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The Marren and Page Case List Kennedy v Kennedy
Learn more about The Marren and Page Case List Kennedy v Kennedy.
Judgments statutory interestFind out where the member last voted; registering to vote usually requires an affirmation of either domicile or residency in the jurisdiction in which the vote is to be cast. Again, when the registration to vote was made could be important, as well as how recently it had last been relied upon. For example, if the registration to vote had been made twenty years ago, and the member last voted years before moving to the forum State, the fact might be of little consequence given events since that time. The February 4, 1991, amendments to the USFSPA, however, put into place a prohibition on partition actions (for omitted pensions) if the underlying divorce decree was dated prior to June 25, 1981, and did not divide the pension or reserve jurisdiction to do so. The amendment had no effect on pre-McCarty divorces which did divide military retirement benefits, or on partition judgments which addressed divorces finalized on or after June 25, 1981. There is one significant valuation problem for defined contribution plans that has not received nearly enough attention in the case law. If the marriage was not completely coextensive with the period of contributions, and there was any variation in the relative rate of contribution over time, a standard time-rule analysis (see below) to value the spousal share might not be appropriate. It would appear to be more precise - i.e., "fairer" - to trace the actual contributions to such an account from community and separate sources, and attributing interest and dividends over time accordingly.1 The scant case authority squarely addressing this issue has agreed with that proposition.2 Ao:::: Approximate annual number of overnights the children will likely spend with parent A 80 = Approximate annual number of overnights the children will likely spend with parent B As = Parent A's base support obligation P> Article 3 state that rights of custody may arise "by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of [the State of habitual residence]."2 This can take several forms. As a matter of logic and math, where the member has a freesurvivorship interest in the spouse’s life, in addition to his own benefits, it seems most appropriate to either have the parties equally divide the premium, or adopt the default position for proportional payments toward that premium. Arizona terminates community property accruals, for the most part, on the date of filing and service of a petition for divorce.1 There, on the same facts, the math would be 10.5 (years of marriage) ¡Â 20 (years of service) x .5 (spousal share) x $1,000 (pension payment) = $262.50. Where the spouse did not consent to non-coverage, and no "special circumstances" are present, the spouse can petition for "instatement" of the benefits later, even after the member’s death.4 The spouse can be named SBP beneficiary even where he or she has little or no time-rule percentage of the retired pay itself.5 The Court noted, that when the parties divorced, they entered into a property settlement agreement which the court approved and made part of the decree. In the agreement, the husband was required to maintain a life insurance policy with the wife being made the irrevocable beneficiary with the apparent purpose to provide for future support and education of the children. At the time of the husband’s death, his second wife was the beneficiary of the policies he did have. The Court concluded that it was permissible for the district court to conclude that the property settlement agreement expressed an intention on the part of husband to provide life insurance for the benefit of his first wife and the children and to conclude otherwise would attribute to the husband an intention to defraud the first wife and the children. The Court found the husband violated the agreement and decree when he designated his second wife as the beneficiary of the insurance policies. The Court held that in such circumstances it was permissible to conclude, that the second wife held the insurance proceeds in a constructive trust for the first wife. The Court believed the district court erred by limiting the constructive trust to $50,000. The Court held that the first wife and the children were entitled to the proceeds of that insurance including the increase in amount by reason of the husband’s accidental death since such increase properly belongs to the person or persons for whose benefit the insurance was required to be carried. The parties were married June 1982. In September 1993, the wife filed for divorce. In March 1994, the parties entered into a written property settlement agreement. The district court required the husband to obtain a life insurance policy. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted the decree did not provide for a corresponding "equal" liability to the wife. The Court found that the district court requiring the husband expend money on the life insurance policy is an "unequal" distribution of debt citing to NRS 125.150(1)(b). Find out where the member last voted; registering to vote usually requires an affirmation of either domicile or residency in the jurisdiction in which the vote is to be cast. Again, when the registration to vote was made could be important, as well as how recently it had last been relied upon. For example, if the registration to vote had been made twenty years ago, and the member last voted years before moving to the forum State, the fact might be of little consequence given events since that time. Joint physical custody may ideally signify something approaching a 50/50 timeshare. However, I am concemed that our judicially mandated 40-percent formula will prove unsatisfactory, especially when used, as intended, to determine support and relocation disputes. Lives change and a child's time is divided, not just between his or her parents, but among friends, school or day care, extended family, sports, and other pursuits. Practical questions seem certain to scuff the bright-line rule-questions like how to count hours the child spends with people besides either parent, or which parent to credit for time the child spends pursuing activities both parents support. Of greater concern, making child support, relocation, and custody determinations depend on parents keeping logs of the number of hours each year a child spends with one parent or the other (leaving aside the calculation and credit questions) detracts from the type of true co-parenting our statutes try to promote. See NRS 