The Marren and Page Case List Renshaw v Renshaw Property Settlement Agreement child support The parties divorced in December 1995, sharing joint legal and physical custody of their child. The mother received an unexpected job offer in Texas. She requested the father’s consent to the move, which he denied. The mother filed a motion to relocate. The father responded with a request for primary custody. The district court denied the mother’s relocation request and granted the father’s motion for primary custody.  First, the Missouri definition recognizes that "joint physical custody" could exist even if parents do not have an equal time share. The FLS asks the Supreme Court to clarify that an award of joint physical custody should not be an option the trial court may consider unless some objective minimum time threshold is established. The Supreme Court held that NRS 111.250(1) (Statute of Frauds) specifically precluded the creation of any interest in land except by a properly executed instrument.  Schreiber v. Schreiber, 99 Nev. 453, 663 P.2d 1189 (1983) In 1977, the parties’ separated. The parties orally agreed to divide the community property and to go their own ways. The family residence was sold and the proceeds divided equally. The wife received most of the family assets, while the husband received the assets of a masonry contracting business owned and operated by the community. In 1980, the wife filed for divorce and sought a division of the community property. The district court found that the parties had entered into an oral agreement to divide their community assets.  However, because the agreement was not in writing, the district court found that the agreement was of no effect had no effect upon the division of community property. Having the member bear the entire premium would only appear to be a correct result if the court determined, based on the entirety of the parties’ economic positions, that the result was mandated as a matter of disparity of income. Similarly, it would be improper to have the former spouse bear the entirety of the SBP premiums, at least in those states in which the courts are required to equally distribute marital property and debts, because the benefit being accorded to the member in the event of the spouse’s death is greater, and there is no cost to that survivorship interest. The Court departed from the "all or nothing" rule set out in Lake v. Bender, 18 Nev. 361, 4 P. 711 (1894). The Court held that the increase in the value of separate property during the marriage should be apportioned between the separate property of the owner and the community property of the spouses. Profit or increase in value of property may result either from the capital investment itself, or from the labor, skill and industry of one or both spouses or from both the investment of separate property and the labor and skill of the parties. Where both factors contribute to the increase in the value of a business, that increase should be apportioned between separate property and community property. SUP> However, ICARA also includes a "limitation on authority" stating that no court issuing any such provisional remedies may "order a child removed from a person having physical control of the child unless the applicable requirements of State law are satisfied."3 In practice, this statement has caused a great deal of confusion and delay in federal courts unfamiliar with state court procedures, as the courts attempt to verify that they can, for example, issue emergency pick-up orders for the protection of children, which procedures are not set out on the face of many states’ versions of the UCCJA, but are either contained in other statutes, or a product of state common law. The Nevada statutes governing separate maintenance go beyond the classic definition of "separate maintenance," framed as "Money paid by one married person to another for support if they are no longer living as husband and wife."4 The statutes encompass much of the possible scope of the typical definition of "legal separation": "An arrangement whereby a husband and wife live apart from each other while remaining married, either by mutual consent or by judicial decree."5 When military retired pay is used as a source for child support or alimony payments, the usual tax consequences remain true (i.e., child support is non-deductible to the payor and non-taxable to the recipient, whereas alimony is deductible to the payor and taxable to the recipient). LI>  The former spouse must not yet be age 65. Upon eligibility for Medicare (Part A), CHAMPUS eligibility ends. Some continuing benefits for former spouses may be available under the "TRICARE-for-life" program effective October 1, 2001. The parties divorced in December 1995, sharing joint legal and physical custody of their child. The mother received an unexpected job offer in Texas. She requested the father’s consent to the move, which he denied. The mother filed a motion to relocate. The father responded with a request for primary custody. The district court denied the mother’s relocation request and granted the father’s motion for primary custody.  Second, the Court could direct the aggrieved party to file a Civil Division action as an "independent" complaint for relief, and then file a motion to consolidate all actions into the Family Court case number.3 Pierce is something of an orphan, standing on its own odd facts, and has no following. The only known case to cite it approvingly was subsequently reversed on appeal.4 All other citations appear to be to note it as an aberration, in decisions holding that a former spouse must be compensated for a member’s post-divorce recharacterization of her property.5 In every system like PERS - in which the payments (but not the retirement itself) can be divided - the structure of the plan determines what happens to the former spouse’s portion of the payment stream if the spouse dies first. As detailed above, the payments revert to the employee, and at issue here is whether PERS should either directly pay the sums ordered as belonging to the spouse to the spouse’s estate, or at least stop rejecting orders requiring the member to make those payments to the spouse’s estate once the spousal share reverts to him through the system. Where a defendant has not made an appearance in an action, a default judgment (for temporary or permanent orders) may only be obtained upon affidavit stating that the person against whom default is requested is not in the military.10 If it appears that a person against whom default is sought is a member of the armed services, default may not be entered against the member until the court appoints an attorney for the member, who is then charged with the duty to "not waive any defense" until the member is located.11 During the pendency of a divorce, the husband and wife entered into a property settlement agreement dated September 15, 1948. The agreement addressed the real properties of the parties and stated how they would be awarded to each of them. As to a Las Vegas property, the parties agreed that it would be divided equally and vested in each of them as their separate property. The parties acknowledged that the Las Vegas property was held in joint tenancy, and they agreed to hold as tenants in common. The parties additionally agreed to execute and deliver documents effectuating transfer. All of the items, except the Las Vegas property, were exchanged in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The husband refused to transfer the Las Vegas property and later died. The wife claimed that the Las Vegas property became vested in her as a surviving joint tenant. The estate brought suit.  