The Marren and Page Case List Oren v Deptartment of Human Resources

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Disqualification same or similar action

PAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Times New Roman; FONT-SIZE: 14pt"> The statute limits direct payment to a former spouse to 50% of disposable retired pay for all payments of property division. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1). More than fifty percent of disposable pay may be paid (up to 65% of "remuneration for employment" under the Social Security law, 42 U.S.C. § 659) if there is a garnishment for arrears in child or spousal support, or in payments of money as property other than for a division of retired pay. In other words (and counter-intuitively), about the only part of arrearages arising from a divorce judgment that cannot be satisfied by garnishment from retired pay is arrearages in retired pay. The California Supreme Court adopted the Court of Appeals decision, with a few more changes, as its own. It held that the 1974 case law permitting division of military retirement benefits could be retroactively applied, that actions to partition omitted assets were explicitly permitted under California law, and that McCarty was not to be construed as acting retroactively. Many of the jurisdictional rules for modification of a child support order are the same as those discussed above for initiation of such a case - such as the permissible bases for exercise and application of the long-arm statute. Interpreting Article 6, Section 20 in such a way as to vacate Department D after it was impossible for voters to fill the post at the 2008 election sets up a conflict with Article 6, Section 5, which provides in pertinent part: Cautious practitioners ensure that property settlement agreements and divorce decrees are so crafted as to allow a later reviewing court to transcend any kind of recharacterization of the benefits addressed, whether anticipated (or even conceived of) at the time of divorce, or not. The tools for doing so are explicit indemnification and constructive trust language, and explicit reservations of jurisdiction, either generally, or to award spousal support, or both. Although the total differential in the majority of cases is likely to be pretty small, that error is being made every day in every case that Welfare processes. And Welfare apparently will never do anything about any of the interest it should have collected since 1987, but failed to collect. Those obligees who relied on Welfare to collect what was due under law are just out of luck, and if those who were short-changed by Welfare’s non-collection become public charges at taxpayer expense, we are just out of luck as well. provide for division of military retirement pay in a divorce, or provide that alimony or child support are to be paid from military retired pay.1 Rights granted by State law are limited by federal law, even if State law does not so provide, and even if the courts of the States do not see any such limitations.2 Family court has too often been treated by the rest of the bench and Bar as a red-headed step-child of lesser standing. It is probably time for any conceivable rationalization for such treatment to be purged from the statutes. There is little excuse today for divorce lawyers failing to deal with pension benefits. Pensions have been recognized as community property for many decades,1 and that recognition was extended to unvested and unmatured pension benefits long ago.2 Statutory and case law throughout the country now recognizes pension benefits as marital property with near-uniformity. Rationales for that recognition usually include that the benefits accrued during marriage, that income during marriage was effectively reduced in exchange for the deferred pension benefits, and that the choice was made to forego possible alternative employment which would have paid more in current wages, in order to have the pension. The Court, when discussing the application of the Pereira and Van Camp methods of apportionment, advised that the law of Nevada was that the rents and profits from a spouse’s separate property are separate property and the earnings of either spouse during marriage are community. Id. at 25-26. The husband filed for divorce in Clark County. The wife mailed a demand for change of venue to the clerk of the court. The clerk’s office apparently did not immediately date stamp the document and it was ultimately filed four days later than the statute permitted. The district court found the demand was filed too late and denied the change of venue. