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The Marren and Page Case List Sertic v Sertic
Learn more about The Marren and Page Case List Sertic v Sertic.
Pensions wait and see approach definedSUP> But it also seems clear that a reviewing court can choose to ignore evidence of abuse as the reason for the passage of sufficient time in the foreign country to find a "settled purpose," as the dissent in Silverman II complained that it was only the father’s abuse that caused the mother and children to remain in Israel beyond the month of their arrival. In a perfect world, the divorcing couple should put aside emotion, anger, and resentment and attempt to come up with a workable solution that has their pet’s best interest in mind. However, as many family law attorneys know, this does not always happen. One or both clients may demand possession of the family pet, either to antagonize the other, or because they can’t see themselves living without "Fluffy." Yet there are variations around the country in terms of what is counted, and how, leading to very different ultimate results. Courts in different States may not even realize that the "time rule" cases decided elsewhere follow different sets of rules and assumptions. ¡¡ 3. If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to subsection 1, it shall assess against the party seeking to invoke its jurisdiction necessary and reasonable expenses including costs, travel expenses and child care during the course of the proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the assessment would be clearly inappropriate. The court may not assess fees, costs or expenses against this state unless authorized by law other than the provisions of this chapter. UP> It is difficult to generalize. Courts have focused on the apparent tactics of the non-military spouse,1 or on the apparent bad-faith conduct of the member2 in reaching their decisions. The cases are - necessarily - very fact-specific. B> Most people in this country earning retirement benefits work for private employers. Most private employee-benefit plans, or "pension plans"1 in the United States today are qualified under, Since all parties agree that Mother was a Nevada resident at all relevant times, Father’s Answer resulted in both parents submitting to the personal jurisdiction of the district court. This, presumably, gave the district court jurisdiction over all issues of property division, wherever situated.2 The boarder had roomed and boarded at the home of the husband and his wife for several years prior and had always paid his bill for the same to the wife and never to the husband. The boarder had applied to her to be received as a roomer and boarder. The home where the boarder stayed was the property of the wife. The wife did all of the work. The district court held that the boarder’s indebtedness for board and lodging was community property. SUP> But it also seems clear that a reviewing court can choose to ignore evidence of abuse as the reason for the passage of sufficient time in the foreign country to find a "settled purpose," as the dissent in Silverman II complained that it was only the father’s abuse that caused the mother and children to remain in Israel beyond the month of their arrival. The Court found that the district court action was for civil contempt, and that there was no imprisonment for debt. The Court noted that monies ordered to be paid as alimony or child support did not constitute a debt within the meaning of Nevada’s constitution citing to Ex parte Phillips, 43 Nev. 368, 187 P. 311 (1920) and In re McCabe, 53 Nev. 463, 5 P.2d 538 (1931). There was sufficient evidence for the district court to find that the father had not paid child support as required, that he had the ability to pay and that he was in contempt for his failure to comply with a lawful order of the court. The Court also cited to In re Chartz , 29 Nev. 110, 85 P. 352 (1907), wherein it was stated, "[t]he power of courts to punish for contempt and to maintain decency and dignity in their proceedings is inherent, and is as old as courts are old." Id. at 428. As to denying the father request to modify, the Court approvingly cited to MacDonald v. Superior Court in and for San Mateo County, 104 P.2d 1071 (Cal.App. 1940), wherein the court stated "[n]o party to an action can with right or reason, ask the aid and assistance of a court in hearing his demands while he stands in an attitude of contempt to the court’s legal orders and processes." Id. at 429. First, the Missouri definition recognizes that "joint physical custody" could exist even if parents do not have an equal time share. The FLS asks the Supreme Court to clarify that an award of joint physical custody should not be an option the trial court may consider unless some objective minimum time threshold is established. SUP> As detailed above, the Legislature was told that the PERS plan was somehow unique due to the potential early retirement dates of its members, because it is a defined benefit (rather than defined contribution) sort of retirement plan that does not allow for a divided interest, but only a divided payment stream, and because the plan does not pay anything directly to a former spouse until the member actually retires. None of those bases withstand analysis. Third, there is a factual question as to whether any such "deceptive conduct" ever occurred, or even was found to have occurred. We have not noted a citation to the record showing the district court making specific findings that Father delayed Mother¡¯s filing by way of affirmative acts of deception (falsely promising to return the children to Nevada). In analyzing the facts of the case, the Court noted that the district court deviated from the statutory formula, and that under the formula the district court should have ordered support of $500 per month. The Court cited to and quoted from Barbagallo v. Barbagallo,105 Nev. 546, 552, 779 P.2d 532, 536 (1989) "´[a]pplication of the formula must be the rule, and deviation from the formula for the benefit of the secondary