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The Marren and Page Case List Engebretson v Engebretson
Learn more about The Marren and Page Case List Engebretson v Engebretson.
Temporary Spousal SupportSPAN> Rush v. Rush, 85 Nev. 623, 460 P.2d 844 (1969) In March 1963, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement. The agreement divided real and personal property and further provided that the wife should pay alimony to husband in the sum of $1,000 per month from April 1963, to April 1973. The decree provided that the agreement should survive the decree. The wife paid alimony through August 1964, and then stopped. The husband then brought suit seeking the remaining alimony due. The wife opposed, claiming that alimony was unenforceable as against public policy and because there was no consideration for the agreement. The district court entered judgment against the wife for $37,000 with interest. The following provision, NRS 125B.080, explains the various reasons the guideline amounts can be modified, including a list of statutory deviation factors. One of these, NRS 125B.080(9)(j), is: "the amount of time the child spends with each parent." The problem with reading the statute to mean exactly what it says is that any such interpretation would be in direct conflict with this Court’s mandates in Gemma, Fondi, and Sertic that the member must make direct payments to the former spouse upon eligibility for retirement, In those cases in which there wassuch an award, no procedural mechanism existed for the enforcement of the interest, leaving spouses to rely upon general State court remedies (e.g., contempt) for enforcement of judgments. B> Most Nevada litigation as to jurisdiction has involved not the "causes" authorizing suits for divorce, but the requisites for filing a complaint under NRS 125.020. What appears to cause confusion in some quarters is the seeming blurring of tests for subject matter jurisdiction, on the one hand, and personal jurisdiction, on the other. They are distinct, but the Nevada divorce statute makes it necessary for at least one party to be a bona fide resident of this state (which incidentally gives the court personal jurisdiction over that person), for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a divorce.1 Texas X Mathematically, the "default" position discussed below distributes the premium debt proportionally to the parties’ respective shares of the benefits taken - not equally, as some of the courts say they do. As of October 8, 2001, military members were authorized to begin participating in the TSP. Military members therefore now have both a defined benefit and a defined contribution type of retirement program, both of which should be addressed upon divorce. The same Deputy A.G. who wrote the misguided 2004 opinion letter testified and claimed that the law should be amended to conform to Welfare’s view of the legislative history and intent. I testified immediately after, in part as follows: SPAN> Rush v. Rush, 85 Nev. 623, 460 P.2d 844 (1969) In March 1963, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement. The agreement divided real and personal property and further provided that the wife should pay alimony to husband in the sum of $1,000 per month from April 1963, to April 1973. The decree provided that the agreement should survive the decree. The wife paid alimony through August 1964, and then stopped. The husband then brought suit seeking the remaining alimony due. The wife opposed, claiming that alimony was unenforceable as against public policy and because there was no consideration for the agreement. The district court entered judgment against the wife for $37,000 with interest. It is more important than ever that such relationships end up in the proper place, since in modern America countless millions of household consist of unmarried cohabitants, both with and without children. Whether a child has been born is a poor reason to send some cases one way, and others another. A State that puts divorce, paternity, and domestic partnerships before its family courts does no service to anyone by sending some cohabitation and palimony cases anywhere else. B> IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Court shall retain jurisdiction to enter such further orders as are necessary to enforce the award to [FORMER SPOUSE] of the PERS retirement benefits awarded herein, in accordance with the provisions of Nevada case and statutory law, including the recharacterization thereof as a division of Civil Service or other retirement benefits, or to make an award of alimony in the event that [MEMBER] fails to comply with the provisions contained above requiring said payments to [FORMER SPOUSE] by any means, including the filing of bankruptcy, or if government or other regulations or other restrictions interfere with payments to [FORMER SPOUSE] as set forth herein, or if [MEMBER] fails to comply with the provisions contained above requiring said payments to [FORMER SPOUSE]. A middle ground is possible. The Court could indicate that child support could only be ordered from a majority time-share parent to a minority time-share parent where the district court concluded that the child custody arrangement constituted "joint custody" where each parent was exercising between 40 and 60% custodial time. Day v. Day, 80 Nev. 386, 395 P.2d 321 (1964) The decree approved, adopted, and confirmed a written agreement which provided for the wife’s future support. The agreement itself provided that it was not to be merged into any decree entered later. The decree did not itself state that the agreement was not merged, nor did it expressly provide that the agreement survive the decree. The Court held that the adoption of an agreement effectuates a merger of the agreement into the decree entered. A merger destroys the independent existence of the agreement and the rights of the parties thereafter rest solely upon the decree. The Court also held that a survival provision of agreement is ineffective unless the court decree specifically recognizes its survival. A decree was entered, granting the husband custody of the minor child, and distributing the community property. The wife appealed, in part, contending she should have been awarded attorney’s fees. The Court noted that a district court was authorized to allow reasonable attorney fees if attorney fees are at issue under the pleadings. The Court further