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded stating: The mother wanted to move to Florida. The mother also had a history of frustrating visitation. The district court denied the request for relocation. The Court affirmed and held that the frustration of the nonmoving parent’s parental relationship may be part of the calculus of the final Schwartz factor, that being whether, assuming all of the other factors have been considered, and reasonable alternative visitation is available. SUP> Most courts find that Mansell calls on them to essentially take a snapshot at the time of divorce, when the award to the spouse is made. Any disposable retired that was already waived in favor of disability pay up to that point is not divisible, but no post-divorce recharacterization of sums already awarded to the spouse are permitted. This includes cases where there was some disability in place at the time of divorce, but the member seeks to increase the disability award after divorce.13 As a matter of law, it is possible to value the spousal share in at least two ways. The majority of States applying the time rule formula seem to view the "community" years of effort qualitatively rather than quantitatively, reasoning that the early and later years of total service are equally necessary to the retirement benefits ultimately received." In considering whether to deviate for extraordinary visitation, the courts have developed a two part test. First, the court will determine if the visitation is in fact "extraordinary." Visitation that is little over the standard 20% will usually not be considered extraordinary visitation warranting deviation. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Flanagan, 656 So. 2d 1228 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (one month visitation in summer is not extraordinary visitation); In re Marriage of Hornung, 480 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa Ct. APP· 1991) (visitation amounting to 21 % of time for father was not reason for deviation); Temple v. Temple, 651 So. 2d 466 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (statute does not require deviation for extensive visitation; deviation not required, especially where there is no extended continuous period of visitation); Schubert v. Toliver, 905 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (father who had custody for two weeks at end of each of three summer months was not entitled to deviation for extraordinary visitation, since he did not ever have children for 30 day stretch); Susan M. v. Louis N., 206 A.D.2d 612, 614 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1994) (partaking of regular visitation is not a reason to deviate down from the guidelines); Gaudette v. Gaudette, 192 A.D.2d 779, 596 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1993) (every weekend visitation does not constitute extraordinary visitation) Connor v. Connor, 434 Pa. Super. 288, 642 A.2d 1136 (1994) (27% visitation not extraordinary). The essential purpose of the Hague Convention is to return children to their countries of habitual residence, where custody proceedings can then be held. Put into general phraseology of Nevada Domestic Relations Law, the Hague Convention treaty determines - between signatory countries - which court has subject matter jurisdiction to make custody determinations, and the children are sent to that jurisdiction for those proceedings. Nothing more. In 1993, representatives of the PERS bureaucracy, openly hostile to what they considered "interference" by divorce courts in the "orderly" disposition of their retirement system, pushed through a shadow of the far more complex and comprehensive statutory scheme governing private retirement benefits in America, but applicable only to PERS, utilizing terminology not ideally suited for a plan that did not permit the creation of separate interests, but only for a divided payment stream. B> Before June, 1981, the treatment of military retirement benefits upon divorce varied widely from state to state. Many courts in the 1960s and 1970s did not acknowledge such benefits as property, characterizing them as either the sole property of the individual in which they were titled or "mere expectancies." Spouses were seldom awarded an interest in military retirement benefits, as such, upon divorce. The new category of pay is "subject to collection actions" for alimony, child support, community property divisions, etc., so the net effect in terms of former spouses should be the gradual erasure of the reduction that the spouses experienced when the retirees elected to take disability awards. Louisiana X X The Supreme Court rejected the wife’s request. The Court noted that the district court has discretionary power to make an order directing entry of judgment for arrears resulting from failure to pay payment of child support citing to NRS 125.180, and Folks v. Folks, 77 Nev. 45, 359 P.2d 92 (1961). The Court concluded since no transcript was filed it had to assume that the evidence supported the district court’s conclusion as to the amount of the arrears, citing to Meakin v. Meakin, 88 Nev. 25, 492 P.2d 1304 (1972), and Leeming v. Leeming, 87 Nev. 530, 490 P.2d 342 (1971). The Court affirmed previous holdings that the district court had discretion to enter judgment for all or none of the arrears and could have ordered the liquidation of any judgment for arrears in any manner the district court deemed proper under the circumstances citing to NRS 125.180, Folks v. Folks, 77 Nev. 45, 359 P.2d 92 (1961) and Chesler v. Chesler, 87 Nev. 335, 486 P.2d 1198 (1971). Good news: they got divorced in 1995. Bad news: the language of their agreement was ambiguous regarding division of retirement assets. Worst news: by 2005, they still had no QDRO entered after 7 years, thus requiring the next 5 years of trial and appellate litigation. Members who entered service before September 8, 