justice system faster and cheaper for the public - even if it inconveniences court staff to learn to do so. Eliminating clerk minutes in favor of real-time order generation would be one huge step in that direction. The district court entered the decree of divorce. The husband appealed contending that the court lacked jurisdiction. The Court held that the question of the wife’s residence in a divorce action is one of fact to be determined by the district court citing to Woodruff v. Woodruff, 94 Nev. 1, 573 P.2d 206 (1978). The Court that there was substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding of wife’s bona fide residence. If this hypothetical member had a standard longevity military retirement (or any other standard defined benefit plan) the above wage history would make his average monthly salary during his last three years' service $4,014.21, and the military retirement formula" would make his retired pay $2,007.11. 2) If the minority time-share parent is exercising less time than 20%, determine if guideline support was reduced by the presumptive maximum set out in NRS 125B.070. If so, the range of potential upward deviation for this factor is the difference between the presumptive maximum and the percentage of income for support set out in NRS 125B.070(1)(b). If not, the range of potential deviation for this factor is based on the trial court’s determination of the increased costs incurred in the majority time-share parent’s household by virtue of the lack of the minority time-share parent’s visitation. Obviously, either approach could be better - or worse - for either party, depending on how much time passes, and whether the account balance increases or decreases during that time, which could be due to market forces having nothing to do with the parties. But in either case, it should be dealt with one way or the other in the decree (preferably) and in any QDRO or other ancillary order dividing the plan benefits (definitely) to avoid what could be considerable litigation as to which possible way to divide benefits was impliedly intended to be done. There is very little published precedent on these or other practical questions encountered in the litigation of tort suits against international abductors, which suits are, themselves, exceedingly rare. The July, 1995, Chair’s Column in the Nevada Family Law Report pretty concisely stated the position of the Section leadership on the process and result of enacting NRS 125.155: 2) multiply the adjustment percentage by the obligor's basic child support obligation to arrive at the parenting expense adjustment; and (3) subtract the parenting expense adjustment from the obligor's basic child support obligation. The result is the obligor's basic support obligation after parenting expense adjustment. Several commentators and researchers have reviewed the cases nationally, reaching the conclusion that post-divorce recharacterization of retired pay as disability benefits just is not permitted without compensation to the former spouse. indicating that recharacterization is permitted, and requiring reimbursement of the former spouse unless the divorce decree permitted the member to convert the benefits post-divorce.1 Over that time, a nearly-uniform consensus emerged throughout the country that a retiree simply is not permitted to recharacterize the former spouse’s share of the retirement benefits as his own separate property disability benefits, unless there is some indication on the face of the divorce decree that such a post-divorce recharacterization is permitted. The parties were divorced August 1943. The property settlement agreement provided that the husband would pay support of $150 per month so long as he did not revert to his rank of Lieutenant Colonel and if he did, his payments would be reduced to $100 per month. In May 1946, the husband filed a motion to construe the decree because he reverted to Lieutenant Colonel for one day and then promoted by to Colonel. The matter came on for hearing October 1946. The district court denied the husband’s request.  Accordingly, the Court held that the plan could and should ignore Liv’s divorce-decree waiver of the survivorship benefits, and "did its statutory ERISA duty by paying the benefits to Liv in conformity with the plan documents." The Court noted that a plan administrator is obliged to act "in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of ERISA, and the Act provides no exemption from this duty when it comes time to pay benefits." Having the member bear the entire premium would only appear to be a correct result if the court determined, based on the entirety of the parties’ economic positions, that the result was mandated as a matter of disparity of income. Similarly, it would be improper to have the former spouse bear the entirety of the SBP premiums, at least in those states in which the courts are required to equally distribute marital property and debts, because the benefit being accorded to the member in the event of the spouse’s death is greater, and there is no cost to that survivorship interest. At any time, a military retiree can apply to the Veteran's Administration to be evaluated for a "service-connected disability." [fthe evaluation shows such a disability, a rating is given between 10% and 100%, and "compensation" is paid monthly from the VA in accordance with a schedule giving a dollar sum corresponding to each 10% increase, plus certain additional awards for certain serious disabilities. Still further waivers of retired pay for VA disability pay can be given if the retiree has dependents (a spouse or children, or even dependent parents). It makes sense for a retiree to obtain a disability award, even with a dollar-for-dollar reduction in retired pay, because the disability awards are received taxfree. Ms. Rivero argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for child support by not reviewing the parties' affidavits of financial condition and noting the discrepancies in the parties' incomes. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Rivero's motion for child support because it did not make specific findings of fact supported by substantial evidence. In reaching our conclusion, we first address the circumstances under which the district court may modify a child support order and discuss the calculation of child support in primary physical custody and joint physical custody arrangements. These limitations override State long-arm rules, and must be satisfied in addition to any State law jurisdictional requirements. Cases lacking such jurisdiction can go forward, but they will not result in enforceable orders as to the retirement benefits. The statute effectively creates an additional jurisdictional requirement, which for lack of a better title can be called "federal jurisdiction." Presumably, other States could have still different rules for measuring when the community or coverture period started or ended. Such variations could lead to significantly different sums collected by the respective spouses over the course of a lifetime. Some courts have refused to permit the member to effectively transfer non-reviewable custody to a third party while staying the non-military parent’s access to the courts for child custody.6 In other contexts, courts have been much less sympathetic to arguments based on the parental preference doctrine.7 B> While the details (and math) can be daunting, the above discussion illustrates how counsel armed with a comprehensive understanding of the workings of a retirement plan can alter the financial impacts of survivorship benefits when the equities of the situation call for it. Some similar sort of adjustment to the "default" is possible in virtually every retirement system, but the practitioner must be fully versed on both how the system will operate without tinkering, and what adjustments are possible. The mother appealed, arguing parental preference was not merely a factor among many factors. The Court began by noting that the district court has broad discretionary powers in determining custody, and the determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion citing to Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 1148, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (1993). The Court distinguished the holding in Fisher v. Fisher, 99 Nev. 762, 670 P.2d 572 (1983), which the grandparent’s argued de-phasized the parental preference doctrine. The Court reemphasized the best interest of the child is usually served by awarding his custody to a fit parent citing to McGlone v. McGlone, 86 Nev. 14, 17, 464 P.2d 27, 29 (1970). The Court found that it was undisputed that the mother was a fit parent. The Supreme Court reversed stating, [w]e conclude that the parental preference policy is a rebuttable presumption that must be overcome either by a showing that the parent is unfit or other extraordinary circumstances."  Id. at 38. [citations omitted.] The attorney for a spouse seeking a portion of a TSP account should specify that the award is to be paid along with interest and earnings on that award. [fsuch language is in the order, the spouse will receive the same accumulations attributable to the spousal share that the participant receives as to the account; if such language is not included in the order, the spouse will receive no accumulations, interest, or earnings on the defined share through the date of distribution. A court order may also specify an interest rate to be applied to a distribution from a given date. Taking a practical turn, we switch to discussion of discovery, tax, and motion practice matters with the intent of providing the practitioner with the tools to actual move these cases along. The Court noted jurisdictional grounds involve a specific fault or condition of a parent (such as abandonment of a child or unfitness of a parent) and dispositional grounds falls on the best interest. The Court felt it was improper to give the mother another chance and after she took advantage of that opportunity to still terminate her parental rights. The RC-SBP was amended as of January 1, 2001, to require written spouse concurrence for taking any benefit less than Option C. Thus, the order of events for retirement and divorce make a difference as to whether the former spouse will have any input into the option selected. Milender vs. Marcum, 110 Nev. 972, 879 P.2d 748 (1994) A default decree of divorce was entered on October 22, 1990. The decree was filed on December 6, 1990. When the husband did not pay under decree terms, the wife filed motion for order to show cause, resulting in order for husband to pay sums to the wife, plus interest and attorney’s fees. The husband moved to set aside the default decree under NRCP 60(b)(1). The default was set aside on July 29, 1991. The wife sought reconsideration of the costs and attorney’s fees incurred in the original default divorce, resulting in attorney’s fee award to the wife. When the husband failed to pay, the wife again moved for order to show cause, but died before her motion was heard. The district court held that its own order setting aside the default decree was void for husband’s nonpayment of the later-ordered attorney’s fees, and re-instituted original decree.  The Court noted in apparent dicta that "because no support obligation is  imposed upon the parties during the (cohabiting) relationship, no spousal maintenance can be when and if the relationship ends."  Id. at 423. O’Hara v. State ex. rel. Pub. Employee Retirement Bd., 104 Nev. 642, 764 P.2d 489 (1988)  Prior to her retirement from the Clark County School District, the wife selected a retirement option pursuant to NRS 286.551, after discussing the decision with the husband.  She selected the option that paid the maximum monthly benefit available, but did not provide for residuary payments to a beneficiary upon her death. The wife died two months after retiring. The husband contended that the selection of a retirement option without his consent was improper transfer of community property and voidable at his election. The district court rejected the husband’s contention.  