125.460; NRS 125.490; see also In re Marriage of Birnbaum, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210, 214-15 (Ct. App. 1989) (dismissing as a "popular misconception" the idea "that joint physical custody means the children spend exactly one-half their time with each parent"; noting that "[p ]arents' demands for equal amounts of a child's time [ can] constitute a disservice to the child"; and that, while "[i]n some cases the nature of the relationship between the parents may necessitate this kind of inflexibility[ u]sually it is temporary, and when the former spouses have adjusted to their new and limited relationship ... mathematical exactitude of time is no longer necessary"); Rutter's, California Practice Guide to Family Law, § 7:358 (2009) (noting that "[a] joint custody order does not mean the child must equally split all of his or her time between the parents"); see also Mosley, 113 Nev. at 60,930 P.2d at 1116 (noting that "NRS 125.460 dictates the public policy of this state in child custody matters [which is] that the best interests of children are served by frequent associations and a continuing relationship with both parents and by a sharing of parental rights and responsibilities of child rearing") (internal citations omitted). B> b. Restrict the Petitioner from freely traveling to or exiting from the country because of the Petitioner’s gender, nationality, marital status or religion. If this hypothetical member had a standard longevity military retirement (or any other standard defined benefit plan1) the above wage history would make his average monthly salary during his last three years’ service $4,014.21, and the military retirement formula2 would make his retired pay $2,007.11. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held where motion for modification of spousal support was filed within the term of support (the last month), but after the final payment was made, the motion to extend the term of support was timely and the district court had jurisdiction to hear it. The term of temporary alimony goes through the last day of the last month of support, even if support was to be paid on the first day of the month. b) If the minority time-share parent is exercising less time than 20%. determine if guideline supoort was reduced by the presumptive maximum set out in NRS 125B.070. If so. the range of potential upward deviation for this factor is the difference between the presurnptive maximum and the percentage of income for support set out in NRS 125B.070(1)(b) If not the range of potential deviation for this factor is based on the trial court's determination of the increased costs being incurred in the majority time-share parent's household by virtue of the lack of the minority time-share parent's visitation. Still, Welfare has come up with a plausible, although illogical, alternative interpretation of the words used. And if a statute is ambiguous, a number of rules of statutory construction come into play. Statutory interpretation should avoid meaningless or unreasonable results. When construing a specific portion of a statute, the statute should be read as a whole, and, where possible, the statute should be read to give meaning to all of its parts. Statutes with a protective purpose should be liberally construed in order to effectuate the intended benefits.1 The scant federal authority has led to the same result as the state cases, but by way of different rationales, primarily involving deferral to state courts in domestic relations cases,1 or squarely addressing and refuting a wide assortment of federal offenses allegedly committed by spouses in state divorce courts.2 1) If, in the case of a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A), a court order provides (in the manner applicable to a division of property) for the payment of an amount from the disposable retired pay of that member or former member (as certified under paragraph (4)) to an eligible spouse or former spouse of that member or former member, the Secretary concerned, beginning upon effective service of such court order, shall pay that amount in accordance with this subsection to such spouse or former spouse. The cases continue to appear, although some states with published authority on the subject are not publishing the follow-up cases, apparently because they were not seen as particularly precedential. The case was eventually appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which determined that state community property laws conflicted with the federal military retirement scheme, and thus were impliedly pre-empted by federal law. The majority held that the apparent congressional intent was to make military retirement benefits a "personal entitlement" and thus the sole property of individual service members, so the benefits could not be considered as community property in a California divorce. SUP> The military retirement system statutes also contain explicit prohibitions against both ordering a military member to retire,4 and ordering payment of a spousal share prior to actual retirement of a member,5 which under current law could mean 40 years of military service. But courts have had no difficulty ordering military members to begin payments upon eligibility.6 UP> Essentially identical holdings to those of this Court have been issued in every other community property State,1 with the exception as noted of Texas, which freezes the spousal share at the rank and grade at divorce. The mother and father divorced in 1987 when their child was one. The mother had primary custody; the father had visitation one week per month, and was to pay support. He paid the support for six months, and exercised five of six weeks of available visitation. Between 1988 and 1992, there was only one visit by the father, and the last phone contact was in April 1991. For the three years prior to the 1992 trial, the father called the mother once or twice per year, but never requested to speak with the child. He also sent only $60 in support during that time, and only after he found out that the mother had requested termination of his parental rights. The district court terminated the father’s parental rights. Option B provides coverage so that payments begin on the later of (1) the date of the retiree’s death, or (2) the date the retiree would have turned sixty. Benefits are actuarially reduced from the sum provided in Option A. The TSP is expressly excluded from the regulations governing the Civil Service defined benefit plans. It is administered by a Board (the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board entirely separate from the OPM, and has its own governing statutory sections