1980, have retired pay equal to terminal basic pay times a multiplier. The multiplier is equal to 2.5 percent times years of service, but is limited to 75 percent. Thus, retired pay equals 50 percent of terminal basic pay after 20 years of service. The following paragraph is an attempt to secure to the former spouse a survivorship interest equal only to the former spouse’s interest in the monthly retirement as reduced for purchase of the survivorship interest. Some points are obvious, such as how long the member has been in the jurisdiction, where the member does his banking, and where he sends his children to school. Investing in local businesses, contributing to local charities, or joining voluntary organizations such as church, civil, professional, or fraternal organizations, indicate ties to the community. Getting married, or buying a burial plot in a place might be construed as evidence of residential intent. On those facts, the father moved to modify child support. The trial court declined to review the motion under NRS 125B.145, finding child support unmodifiable based on the parties’ 2000 stipulated order. The immediate lesson of Schwartz is simply to add a step to the legal analysis in every alimony case (as to reviewing the health of the obligor), but the implications are broader. Probably the most obvious variation from place to place is when to stop counting. California, Nevada, and Arizona are three community property states sitting right next to one another, and it is not unusual for cases to involve parties with ties to any two of them. All three claim to apply the time rule to pension divisions, but they do the math differently. PAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Times New Roman; FONT-SIZE: 14pt"> The statute limits direct payment to a former spouse to 50% of disposable retired pay for all payments of property division. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1). More than fifty percent of disposable pay may be paid (up to 65% of "remuneration for employment" under the Social Security law, 42 U.S.C. § 659) if there is a garnishment for arrears in child or spousal support, or in payments of money as property other than for a division of retired pay. In other words (and counter-intuitively), about the only part of arrearages arising from a divorce judgment that cannot be satisfied by garnishment from retired pay is arrearages in retired pay. In cases where the parties have joint physical custody, the Wright v. Osburn formula determines which parent should receive child support. 114 Nev. 1367, 1368-69, 970 P.2d 1071, 1072 (1998). We take this opportunity to note that Wright overrules Barbagallo's application of the statutory child support formulas in joint physical custody cases. Barbagallo directs the court to identify a primary and secondary custodian and order the secondary custodian to pay the primary custodian child support in accordance with the appropriate formula. 105 Nev. at 549, 779 P.2d at 534-35. This is no longer the law. C) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay un der chapter 61 of this title [10 U.S.C.S. ˜˜ 1201 et seq.[, are equal to the amount of retired pay of the member under that chapter computed using the percentage of the member's disability on the date when the member was retired (or the date on which the member's name was placed on the temporary disability retired list); or Hague Convention judgments by either state or federal courts ordering or denying a return of a child are afforded full faith and credit.3 However, full faith and credit is only to be accorded a decision if a Hague Convention claim was actually adjudicated in the action in accordance with both the Hague Convention and ICARA.4 Thus, a Hague determination should not be considered either precluded or implied from a state court custody decision. Most alimony analyses give no significant weight to the natural talent or primary education of the working spouse (definitionally) "separate property" components to any career success), focusing instead on the education, training, and even business experience achieved during marriage to determine whether there is a legitimate spousal interest in the career asset of the employed spouse. This leads to the conclusion that there is a marital component to the "career asset" of the working spouse in any marriage of significant length. compared to the other parent. In cases in which parents have different time-Sharing arrangements for different children, H% equals the average of the approximate percentages of time the high earner parent spends with each child. And judges should consciously consider their jurisdiction to proceed before wading into the merits of cases, with sufficient knowledge of the jurisdictional rules both to understand what they should not do, and to ignore legally fatuous arguments based on indefensible attacks on their legitimate jurisdiction. If the agreed facts resolve a jurisdictional question, one way or another, the merits can be addressed; if not, the court should focus on convening such proceedings as are necessary to make the factual determinations that permit the jurisdictional call to be made promptly, economically, and correctly.

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