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The Marren and Page Case List Lemkuil v Lemkuil
Learn more about The Marren and Page Case List Lemkuil v Lemkuil.
Property Settlement Agreement arrears for child support and alimonyThe reviewing court affirmed the order requiring reimbursement, rejecting the retiree’s argument that ordering reimbursement violated Mansell, and stating that it merely enforced the parties’ property settlement agreement, rather than dividing disability benefits. Since the case involved a post-Mansell divorce, the decree had included an indemnification provision1 because of the "higher standard of clarity" some courts have required of decrees after Mansell to be certain of the divorce court’s intent. However, the court noted that such enforcement of the intent at the time of the dissolution was appropriate whether or not the original order contained a specific indemnification provision.2 Finally, the appellate court noted that "[t]he equity of the result reached . . . is undeniable."3 SPAN> Carr-Bricken v. First Interstate Bank, 105 Nev. 402, 915 P.2d 254 (1996) While the divorce proceedings were pending, the husband died and was replaced as defendant by respondent First Interstate Bank of Nevada as Special Administrator of the Estate of Jules Bricken. The district court denied the wife’s request for temporary support. The Court held that orders for support pendente lite may be granted in the discretion of the district court citing to NRS 125.040(1). If there is no ten-year overlap, consider substituting an alimony award, which is directly payable irrespective of the length of the marriage/service overlap Retirement benefits are essentially a form of deferred reward for service, and so are generally divisible upon divorce, while disability benefits are conceptualized as compensation for future lost wages and opportunities because of disabilities suffered, and are thus typically not divisible or attachable. When accepting a disability award requires relinquishing a retirement benefit, the interests of the parties as to the proper characterization of the benefits become instantly polarized.1 PAN style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt"> (Emphasis added.) See also Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 1995). Thus, the Convention states that a court may make an award when appropriate, and ICARA compels the court to make an award to the Petitioner, unless the Respondent can demonstrate the "inappropriateness" of such an award. Notably, the federal law provides that such a stay request does not constitute the making of a general appearance and does not waive or relinquish any defenses otherwise available, whether substantive or procedural.6 Second, in relying on Parkinson, the Scott court erroneously expanded the comment made in footnote 1 in Parkinson, 106 Nev. at 483 & n.1, 796 P.2d at 231 & n.l. In that footnote, the Parkinson court mischaracterized the holding in Perri v. Gubler, 105 Nev. 687, 782 P.2d 1312 (1989). Parkinson, 106 Nev. at 483 & n.l, 796 P.2d at 231 & n.I, In Perri, the father had custody of the children and the parties agreed that the mother would not pay child support to the father. 105 Nev. at 688, 782 P.2d 1313. Upon the father's motion, the district court modified the decree to require the mother to pay child support to the father. Id. The Perri court reversed, concluding that because the father provided inaccurate financial information to the district court, the district court would be unable to find that the father's circumstances had changed to warrant a modification of the support order. Id. This court's decision was correct under Nevada caselaw and under the newly amended NRS 125B.080(3), requiring changed circumstances to modify a support order when the parties did not stipulate to the support. 1989 Nev. Stat., ch. 405, § 14, at 859; see Harris v. Harris, 95 Nev. 214,216 & n.2, 591 P.2d 1147, 1148 & n.2 (1979) (interpreting former NRS 125.140(2) as allowing courts to modify child custody and support awards to accommodate changes in circumstances after entry of the order). Although the Perri court did not cite to NRS 125B.080(3), it properly reasoned that because the father had provided inaccurate financial information, he had not adequately proven any changed circumstances warranting modification of the support decree. Perri, 105 Nev. at 688,782 P.2d at 1313. 8) is incapable of self-support because of a mental or physical incapacity that existed before becoming 18 years of age and is dependent on the member or former member for over one-half of the child's support; or bsp; a. NRS 125C.200-parent wishing to move must request the written consent of the non-custodial parent. If the non-custodial parent refuses to consent, the custodial parent may petition the court for permission to move the child. Especially when they were new, there was some question as to whether VSI and SSB benefits were, or should be, divisible as marital or community property because (as with the CSB/REDUX) there is no explicit mechanism for division of the payments with a spouse. 