The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of the Parental Rights as to Co

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Temporary Spousal Support

It can hardly be adequately stressed that the Convention does not give rise to custody proceedings; as explained in greater detail below, it is concerned with return of children to their countries of habitual residence, which is where any custody proceedings should be held. To the degree that the order rendered by a court deciding a Hague Convention case provides physical "custody" of a child, it does so only long enough to allow a petitioner to reach and enter another State, and perhaps long enough to initiate appropriate custody proceedings there.10 This conclusion is supported by footnote four, noting that when a different district court judge in another case found that Davidson had acted within the scope of the authority granted him (i.e., "fraud on the court" had not been made out), the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that decision, as well. The parties each had substantial separate property interests when they married, and had children from prior marriages. A complaint for divorce was filed January 1984. The character and value of much of the property owned by the parties was established by agreement. The remaining property was divided by the district court. The wife appealed claiming the district court erred by refusing to award attorneys’ fees to her in lieu of reimbursing the community for the husband’s expenditures of community property income during the parties’ separation. In November 1921, the wife filed for divorce and requested sole custody of their child and for support. In February 1922, the husband bequeathed all of his property to a third person, with the express condition that she pay to his daughter, $50 per month until the daughter should emancipate. The father also bequeathed his automobile to his daughter with the condition that should she or her guardian attempt to break the will she was to receive only $5. In June 1922, the husband died. The mother then filed a petition requesting that $1,817 in insurance proceeds be collected by the executrix and be declared exempt and set apart for the daughter’s use. The district court ordered that the money be set aside for the daughter. The executrix appealed. The daughter was living with the father at the time of death. The question for the Court was the daughter a member of the father’s family. The parties held a deed to property in joint tenancy. The district court found that the lot was community property and ordered it sold at fair market value with the proceeds divided equally between the parties. The husband never objected to the characterization of the lot as being community property. As put by the Court in Moore: "Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent, and is considered to have ´notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’" Our court determines that neither the child, nor a parent, nor any person acting as a parent has any significant connection to this State, and that no substantial evidence exists here as to the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; Some states, such as Texas, which found the USFSPA inadequate by itself to allow the re-opening of gap cases, never passed legislation permitting those divorced during the gap to bring their decrees into conformity with those divorced before McCarty or after the USFSPA. Divorces during the gap that gave 100 percent of the retirement benefits to the memeber because of McCarty remain unalterable in such states for lack of a mechanism through which to litigate them.13 Some members retired before 1972 are nevertheless participants in the SBP, since Congress has provided a number of "open enrollment periods" or "open seasons" during which non-participants could join the program, and those who had selected less than the full amount of benefits could increase their level of participation. Those choosing to begin or increase their participation in the SBP program during an open season are also faced with paying an additional retroactive premium. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that payments to SPOUSE shall be made as called for in this Decree beginning on the first day of the first month following MEMBER's first eligibility for longevity retirement [ADD THE FOLLOWING IF LOCAL LAW CALLS FOR IT] and SPOUSE's making of the irrevocable election to begin receiving benefits. If MEMBER should remain in military service after becoming eligible for retirement, so that SPOUSE receives a percentage of a hypothetical retirement that MEMBER would have been eligible to receive, and MEMBER actually retires thereafter, the spousal percentage payable to SPOUSE shall Again, if the spouse dies first, the member gets the full gross military retirement benefits, but if the member dies first, the spouse continues to get only her share of the benefits. Note that under 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1), it is not permissible to pay the former spouse more than 50% After the mediation, but before the next district court hearing, Ms. Rivero served a subpoena on Mr. Rivero's employer for his employment records. The district court granted Mr. Rivero's motion to quash the subpoena, explaining that under the divorce decree, each party had joint physical custody, neither party owed child support, and the only pending issue was whether the parties could agree on a timeshare plan. Ms. Rivero then argued that the district court should reopen the child support issue and allow relevant discovery. It can hardly be adequately stressed that the Convention does not give rise to custody proceedings; as explained in greater detail below, it is concerned with return of children to their countries of habitual residence, which is where any custody proceedings should be held. To the degree that the order rendered by a court deciding a Hague Convention case provides physical "custody" of a child, it does so only long enough to allow a petitioner to reach and enter another State, and perhaps long enough to initiate appropriate custody proceedings there.10 Theoretically, lawyers can note the absurdity of such support figures, and judges can vary upward from them. The crush of the docket and the inherent ease of resting on defaults, however, makes variance rare even when non-custodial parents make several hundreds of thousands of dollars per year. In my experience, when variance is granted, the dollar sum of the change is often niggling, as judges require proof that "it's needed" rather than staying focused on the means of the obligor. Cases consolidated for disposition only ("Gandee" and "Montelione"). In Gandee, the father wanted to move to Oregon with two daughters (ages four and five, with elder physically disabled) to accept a promotion. The mother refused consent to move, and the father filed a move motion per NRS 125A.350. The district court found that only actual advantage to move was a "few thousand dollars" that would "be eaten up on forfeited child support or transportation costs." In the second case, the district court denied a request to relocate primarily based on the fact the non-primary parent had custody of the child at issue two days each week in addition to holiday and school recess time. The Supreme Court reversed both. Some points are obvious, such as how long the member has been in the jurisdiction, and where the member does his banking. Consider asking the question "Where is home?" in deposition, and find out if the member has made any kind of pronouncement of his present or future plans. Cautious practitioners ensure that property settlement agreements and divorce decrees are so crafted as to allow a later reviewing court to transcend any kind of recharacterization of the benefits addressed, whether anticipated (or even conceived of) at the time of divorce, or not. The tools for doing so are explicit indemnification and constructive trust language, and explicit reservations of jurisdiction, either generally, or to award spousal support, or both. Withdrawal of TSP funds by a participant is normally limited to those separating from service, but in-service withdrawals may be made in two categories: "age-based" withdrawals1 and special "financial hardship" withdrawals. Notably, one of the four categories for such financial hardship withdrawals is "legal expenses for separation or divorce."2 Counter-intuitively, however, if a member is married, the spouse must normally consent to an in-service withdrawal, whether or not the parties are separated.3 The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that a de Jacto marriage interpretation could not be sustained in a state the did not recognize common law marriage. The Court concluded that the word "remarriage" was easily understood and is not ambiguous. The husband's request to terminate support was denied. The trial court entered a temporary custody order in favor of the other parent, but stayed the remainder of the case, over the objection of the member and the grandmother, who argued that the stay was "automatic" and prevented entry of a temporary custody order. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that an SCRA stay does not "freeze" a case, leaving it in limbo indefinitely and allowing no authority for the trial court to act. Rather, the court found that a trial court could properly entertain the issue of temporary custody, even if the stay was in place when the issue was considered, on the basis that a child’s life cannot be put in "suspended animation" awaiting the member’s return. For the same reason, the trial court was able to consider issues such as support.4 Further, in the years since Mansell, reviewing courts have gone from examination of the decree to see if there was a specific savings clause by which the spousal share could survive the retiree’s recharacterization, to examining the underlying decree for a specific provision permitting the retiree to retroactively reduce the award to the former spouse. One year and one day after the divorce, the third former spouse’s rights would be secure. The first former spouse could go back to court at any time (prior to the member’s death) to get a valid order for SBP beneficiary status, and then serve the pay center. The second annulment,"19 whereas the former spouse must make the request "within one year of the date of the court order or filing involved."20 Does it contain language which authorizes the system to provide specific information to the alternate payee from the retirement file of the member? (In lieu of this provision, the member may file a waiver which allows the ex-spouse to review the memberfs file. The waiver must be submitted with the QDRO.) The third group is made up of members who entered service on or after August 1, 1986. That year, Congress had arranged to provide retirement benefits to those members that were lowered in two different ways. b) If the minority time-share parent is exercising less time than 20%. determine if guideline support was reduced bv the presumptive maximum set out in NRS 125B.070. If so. the range of potential upward deviation for this factor is the difference between the gresumptive maximum and the percentage of income for support set out in NRS 125B.070(1 )(b). If not, the range of potential deviation for this factor is based on the trial court's determination of the increased costs being incurred in the majority time-share parent's household bv virtue of the lack of the minority time-share parent's visimtion. The noncustodial parent was required to make $50 per month support payments, and was given reasonable rights of visitation. The custodial parent filed a motion to modify the decree to terminate the noncustodial parent’s visitation rights for nonpayment of support, and for judgment for the arrearage in the support payments. The noncustodial parent responded by filing a countermotion seeking to have the custodial parent held in contempt for failing to give visitation. The district court reduced the arrears to judgment and provided that rights of visitation should not commence until the father had paid the arrears and was current in all his support obligations. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that in matters of custody, including visitation, rest in the district court’s sound discretion citing to Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996). The Court further noted that it would not change a district court’s custody determination absent a clear abuse of discretion citing to Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 1148, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (1993). The Court recited the Murphy standard. The Court held that remarriage alone did not establish changed circumstances and that the district court erred in finding changed circumstances on that basis. The Court further held that although a custodial parent’s substantial or pervasive interference with a noncustodial parent’s visitation could give rise to changed circumstances justifying a change in custody, the record in this case did not support a determination that the mother substantially or pervasively interfered with visitation and the district court abused its discretion when it found changed circumstances based upon the mother’s alleged interference with visitation. PAN style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt"> In other words, while Mr. Pyne’s comments were rather ambiguous as to the intended scope of the statutory change, Mr. Ray indicated that the sole objective of the terminology used was to shield PERS from any court direction or demand to distribute benefits other than as set out by the Plan’s terms. And in the unusual circumstances supporting an assertion of initial emergency jurisdiction (the child is present here and has been abandoned or an emergency amounting to actual or threatened mistreatment or abuse is presented), it is now clear that such an order only lasts until a State with initial or continuing jurisdiction under NRS 125A.305, 125A.315, and NRS 125A.325, issues an order relating to the matter. Only in the peculiar situation that such other State does not issue any order on the subject within the time specified in our order, does the order either continue or expire, as it provides.3 And only if that other State never acts could the emergency order of this State become a final determination, making this State the Home State of the child.4 This Court is thus compelled by its holding in Haggerty and other decisions to explore whether there is an interpretation of the words "next general election" that would not enforce one Constitutional provision by means of frustrating another. The fact that literal enforcement of one Constitutional provision would hinder application of another necessarily creates an ambiguity, and among this Court’s rules for statutory construction are the principles that if a statute is ambiguous, courts should attempt to follow the legislature’s intent, and "no part of a statute should be rendered nugatory, nor any language turned to mere surplusage, if such consequences can properly be avoided."3 The Supreme Court reversed. The Court began by noting that unless otherwise provided by law, decree, or agreement, all property acquired after marriage is considered to be community property under NRS 123.220 and that presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence citing to Todkill v. Todkill, 88 Nev. 231, 495 P.2d 629 (1972) and Kelly v. Kelly, 86 Nev. 301, 468 P.2d 359 (1970). The Court further noted that property held in the individual name of a spouse or in the name of both spouses as tenants in common could be compatible with the concept of community property, but property held in joint tenancy could not because certain incidents of joint tenancy would be inconsistent with incidents of community property. At the court-ordered mediation, the parties were unable to reach a timeshare agreement. Following mediation, after a hearing, the district court modified the custody arrangement from a five-day, two-day split to an equal timeshare. Ms. Rivero appeals.

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