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The Marren and Page Case List Sogg b Nevada State Bank Fick v Fick Dimick v
Learn more about The Marren and Page Case List Sogg b Nevada State Bank Fick v Fick Dimick v.
Respect and decorum in the courtroom and between attorneys falls to the courts to police. Anyone can have a bad day or a bad mood, of course. Cautions are effective for all of us who get caught up in the moment and say something that is not appropriate. However, sanctions, bar complaints, suspensions, and disbarment are tools that are rarely used in even the most outrageous cases of intentional, unethical, and even illegal behavior by some attorneys. Acceptance of unacceptable, intolerable misbehavior only breeds further contempt and should be stopped by the court as soon as the infraction oocurs. All the case law established for V A waiver cases will probably be found applicable whenever a member chooses CRSC, and thus wipes out payments to a former spouse that would have been made under CRDP. Members making the election to receive CRSC will be getting substantially more money each month, but their former spouses will see nothing, and will presumably have to continue suing in divorce court for indirect compensation. Previously, SBP payments were reduced for a beneficiary who was 62 or older, although an expensive supplement was developed which, if purchased, eliminated the reduction.3 Continued political pressure resulted in elimination of the Social Security offset, phased in over three and a half years starting in October, 2005, and ending April, 2008.4 The SSBP premiums were phased out; at the end of the adjustment period, all SBP recipients should receive 55% of the base amount indefinitely, regardless of age. It must be noted that after the Court adopted the Missouri definition, it became common practice for litigants to claim that the case law of Missouri must solely control determination of issues of joint physical custody. We do not believe that this Court intended to adopt the case law of Missouri merely because it chose to borrow that State’s statutory definition of joint legal custody. While Missouri case law may be informative, and perhaps persuasive, it should not control the analysis and outcome of a case. A trial court must not be prevented or limited in its review of all law that is relevant and applicable to the facts and issues before it. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that it had required district courts to utilize either the Van Camp or Pereira apportionment methods in classifying separate property businesses citing to Wells v. Bank of Nevada, 90 Nev. 192, 194, 522 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1974). However, the Court held even if the district court erred by failing to apply one of the two apportionment methods, the husband failed to establish that such error was prejudicial s the husband provided no evidence to contradict the district court’s determination that the business and business goodwill were entirely community property and therefore, no issue of apportionment of separate and community shares in the medical practice arose. The Court noted the only question facing the district court was one of valuation. The Court concluded that the district court’s finding that the vast bulk of value of the practice consisted of good will was sound. The Court held that in valuing the business goodwill, the district court was free to use any legitimate method of valuation which measures the present value of good will by taking into account past earnings citing to Ford v. Ford, 105 Nev. 672, 680, 782 P.2d 1304, 1309 (1989). The Court concluded that the district court’s valuation of good will was well within the range of valuations offered at trial, and the valuations were properly reached by methods which took into account past earnings. Several members of the Executive Council were instrumental in deflecting what would have been incredibly bad legislation, in the form of A.B. 292. That bill would have significantly damaged the whole scheme of community property by disallowing division of unvested retirement benefits, among other things. It was detected the day before its final vote in the Senate, having passed entirely through the Assembly, and Senate Judiciary, without any notice to the Council whatsoever. 2. Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this state shall consider whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall consider all relevant factors, including: There is a question whether the "broad discretion" accorded to trial courts in making property distributions under the pre-1993 law has been changed in any meaningful way by the change from "equitable" to "presumptively equal" division. The matter could probably be argued either way. There is plenty of authority for the proposition that the legislative change reduced the scope of judicial discretion to make unequal distributions, since legislative enactments are to be construed so that "no part of a statute should be rendered nugatory, nor any language turned to mere surplusage, if such consequences can properly be avoided."6 On the other hand, the new statutory construction still appears to be leave plenty of wiggle room. SUP> This made a difference to the totals reached, at least when arrears were due from before July, 1987. Rates before that date were fixed, so changing the arrearage to which a payment was applied altered the calculation. It still was no problem, really, since the uniform policy of the District Attorney’s offices throughout Nevada was to conform to any total judgment as found by a district court. The court rejected the "equal protection" attack on partition of pensions omitted from the initial decrees of some of the plaintiffs, recounting the retirees’ "odysseys through the State and federal courts challenging state court decrees dividing their retirement pay" and noting that the retirees "were unable, as a final matter, to convince any of these courts that division of their retirement pay was unconstitutional or legally improper." The court found that partition of military retirement benefits is precisely the sort