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Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and PKPA
Learn more about Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and PKPA.
The UCCJA sets out four grounds for finding original jurisdiction The Parenting Kidnaping Prevention Act addresses the continuing interstate custody jurisdiction problemsB> A case may be removed from state court to federal court, and delay by the state court in making a determination is by itself considered a valid reason for removal.5 Further, the federal abstention doctrine applicable to domestic relations generally does not apply to Hague Convention cases.6 While CRSC is subject to garnishment for alimony and child support, it may not be attached for property payments. It is considered disability pay, and while it is determined in accordance with a separate disability value table (and varies in amount in accordance with the number of the member's dependents), it cannot exceed the sum of retired pay waived by the member for VA disability. Because it is not being phased in, CRSC will actually be around longer than CRDP - the latter will disappear as of 20 14, when the full amount of longevity pay is restored by the program. One wrinkle that seems to cause a lot of confusion is the phrase in the Home State provision "or was the Home State within six months prior to that commencement." The easiest way to conceptualize this rule is by realizing that "There can be only one." Until and unless a new State is the Home State, the old Home State continues to be the Home State, and is the place in which custody litigation should be commenced, if anyone relevant continues to reside there. The Court held that payments once accrued under a decree, for either alimony or support of a child, become a vested right and cannot thereafter be modified or voided. The Court noted that it was well settled in that a district court was without power to effect a revision or remittance of past due alimony. The Court rejected the husband's claim of an equitable offset and further held the husband was not entitled to retroactive modification of alimony provisions of the decree to give him credit against the amount of arrear ages sought to be recovered by divorced wife because of amounts paid by him directly to the son. 3)(A)ln the event of effective service of conflicting court orders under this section which assert to direct that different amounts be paid during a month to the same spouse or former spouse of the same member, the Secretary concerned shal1-- Rather, this is a situation where ¨C at least collectively ¨C the lawyers have to look right in the mirror. I am sure that some of those volunteering their time and efforts to serve the bar process are diligent and deserve commendation for donating their time. That said, fault lies with those "volunteers" who are apparently more interested in having publicly visible positions than actually doing the work called for by those positions, and with the organized Bar structure which is (or should be) aware of this problem, but so far as can be seen, has done nothing of consequence to address it. SPAN> NRS 33.100 does not purport to confer jurisdiction on the courts of this state. We therefore find the language of that statute unpersuasive in determining the jurisdiction of the municipal court. The Legislature appears instead to have overlooked the jurisdiction of the municipal court when it designated "the county jail" in NRS 33.100. Congress reacted by enacting the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act ("USFSPA") on September 8, 1982.1 The declared goal of the USFSPA, at the time of its The statute is more limiting regarding division of retired pay as property, however. The former spouse can apply for direct payment from the military to the former spouse,1 but the USFSPA limits direct payment to a former spouse to 50% of disposable retired pay for all payments of property division.2 More than fifty percent of disposable pay may be paid3 if there is a garnishment for arrears in child or spousal support, or in payments of money as property other than for a division of retired pay. In other words (and counter-intuitively), about the only part of arrearages arising from a divorce judgment that cannot be satisfied by garnishment From Retired Pay is arrearages in retired pay. SPAN> Of the referenced model sections, the key is Section 202, which became NRS 125.315. This new provision defines "Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction" (commonly, if oddly, abbreviated as "CEJ"). It provides a few very simple rules by which continuing jurisdiction can nearly always be easily and quickly ascertained. The wife filed for divorce. The husband made no appearance because at the time of service he was a member of the armed services stationed in California, and was later transferred to Japan. The district court ordered the husband to pay support of $100 a month for the two minor children. The husband later filed a motion to modify the decree by terminating alimony. The wife had an order to show cause issued on why the husband should not be held in contempt for failing to pay $3,663 in alimony, and why judgment should not be entered against him. The husband’s motion to terminate alimony was ranted, the husband was purged of contempt. The wife’s request for entry of judgment was denied. still working. They argue that the spousal share should be frozen at the earnings level at divorce; a minority of States, including Texas, have adopted this approach, sometimes in cases that do not appear to have contemplated the actual mathematical impact of the decision reached.1 This minority approach undervalues the spousal interest by giving no compensation for deferred receipt, and also contains a logic problem, at least in a community property analysis, of treating similarly situated persons differently. The former spouse must not yet be age 65. Upon eligibility for Medicare (Part A), CHAMPUS eligibility ends. Some continuing benefits for former spouses may be available under the "TRICARE-for-life" program effective October 1, 2001.1 B> A case may be removed from state court to federal court, and delay by the state court in making a determination is by itself considered a valid reason for removal.5 Further, the federal abstention doctrine applicable to domestic relations generally does not apply to Hague Convention cases.6 The parties were married September 1940. The husband, even though he was 81, commenced divorce proceedings. The district court gave the wife a lump sum support and maintenance award of $331,200 payable in nine installments, and awarded the wife's counsel $47,500, plus $5,000 preliminary fees. The district court came up with the figure by taking into consideration the fact that the husband's life expectancy was 4.9 years, the wife's life expectancy was 23.1 years. The district court awarded the alimony on the basis of $1 ,200 per month or $14,337.66 per year multiplied by her life expectancy, totaling $331,100, taking into consideration factors including the wife's age, health, length of marriage, standard of living, assets of each party, health insurance policies, ownership of furnishings, earning capacity of each party and conduct of the parties. 5. Pursuant to subsections (7) and (8), calculate the net amounts owed by each parent for the expenses incurred for day care and health insurance coverage for the child. Day care shall be calculated without regard to the 25-percent reduction applied by subsection (7). bsp; 3. Commingling is when there is identifiable bits of both separate property and community property in same place. 65279;The discussion below basically concerns "regular" retirement, although most of it also applies to those cases in which a member takes a 15 to 20 year TERA ("early out") retirement. Nev. 1367, 1368, 970 P.2d 1071, 1072 (1998) (using the terms joint physical custody, equal physical custody, and shared physical custody); Barbagallo, 105 Nev. at 547-48, 779 P.2d at 533-34 (utilizing the terms joint or shared custody). Given the various terms used to describe joint physical custody and the lack of a precise definition and timeshare requirement, we now define joint physical custody and the timeshare required for such arrangements. The scant federal authority has led to the same result as the State cases, but by way of different rationales, primarily involving deferral to State courts in domestic relations cases,1 or squarely addressing and refuting a wide assortment of federal offenses allegedly committed by spouses in State divorce courts.2 Indeed, the overwhelming majority of courts addressing the matter, before and after Egelhoff, have reached the same conclusion. The line of reasoning goes back at least as far as the Fourth Circuit’s 1996 decision in Altobelli,2 in which the court noted that ERISA does not directly address the issue, and found that ERISA’s anti-alienation provision does not apply to a beneficiary’s waiver of benefits. The blurring and blending of tests and terminology from the UCCJEA and the Hague Convention in the UCAPA seems likely to promote some confusion among courts and counsel as to what legitimate objectives and arguments might be raised in which kinds of proceedings. Counsel must be diligent in seeing that proceedings under all three laws remain focused on the legitimate objectives of the proceedings. 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