When the parties were divorced, the district court awarded each party an equal interest in the insurance policies owned by them, including an equal interest in the cash value of said policies, if any. After the decree was filed, the husband canceled his life insurance policies. The husband was found to be in contempt of court and was placed in custody. The district court concluded the cancellation of insurance policies to be a violation of the decree and ordered that the husband be divested of his interest in the marital residence. The equity was approximately one-half the face value of the policies. Whether or not the gift is reasonable or unreasonable, is a question to be decided by the courts in each particular instance, and no hard-and-fixed rule can be laid down as to just what proportion of the community interest can be so disposed of by the spouse. A spouse may make a gift of community property reasonable in reference to the whole amount, in the absence of a fraudulent intent to defeat the wife’s claims. The second "detail" is that there are a few rounding errors in the final chart as published by the AOC. They rounded down on two numbers where they should have rounded up: for example, in the second bracket, last year's number was $623. Multiplying it by 1.0250/0 yields $638.58, which should have rounded to $639, but was rounded to $638. The AOC did correctly round up on the "no limit" bracket (from $929.68 to $930), so the errors were not the result of any methodological confusion). The court rejected the "equal protection" attack on partition of pensions omitted from the initial decrees of some of the plaintiffs, recounting the retirees’ "odysseys through the State and federal courts challenging state court decrees dividing their retirement pay" and noting that the retirees "were unable, as a final matter, to convince any of these courts that division of their retirement pay was unconstitutional or legally improper." The court found that partition of military retirement benefits is precisely the sort of "economic adjustments to promote the common good" that legislatures properly perform, and that any retroactive effect of USFSPA is curative, accomplishes a rational purpose, is entitled to be liberally construed, is shielded from constitutional attack, and serves public policy. It rejected the contract clause and due process arguments as well. There has never been a case, apparently, in which a court has ordered a bond to secure payment of a spousal share ordered not paid at eligibility, in accordance with NRS 125.155(2)(a). It is difficult to conceive how such an order might work, as such a bond would require a dollar sum certain to secure an unknown future performance to begin on an unknown future date. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, if a court order provides for extended visitation between an obligor and a child living with an obligee, the support obligation presumed to be the correct child support amount due on behalf of all children of the obligor living with the obligee must be determined under this subsection. The Justices of the current Nevada Supreme Court are bright, compassionate individuals who seem deeply committed to doing the right thing whenever possible. When they come to our annual meetings in Ely, they seem genuinely concerned with the issues and policies that guide the evolution of family law in Nevada. If the money is paid to a third party, however, such as a child (or, presumably, either party’s attorney), the participant is stuck with the amount of the distribution as part of gross income for that year, and 10% is withheld. These rules provide a way of shifting the tax burden of funds to be withdrawn and used to pay attorney’s fees, just by changing the payee of the withdrawal. Jepsen is not the only case stressing the practicality of interpretation of the law of elections and appointments. Nearly seventy years ago, in Grant and McNamee v. Payne,9 this Court agreed with the opinion of the Iowa Supreme Court in State ex rel. Halbach v. Claussen10 that "the next general election" might not mean the one appearing next on the calendar: The Supreme Court reversed. In reversing, the Court noted that unless otherwise provided by law, decree, or agreement, all property acquired after marriage is considered to be community property under NRS 123.220 and that presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence citing to Todkill v. Todkill, 88 Nev. 231, 495 P.2d 629 (1972) and  Kelly v. Kelly, 86 Nev. 301, 468 P.2d 359 (1970). The Court further noted that the opinion of either spouse as to whether property is separate or community is of no weight citing to In Re Wilson’s Estate, 56 Nev. 353, 53 P.2d 339 (1936) and Barrett v. Franke, 46 Nev. 170, 208 P. 435 (1922).  Two Texas cases primarily distinguished what a court (in Texas, anyway) should do when faced with a current divorce proceeding, on the one hand, versus a contempt enforcement proceeding, on the other. A North Dakota case focused on the necessity, in a contempt proceeding, for the underlying decree to specify just what it is that the former spouse was to receive. Finally, a case from Arizona represented a maturing of the analysis on this point. You can find Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and PKPA Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Part Two Subsection III A Hague Convention Basics What is Considered Community Property The Marren and Page Case List In re Wilsons Estate Burdick v Pope and Fick The Marren and Page Case List Weeks v Weeks and Graham v Graham Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section II Subsection C Pre-Mansell and Post-Mansell Decrees The Marren and Page Case List Bush v State Department of Human Resources The Marren and Page Case List Gorden v Gorden and Campbell v Campbell Th Marren and Page Case Lisst Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection The Marren and Page Case List Magiera v Luera and Russo v Gardner The Marren and Page Case List Kelly v Kelly Todkill v Todkill Peters v Pete Overview of Disability Benefits in the Military Retirement System retirement benefits Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Part One Subsection II Withdrawal and Borrowing of Money from the TSP During Service Uniform Child Custody Enforcement Act The Marren and Page Case List Foster v Marshman Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and PKPA available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map Child Support exceeding the statutory presumed maximum The Marren and Page Case List Peardon v Peardon Rush v Rush Applebaum v App Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section X The Marren and Page Case List Chambers ex rel Cochran v Sanderson and Herma Introduction to Nevada alimony and spousal support law Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Three Section Two Legal Authority For Use in Requesting Fees in a Pro Bono Case Reciprocal Links: Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and PKPA Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and PKPA Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and PKPA Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and PKPA

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and PKPA Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and PKPA Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and PKPA Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and PKPA