of "economic adjustments to promote the common good" that legislatures properly perform, and that any retroactive effect of USFSPA is curative, accomplishes a rational purpose, is entitled to be liberally construed, is shielded from constitutional attack, and serves public policy. It rejected the contract clause and due process arguments as well. In enacting the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act,1 Congress was concerned that a forum-shopping spouse might go to a State with which the member had a very tenuous connection and force defense of a claim to the benefits at such a location. SUP> Most of those who propose a "freeze at divorce" approach either oppose or ignore the question of whether distribution of the spousal share should be mandated at the time of the participant’s first eligibility for retirement.6 It is not possible to fully and fairly evaluate the impact of a "freeze at divorce" proposal without examining that question as well.7 Again, the topic is treated at much greater depth in the military section of the materials, since so many of the cases have involved military retirement. The fourth scenario imposes the SBP premium payment entirely on the member, by increasing the spousal share to 26.7380%.5 The former spouse remains over-secured, as above. The entire premium falls to the member, who still has the free survivorship on the spouse’s life. Shifting the premium in this way is analogous to making a spousal support award. The judge had put a fixed percentage in the order as the spousal share, but the client had continued working for PERS after the divorce, which had the effect of greatly increasing the ex-wife’s share to a sum much greater than it should have been. It should have been phrased as a "formula order" with the correct denominator to be filled in at eligibility for retirement. There were several other, more subtle, errors as well, altering the earliest payment date and survivorship matters. An example might prove useful to illustrate this discussion. Presume a worker who was employed for exactly 20 years, and was married to wife one for the first ten, and wife two for the next ten, retiring on the day of divorce from wife two. Presume he had started work at $20,000 per year, and had enjoyed 5% raises every year. That would make his historical earnings look like this: At the time of the divorce, the parties had a residence, a lot in Fallon, a nine acre parcel by the river, two secured promissory notes, some small bank accounts, cars and other personal property. The wife had the residence from a prior marriage and title remained in her name during her marriage. Title to the rest of the real property and securities was placed in joint tenancy. The residence was remodeled and improved with separate funds the husband received from an inheritance. The remaining realty and promissory notes were also acquired with these funds. The district court made an equal distribution of all of the property. How then to explain the series of bad choices and misfires in the decisions being issued? Not perceiving the practical unworkability of Rivero I. The missed opportunity to clarify the mess of NRS 125.155, in Hedlund. Undermining the uniformity of the uniform act in Ogawa. Making it nearly impossible in many divorce cases to get paid, through Argentena. Needlessly mucking up the law governing dissolution of cohabitant relationships (while demoting family court judges to the rank of "junior grade") in Landreth. 5) This parenting time credit reflects the presumption that while exercising parenting time, a parent is responsible for and incurs the costs of caring for the child, including but not limited to, food, clothing, transportation, recreation and household expenses. Appendix IX-F sole-parenting awards are adjusted for Shared-parenting by calculating the PAR's income share of the total two-household expenses (the basic support obligation plus the PAR's time adjusted-fixed expenses) for the child and then deducting the PAR's time-adjusted fixed and variable expenses for the child. This mechanism adjusts the award to accommodate the PAR's fixed and variable expenses incurred while the child is with that parent and the PPR's reduced variable expenses while the child is not in that parent's household. The PAR's income share of the net supplemental expenses (e.g., child care, court-approved special needs) is added to the PAR's adjusted basic obligation. Detailed instructions and a worksheet for calculating shared-parenting awards are provided in Appendices IX-B and IX-D respectively. The Supreme Court construed the 1993 revision of NRS 125.150 in this opinion, which required an equal division of community property unless compelling reasons to the contrary existed. The husband had transferred $100,000 to his father; while he got most of it back, some $39,800 remained unaccounted-for, which the district court found was either wasted or secreted. The husband also "transferred $17,000 for his personal use," used $11,200 to improve and $10,000 to furnish his [apparently separate property] house, transferred another $13,000 to his father, paid $5,000 to his children. Adding these sums to the missing $39,800 totaled some $96,000. The district court’s "augmented" the wife’s share by half that sum, or $48,000. P> Article 3 state that rights of custody may arise "by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of [the State of habitual residence]."2 This can take several forms. Examining the legislative history, the LCB noted that since presumptive maximums only applied to "higher wage earners," the reason for the 2001 amendment had been the equal protection problem presented by a system in which "higher wage earners had not had an increase in their child support obligations since 1987 ... while the obligation of the lower wage earners increased steadily with an increase in wages." Unfortunately (for reasons discussed below), the LCB letter added that the previous, compounding methodology was not only consistent with legislative intent in the 2001 enactments, but also with "every other calculation of adjustments based on the Consumer Price Index contained in the Nevada Revised Statutes, and is consistent with the use of the Consumer Price Index generally to measure inflation." SUP> Notably, the rules governing support and custody operate independently of one another. The courts of this State might be called upon to enforce a child support obligation against someone found here, or filing here, while having no jurisdiction over custody matters.2 The obligor parent can always be sued for child support where that parent lives,3 because child support is set by the court with personal jurisdiction over the paying parent. These are pretty much "one-way" problems, insofar as there seems to be little authority regarding U.S.