and regulations. The TSP Board has its own finance center. Contrary to belief in some circles, the SCRA does affect divorce, custody, and paternity cases,2 but it only applies if the opposing party is on active duty.3 If the member is on active duty, but has not made an appearance, the court may stay the proceedings for at least 90 days on application of counsel or the court’s own motion - if the court determines that there might be a defense which cannot be presented in the absence of the member, or if the member has not been contacted and it can’t be determine if a meritorious defense exists.4 Given the employee’s automatic and free benefit of restoring option one (full) retirement benefits if the former spouse dies prior to retirement, the cost of the one pre-retirement survivorship interest requiring any payment (private insurance in favor of the former spouse) should presumptively be split equally between the parties, as part of dividing their property rights and obligations equally. This is a discretionary (as opposed to strictly legal) decision, but it does not seem reasonable for a trial court to get dragged into a dispute as to which of the two potential beneficiaries is most "deserving" of the SBP - a dispute that would almost certainly devolve into a conflict over the causes of the original divorce, with all of the fault-based overtones that modern divorce practice tries to avoid. The decree required the father to pay $175 per month for child support. He later moved to modify. The district court was critical of the father's lack of desire to cut his own family expenses. The father owned one automobile at the time of the divorce, and bought two more after the divorce even though only one was necessary. The maintenance and insurance for the vehicles was equivalent to the amount of the reduction he was requesting. The district court denied the request. 1. Home State priority. The PKPA prioritizes "home State" jurisdiction by requiring that full faith and credit cannot be given to a child custody determination by a State that exercises initial jurisdiction as a "significant connection State" when there is a "home State." Initial custody determinations based on "significant connections" are not entitled to PKPA enforcement unless there is no home State. The UCCJA, however, specifically authorizes four independent bases of jurisdiction without prioritization. Under the UCCJA, a significant connection custody determination may have to be enforced even if it would be denied enforcement under the PKPA. The UCCJEA prioritizes home state jurisdiction in Section 201. B) If each form of the punishment that would result n the termination of eligibility to receive retired pay is after remitted, set aside, or mitigated to a punishment that does not result in the termination of that eligibility, a payment of benefits to the eligible recipient under th is subsection that is based on the punishment so vacated, set aside, or mitigated shall cease. The cessation of payments shall be effective as of the first day of the first month following the month in which the Secretary concerned notifies the recipient of such benefits in writing that payment of the benefits will cease. The recipient may not be required to repay the benefits received before that effective date (except to the extent necessary to recoup any amount that was erroneous when paid). The parties had a short marriage which produced two children. They divorced in 1998, at which time they were doing well financially, owning two homes and with no debt. The father was a day trader earning a minimum $500,000 per year, and the mother also worked in the securities industry. The mother had primary physical custody, and the father voluntarily paid $3,000 per month in child support, plus the costs of a housekeeper, nanny, and all medical expenses for the children. The Court discussed NRS 123.230(3). The Court then noted that the statute does not apply when the spouses hold property as joint tenants, citing to Allen v. Hernon, 74 Nev. 238, 242, 328 P.2d 301, 304 (1958). The Court further noted the fact that a deed to property owned by a husband and wife is taken in joint tenancy "raises a rebuttable presumption that the property was, in fact, held in joint tenancy," citing to Peters v. Peters, 92 Nev. 687, 691, 557 P.2d 713, 715 (1976). The Court held that there was ample evidence to support the court’s determination that the property was community. The property was purchased with community funds, the wife’s affidavit that the husband had indicated to her that any interest that they had was community and that to months prior to obtaining the loan for the property, both parties alleged in their divorce pleadings that the property was community. Obviously, if the employee manages to reduce or eliminate the value of the TSP prior to a court-ordered division, that fact should be discovered and taken into account. SUP> This made a difference to the totals reached, at least when arrears were due from before July, 1987. Rates before that date were fixed, so changing the arrearage to which a payment was applied altered the calculation. It still was no problem, really, since the uniform policy of the District Attorney’s offices throughout Nevada was to conform to any total judgment as found by a district court. North Carolina X You can find The Marren and Page Case List Kennedy v Kennedy Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection The Marren and Page Case List Boulter v Boulter Public Employees Retirement System PERS Benefits Section III Subsection C Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section III Key Concepts Bankruptcy The Left Behind Parents Rights of Custody Legal Authority for Use in Requesting Fees in a Paid Case Las Vegas lawyer Marshall Willick The Marren and Page Case List Ormachea v Ormachea Murphy v Murphy and Kern The Marren and Page Case List Rosenbaum v Rosenbaum The Marren and Page Case List Peters v Peters The Marren and Page Case List Applebaum v Applebaum The Marren and Page Case List Kramer v Kramer NV Ind Dev v Benedetti Blanch Late Retirement by Members the Smaller Slice of the Larger Pie Court Ordered Divisions of the TSP Survivorship Benefits for the TSP The Marren and Page Case List Kennedy v Kennedy available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map Either Federal or State Courts May Make the Hague Determination The Marren and Page Case List Arnold v Arnold Nevada prenuptial agreement attorney The Marren and Page Case List Cord v Neuhoff Hedlund Amicus Brief Discussion of Issues Requested Constitutional Concerns Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit One |