2) Each parent's share of the adjusted basic child support obligation shall then be multiplied by the percentage of time the child or children spend with he other parent to determine the theoretical basic child support obligation owed to the other parent. (3) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection, the parent owing the greater amount under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall owe the difference in the 2 amounts as child support. The language used in NRS 286.6703 (the provision calling for payments to "Alternate Payees") has implications that are significant to the practicalities of litigation, both as to what is stated, and what is not stated. Unlike many other retirement plans, there is no requirement that the order be a final order, so apparently an interim order is enforceable. The "other dependent" language in the definition of permissible alternate payees appears to clear the way for "palimony" or other such awards. There does not appear to be any payment limitation, so even 100% of the benefit could be transferred from the employee to the other party in an appropriate case. NCCUSL modified UIFSA in 2001 to clearly provide that for UIFSA, as for the UCCJEA, jurisdiction is determined by the parties’ actual physical residence at the time a motion to modify is filed.5 The Nevada Legislature adopted those amendments in 2007.6 Any contrary reading would be antithetical to the "certainty and predictability" that the provisions are intended to create, contrary to the case law that exists, and lead to interpreting the two statutes differently from one another for no valid purpose. The reviewing court affirmed the order requiring reimbursement, rejecting the retiree’s argument that ordering reimbursement violated Mansell, and stating that it merely enforced the parties’ property settlement agreement, rather than dividing disability benefits. Since the case involved a post-Mansell divorce, the decree had included an indemnification provision1 because of the "higher standard of clarity" some courts have required of decrees after Mansell to be certain of the divorce court’s intent. However, the court noted that such enforcement of the intent at the time of the dissolution was appropriate whether or not the original order contained a specific indemnification provision.2 Finally, the appellate court noted that "[t]he equity of the result reached . . . is undeniable."3 The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court began by noting that there is rebuttable presumption that, all property acquired after marriage by either spouse is community property citing to NRS 123.220. The Court further noted that the presumption that the property is community property was stronger when any claimed separate property has been extensively intermingled with community property citing to Fox v. Fox, 81 Nev. 186, 401 P.2d 53 (1965). The Court noted that accountants testified extensively as what was commingled and what was not. The Court found that there was substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding that community and separate income and expenditures were traceable citing to Kelly v. Kelly, 86 Nev. 201, 307, 468 P.2d 359, 363 (1970). The mother was the primary custodian. The child sharing arrangement was for every other weekend, plus two week days, plus four weeks in the summer. The child was born in Las Vegas as were both parents, and raised to age two there, and had multiple extended family members (on both sides) in Las Vegas. The mother’s new boyfriend/fiance was from Ohio, and had far more money than she did. While the mother wanted to move to be with the boyfriend, get married, and stay home as a full-time home-maker, she testified that she would remain in Las Vegas if not permitted to remove the child. One California court, surveying cases from around the country, held in 1999 that Mansell does not apply to post-judgment waivers of retirement pay at all, because Mansell held only that disability benefits could not be divided "upon divorce."1 B> As noted above, one of the ways PERS provides benefits for its members is to provide them with a free survivorship interest in their spouse’s life, before or after retirement, and before or after divorce. No corresponding benefit is provided for the spouse - if the member dies before retirement, a former spouse receives nothing. B> The major problem facing bureaucracy is not the struggle for power but the evasion of responsibility; bureaucrats are very reluctant to take action. For a divorce occurring while a member is still on active duty, there are even more variables. First is the uncertainty that the member will retire at all. The precise length of service cannot be known - economic conditions, the defense budget, and world crises all could change the date of separation of a member by several years. Likewise, it is usually impossible to know the rank that such an active duty member will achieve. Each of these factors affects the "present value" assigned to the spousal share. Congress may will decide, as it has in the Civil Service and Foreign Service contexts, that more protection should be afforded a former spouse of a retired service member. This decision, however, is for Congress alone .... in no area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference than in the conduct and control of military affairs." cannot exceed the sum of retired pay waived by the member for VA disability. Because it is not being phased in, CRSC will actually be around longer than CRDP - the latter will disappear as of 2014, when the full amount of longevity pay is restored by the program. 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