-based servicemembers attempting to litigate against foreign spouses or former spouses overseas. Rather, the typical problem involves situations where both the member and the spouse are located overseas, or the spouse is States-side, and the member is located at a U.S. installation in some foreign country. The inquiry made in a Hague proceeding therefore splits into three questions: Where was the child’s habitual residence? Did the parent who had the child in the other contracting state have a right of custody under the law of the State of the child’s habitual residence, which was actually being exercised (or would have been but for the removal or retention)? If so, did the removing or retaining parent’s actions violate those rights? Respect and decorum in the courtroom and between attorneys falls to the courts to police. Anyone can have a bad day or a bad mood, of course. Cautions are effective for all of us who get caught up in the moment and say something that is not appropriate. However, sanctions, bar complaints, suspensions, and disbarment are tools that are rarely used in even the most outrageous cases of intentional, unethical, and even illegal behavior by some attorneys. Acceptance of unacceptable, intolerable misbehavior only breeds further contempt and should be stopped by the court as soon as the infraction oocurs. The Court further held that past due arrears must be considered in determining whether the father had satisfied his arrears under paragraph 2(b)(1) of NRS 425.560. The Court held that to satisfy paragraph 2(b)(1) (which required the person who is in arrears to pay the payment amounts for the preceding 12 months which a court has determined are in arrears), the father was required to pay an amount equal to his child arrearage payments as ordered by the California court, in addition to his ongoing child support payment of $200 per month, for a period of twelve months. The statute is more limiting regarding division of retired pay as property, however. The former spouse can apply for direct payment from the military to the former spouse,2 but the USFSPA limits direct payment to a former spouse to 50% of disposable retired pay for all payments of property division.3 More than fifty percent of disposable pay may be paid4 if there is a garnishment for arrears in child or spousal support, or in payments of money as property other than for a division of retired pay. In other words (and counter-intuitively), about the only part of arrearages arising from a divorce judgment that cannot be satisfied by garnishment from retired pay is arrearages in retired pay. The PKPA mandated that State authorities give full faith and credit to other States’ custody determinations, so long as those determinations were made in conformity with the provisions of the PKPA. The PKPA provisions regarding bases for jurisdiction, restrictions on modifications, preclusion of simultaneous proceedings, and notice requirements were similar to those in the UCCJA. There were, however, some significant differences. The tools for doing so are explicit indemnification and constructive trust language, and explicit reservations of jurisdiction, either generally, or to award spousal support, or both. The Hague Convention addressed the increasing problem of international child abduction in the context of international law while respecting rights of custody and visitation under national law.3 According to its Preamble, the Convention aims "to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence."4 You can find The Marren and Page Case List Sogg b Nevada State Bank Fick v Fick Dimick v An Introduction to Pensions in Nevada Divorce Law Section I Subsection B Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar The Marren and Page Case List Willmes v Reno Municipal Court Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Three Section Four Motion to File Errata on Rivero Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection The Marren and Page Case List Johnson v Steel Inc Garner fraud on the court client need not sign order Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Approaches Relating to Unequal Joint Custody Welfares Critical Error The Marren and Page Case List Wolford v Wolford Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar The Marren and Page Case List Mack Ashlock Love me Love My Dog Part two of two The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to Carron Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section X Withdrawal and Borrowing of Money from the TSP During Service What is Considered Separate Property Including Characterization of Earnings family law jurisdiction The Marren and Page Case List Sogg b Nevada State Bank Fick v Fick Dimick v available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map Public Employees Retirement System PERS Benefits Section III Subsection B C Division 5050 or Other The Marren and Page Case List Wiese v Granata Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section IV Elko child support expert Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section IX Subsection A The Marren and Page Case List Ellet v Ellet Reciprocal Links: The Marren and Page Case List Sogg b Nevada State Bank Fick v Fick Dimick v The Marren and Page Case List Sogg b Nevada State Bank Fick v Fick Dimick v The Marren and Page Case List Sogg b Nevada State Bank Fick v Fick Dimick v The Marren and Page Case List Sogg b Nevada State Bank Fick v Fick Dimick v |
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