noted that the wife requested attorney’s fees and the husband denied the same in his reply. The Court held that although a wife was no longer required to show necessitous circumstances to support an award of attorney fees citing to Sargeant v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 495 P.2d 618 (1972), such an award was neither automatic nor compulsory, but within the sound discretion of the district court. The Court further noted there was no evidence in the request to support the request that the wife should have been awarded attorney’s fees. UP> A default against the member is voidable - apparently forever - if the court did not appoint an attorney for the member before entering the order. The act grants a member the ability to reopen and set aside a default, or even prevent execution on a judgment, by applying to the court that entered the order within 90 days of leaving military service, if the member can demonstrate that military service prejudiced the member’s ability to defend, and that there was a meritorious defense.1 A period of military service apparently tolls all statutes of limitations for the duration of military service.1 The courts holding that the SBP should be maintained seem to impliedly realize that the members’ survivorship interest in the former spouse’s benefits is automatic and free, while the spousal survivorship in the member’s benefits requires payment of a premium. None of the decisions goes into detail, comparing what the member or the spouse would actually receive in the event of the death of the other, or whether the results fit into the theory of equitable or equal community property and debt division. While courts have been uncertain how to characterize the nature of the SBP,3 those squarely addressing the question have concluded that a spouse is "to be awarded a proper share of both the former husband’s military retirement plan and the survivor benefit plan," because of the "´potential unfairness’ to the wife should her former husband predecease her, thereby extinguishing pension rights."4 PAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Times New Roman; FONT-SIZE: 14pt"> The down-side to such an arrangement for the former spouse is risk - some members have sought court orders revoking such bargained-for "irrevocable" awards, usually based on the changed circumstances of one party or the other. Even when the former spouse prevails, there is a substantial expense. See Waltz v. Waltz, 110 Nev. 605, 877 P.2d 501 (1994). The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that the litigation was between the father and the mother and that the maternal grandparents were not parties to it, have never enjoyed legal custody of their grandchildren, and have never asserted a claim to such custody. The grandparents court as witnesses and apparently were amenable to the responsibilities of custody should the court decide such a course to be the desirable one. The Court further noted that it was reluctant to approve an award of custody to nonparties. The Court then looked at the legislative history. The Court concluded that the custody statute and the guardianship statute, when read together, created a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent is to be preferred over nonparents with respect to custody. The Court further concluded that the best interest of the child is usually served by awarding his custody to a fit parent citing to Peavey v. Peavey, 85 Nev. 571, 460 P.2d 110 (1969), where we ruled that as between fit parents, a child of tender years should be awarded to the mother. Here, there was no finding that the father was unfit to have custody. The Court concluded that the father was entitled to the custody of his daughters. In 2001, the Arizona Court of Appeals again dealt with the contract theory, federal law supremacy assertion, and claims of "involuntariness" that appeared in several of the cases discussed above, in Danielson v. Evans.29 Because the divorce at issue occurred after Mansell, the prevailing former spouse in Danielson was held to the "higher standard of clarity" in the underlying decree (discussed above) to protect her interests. It is for that reason (among others) that Mr. Vaile submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Nevada for the setting of a child support order, even though his divorce Complaint contained a fraudulent assertion of residency and Nevada had no jurisdiction over questions of child custody. SUP> Before 1975, that "subject to" statute ¨C NRS 123.230 ¨C vested management and control in the husband. The sea change at that time altered the system to joint management and control, and set out a series of rules for what the spouses could do individually or jointly, with their property. Even the court's list of general "factors to be considered" has varied wildly and without explanation. For many years, the court referenced a list of factors it posited in Buchanan v. Buchanan, 90 Nev. 209, 523 P2d 1 (1974), periodically reversing decisions when it a failure of a district court to "adequately consider" those factors. See Forrest v. Forrest, 99 Nev. 602, 606, 668 P2d 275, 278 Several of the disability cases involved situations where a divorce decree was entered, the member later applied for disability payments, and the former spouse brought a contempt proceeding. In some circumstances, such as where both parties have resided overseas for a substantial period of time, or the children were born in a foreign country, the best route to obtaining a legitimate order for custody might be through the courts of the foreign country. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act recognizes many foreign countries as "States,"6 and such orders may generally be registered and enforced in the United States. You can find The Marren and Page Case List Engebretson v Engebretson Las Vegas family law advocate Rivero v Rivero Opinion Subsection Three B Las Vegas CSRS expert lawyer Valuation of Military Retirement Benefits Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Part One Subsection I The Marren and Page Case List Laws v Ross Milisch v Hillhouse and Verheyden Conclusions as to Disability Awards Key Concepts in Military Retirement Benefits Las Vegas spousal law lawyer The Marren and Page Case List Engebretson v Engebretson available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. 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