The district court concluded that the agreement severed the joint tenancy. Examining the definition of "abandonment" in NRS 128.012, the Court held that intent is the decisive factor, and may be shown by the facts and circumstances of the individual case. Thus, the Court held that the court could consider the father’s pre-birth conduct as one factor in its inquiry regarding abandonment, noting the statutory language allowing a ruling based on "any conduct of one or both parent of a child which evinces a settled purpose . . . to forego all parental custody and relinquish all claims to the child." The Court reiterated the principle of statutory construction that when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, a court should give that language its ordinary meaning and not go  beyond it. Apparently seeking to hedge its holding, the Court added that it was not holding that pre-birth conduct alone justified termination of parental rights, such conduct would serve at least in part as the basis for finding any jurisdictional or dispositional grounds. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court concluded that district court incorrectly assumed that support beyond $500 of NRS I 25B.070(2) could only be awarded on showing that needs of a particular child are not met by that sum. The Court quoted from Herz v. Gabler-Herz, 107 Nev. 1l7, 118,808 P.2d I, I (1991), "[there was and is nothing in the applicable statutes to preclude the district court from awarding an additional amount of child support based on some factor other than increased need." The father's income was expressly ruled "relevant" to support; argument to contrary was "completely untenable." The Court concluded that among the factors which the district court must consider when deviating from the formula is "[the relative income of both parents," citing to NRS 125B.080(9)(1). Because of that, the Court held that denying the daughter discovery and a hearing, the district court erred. Some courts have ruled that the 50% limitation is a payment limitation only, so that trial courts may award more than that amount - up to 100% of the retired pay - to the former spouse, but the pay center can only pay 50%, leaving the spouse to collect the remainder from the military member by other means (such as normal state court contempt proceedings if not paid)." The Department of Defense has concurred in this interpretation." B> As noted and discussed in the preceding two sections, NRS 125.150(2) allows the court to provide reimbursement to a party for his or her separate property contribution to property which is held by the parties as joint tenants, and case law permits the tracing out of community property contributions to separate property real estate, in at least some circumstances. Some critics complain that such a formula gives the non-employee former spouse an interest in the employee spouse¡¯s post-divorce earnings, at least where the divorce occurs while the employee is still working. They argue that the spousal share should be frozen at the earnings level at divorce; a minority of States, including Texas, have adopted this approach, sometimes in cases that do not appear to have contemplated the actual mathematical impact of the decision reached.1 This minority approach undervalues the spousal interest by giving no compensation for deferred receipt, and also contains a logic problem, at least in a community property analysis, of treating similarly situated persons differently. Similarly, driver’s licenses and car registrations may be useful in determinations to remain in a place for at least some period of time. If the member has ever been party to a lawsuit, find out what declaration of residence was made in the litigation or any affidavits. There may be similar declarations in deeds, mortgages, leases, contracts, insurance policies, or hospital records. However, once a valid court order is issued requiring coverage, the one year period begins to run, and any subsequent court order that merely reiterates, restates, or confirms the right of coverage as SBP beneficiary cannot be used to start a new one-year election period.18 The minutes are almost never complete or accurate, so most attorneys do not rely on them for any serious purpose, such as order drafting, preferring instead to review the video record and take the orders (and time indexes for those orders) directly from that source. The video provides a complete record of what actually occurred in every hearing in every district courtroom. That record, and only that record, should be the normal basis for any court order. b) if the amount of time to be spent with the children is 131 overnights or more, multiply the number of overnights over 130 by .0084, then multiply the result by the base combined child support obligation, and then subtract the result from the obligor's payment as determined in Subsection (3)(a) to arrive at the obligor's payment. In divorces where Civil Service benefits are at issue (probably CSRS, for those starting federal service before 1984; FERS for all those thereafter), the jurisdiction of the court to alter survivor beneficiary designations is again a matter of time rather than place. Here, however, the question is time in relation to events. belonging to the parties in Nevada. The husband alleged there were four minor children, that the wife receive custody and that he pay $20 per month per child. The wife answered and denied that the husband was a resident. Upon the husband’s motion, the wife’s answer was struck. The district court then entered default. The decree was then granted. The court also ordered struck her motion to set aside said findings and decree. The wife appealed in proper person. The Court appointed an attorney to file an amicus curiae brief. The attorney filed a motion to dismiss because the husband died. The Fifth Circuit has simply held that an award to a former spouse of a portion of the retired pay as property made it her separate property from that day forward, leaving no "debt" to be discharged or otherwise addressed by the bankruptcy court.1 The Ninth and Eighth Circuits have generally agreed with this principle, although their opinions diverge on the question of arrearages. the weight of modern authority, however, seems to recognize such agreements as enforceable where it appears to the advantage of the minor to enforce the same. This latter view seems to us to be supported by the better reason. It recognizes the superior rights of natural parents, all other matters being equal, but places the interest of the child as the first consideration, and, where it appears that the interest of the child will manifestly be advanced by enforcing such agreement, the same will not be disturbed. Perhaps more useful is the member’s DD-2058 form on file with the military, which is the member’s "State of Legal Residence Certificate," or legal residency form. Again, questions must be asked about when the form was filed, and why, which may have greater or lesser relevance to traditional notions of residency and domicile. Federal law provides that members may not "accidentally" lose or acquire a residence or domicile solely by reason of military assignment,6 so indicia of intent are critical to such an analysis. We realize that this commentary is beyond the scope of the issues squarely presented by the decision on appeal and the directions of this Court. Nevertheless, we believe that we would be doing a disservice to this Court if we did not note that the presumptive maximums set out in the statute are contrary to the design of those very statutes, directly affect our analysis, and cause a disconnect in our logic. The maximum presumptive deviation downward would normally be that which would be produced by the Wright/Wesley process, since that would be the sum payable if custody was on a 50/50 basis. 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