custodian must be the exception,’" and when deviating from the formula, the district court must "´set forth findings of facts as to the basis for the deviation. . . . The ´basis for the deviation’ must be found in the unfairness, the injustice, which may result to the secondary custodian. . . .’" Id. at 1111. adults who voluntarily live together "may agree to pool their earnings and to hold all property acquired during the relationship in accord with the law governing community property." After the fall of Rome, marital practices in the West devolved to the level of tribal or local custom. The practice of community ownership had existed among the Germanic tribes after the fall of Rome, and was brought by them in their migrations to and through the Iberian Peninsula to what is now Spain and France.2 SUP> Given these developments, and the time and place that they were being debated and implemented, it is unsurprising that Nevada followed suit. The original territorial laws were non-specific, stating only in Chapter 33, Section 25, that in granting a divorce, "the court shall also make such disposition of the property of the parties, as shall appear just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits of the parties, and to the condition in which they will be left by such divorce, and to the party through whom the property was acquired, and to the burdens imposed upon it, for the benefit of the children." The parties were married when the lawyer-husband worked his way to part owner of a firm. When the parties separated, the husband stopped wife from getting her own lawyer upon divorce with promise that "I will take care of you" and "I will be fair to you and the children," and he prepared all papers. Seven years later, in consulting with a lawyer, the wife first learned that law practice was community property divisible asset. The wife then sought partition. The district court denied her request stating that the wife’s position was "Monday morning quarterbacking" and remorse that she "didn’t get more." The court further found that the wife failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the law practice was not divided upon divorce. This was a case with a limited record. The trial transcript was not a part of the record and except for the district court's findings of fact the husband's statement was the only recitation of facts which the Court had to review. The husband appealed from the district court making a lump sum alimony awards contingent upon the wife seeking training to improve her hearing ability and to improve her earning capacity as a beauty operator. The Court approved the district court making a lump sum alimony awards contingent upon the wife seeking training to improve her hearing ability and to improve her earning capacity as a beauty operator. SUP> Paragraph 2(c) provides that the court may "pursuant to an agreement of the parties" increase the value of the spousal share as compensation for delay in payment. Of course, that is what the time rule does automatically for everyone else. It is hard to imagine a circumstance in which a PERS participant, having gained the ability to deprive his or her spouse of that automatic "smaller slice of the larger pie" benefit, would ever agree to give it back; there is no known instance of it being used. Where the military member is the custodial parent, there is authority indicating that the member can use the SCRA to stave off change-of-custody or contempt proceedings, even where the non-military parent is thus The father obtained custody in a 1987 divorce. On December 30, 1993, the mother obtained Temporary Protective Order against domestic violence, alleging physical abuse eight years earlier, coupled with recent receipt of "bizarre" letters, alleged inquiries by the father into the car being driven by the mother, and the mother’s sighting of the father stalking her so that she felt in danger. The mother sought extension of the Temporary Protective Order in January 1994, seeking alteration of the mother’s visitation with child, but not modification of custody, with a hearing set in April. The father did not appear at the TPO extension hearing; the record on appeal did not specify what occurred, but the district court issued an order five days later granting the mother physical custody. The father requested an emergency stay; there was a 30-minute hearing, five days after which the court denied the stay request and reaffirmed its change-of-custody order. The only practical method of ameliorating this risk would appear to be through private insurance. The problem is that few service members carry significant sums of secondary private insurance. The parties had one child together. In the decree, the mother was awarded primary custody. The father was ordered to pay support of $200 per month. The father ceased making payments. Approximately five years after the father stopped making the payments, and approximately two weeks after the son’s eighteenth birthday, the mother filed a motion to reduce 64 months of child support arrears to judgment. The father opposed asserting that the mother had impliedly agreed to modify the support agreement, had impliedly waived her right to child support, or was estopped from asserting her right to the support. The district court held a hearing and found that despite repeated contact for several years after the payments stopped, the mother acknowledged she never made any demand nor did she pursue her legal rights during the time the payments stopped and the child emancipated. The mother also told the father the son did not want to see him that he should stay away. The father’s version of the events was corroborated by a third party. The district court found that the mother had impliedly waived her right to the child support and denied her motion to reduce the arrears to judgment. nbsp; The fourth scenario imposes the SBP premium payment entirely on the member, by increasing the spousal share to 26.7380%. The former spouse remains over-secured, as above. The entire premium falls to the member, who still has the free survivorship on the spouse's life. Shifting the premium in this way is analogous to making a spousal support award. The Court found that the misrepresentation of the value of the pension could only be attributed to mutual mistake or fraud; if both parties were mistaken, the property settlement was based upon the mistake that the property was being evenly divided, entitling the wife to redress under NRCP 60(b)(1); if husband or his attorney knew the true value, they fraudulently misrepresented under NRCP 60(b)(2). The Court noted that the purpose of Rule 60(b) was to redress any injustices that may have resulted because of excusable neglect or the wrongs of an opposing party, and should be liberally construed to do so, citing to Nevada Indus. Dev. v. Benedetti, 103 Nev. 360, 741 P.2d 802 (1987). This reality has caused some to suggest using the State Bar fee dispute mechanism as an alternative route to determining fees owed and obtaining a judgment. However ¨C at least the way things are today ¨C that system is so dysfunctional that it is not a viable mechanism for such disputes, making the suggestion at best illusory, and at worst hypocritical. SPAN> Miller v. Wilfong, 119 P. 3d 727, 121 Nev. Adv. Rep. 61 (September 22, 2005)The parties dated, but never married. They had a child together. After the child was born, the father filed a petition to determine paternity. The father served the petition on the mother after the welfare office sought to recoup funds given to the mother from the father. The father also sought joint physical custody. Pro bono counsel represented the mother, and the father appeared in proper person, but later obtained counsel. The district court awarded the parties joint legal custody and awarded the mother primary physical custody and child support. The district court also awarded the mother’s attorney $3,000 in attorney fees pursuant to Sargeant v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 495 P.2d 618 (1972). In addition to concluding that fees could be awarded to pro bono counsel and that fees could be awarded in paternity cases, the Court also issued sanctions for filing a deficient brief. Previously, SBP payments were reduced for a beneficiary who aged 62 or older, although an expensive supplement was developed which, if purchased, eliminated the reduction. Where the divorce precedes the time of the member making the CBS/REDUX election, the decree most probably would anticipate payment of the maximum possible sum of retirement benefits. Where the member, post-divorce, takes the election, and thus both obtains cash and reduces the value of the retirement benefits, the expected orders should be a distribution to the spouse of a share of the cash payment equal to the spousal share of the retirement benefits, or recalculation of the spousal share of the retirement, to increase it so that it would be equal to what it would have been if the member had not taken the election. Given the complicated calculation of a REDUX retirement, the first of these would be simpler. The USFSPA set up a federal mechanism for recognizing state-court divisions of military retired pay, including definitions that were prospectively applicable, and rules for interpretation to be followed by the military pay centers in interpreting the law; later, regulations were adopted, and the pay centers were consolidated." This eliminated the recusal lists for personal bias, and led to several instances of judges in family court exercising personal vendettas against lawyers they did not care for. And the clients, of course, were caught in the resulting cross-fire, because a lawyer assigned a case in which he sincerely believed the judge to be biased would be ethically required to advise the client that the judge’s pervasive hostility against counsel could result in a negative outcome having nothing to do with the case. Lawyers released cases when they were re-assigned to such departments (even after years of litigation), and clients felt forced to fire lawyers out of fear that a personal grudge could be taken out on them. The parties settled the suit by entering into a stipulation to compromise a paternity action under NRS 126.141(1)(b). The agreement provided that paternity would not be determined, at least with regard to the formal record. While there are some variations around the country in both the discretion of courts and the role of fault in dividing property, the great majority of States today perform a division of assets in accordance with the property accrued during the marriage, whether described as community property or equitable division. Most member-defendants, faced with the near-certainty of an identical result (at much greater expense, through two divorce actions) will relent and permit litigation of all claims in the court hearing the other property/debt/custody/support issues - almost always, the jurisdiction where he is living. Where a defendant has not made an appearance in an action, a default judgment (for temporary or permanent orders) may only be obtained upon affidavit stating that the person against whom default is requested is not in the military.5 If it appears that a person against whom default is sought is a member of the armed services, default may not be entered against the member until the court appoints an attorney for the member, who is then charged with the duty to "not waive any defense" until the member is located.6 You can find The Marren and Page Case List Sertic v Sertic Nevada divorce no prenup Public Employees Retirement System PERS Benefits An Introduction to Pension in Nevada Divorce Law Section III Subsection C Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar Carson City civil service retirement lawyer Disability Benefits QDRO checkup An Introduction to Pensions in Nevada Divorce Law Section V Family Law and Contingency Fees Time to Reconsider The Marren and Page Case List Sertic v Sertic available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. 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