The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to Q L R
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Temporary Spousal SupportRequiring counsel to choose between having malpractice coverage and getting paid for work done is no choice at all. The real "choice" resulting was between refusing to work for clients who do not have money on retainer at all times, or continuing to do work knowing that there was no practical way to get paid after the end of the case if the client did not wish to voluntarily pay the bill. Technically, the case involved appeal of a default judgment entered by the family court judge (Del Vecchio), which that court had refused to set aside. But on appeal, the case turned on the question of jurisdiction. The Wisconsin joint-custody provisions create a mathematical construct that appears to be similar to the original Rivero formulation. It is triggered at 25%, and like Alaska, usually (but not always) counts overnights as its measure of time, with the trigger-number being 92. Like Alaska, once the formula is activated, total support is increased to 150% to account for redundancy of expenses in the two households. B> As noted by the FLS in its February 28, 2008, Amicus Curiae Brief ("First Brief"), Missouri defines a time share as "joint physical custody" based on the vague and subjective basis of whether the time share is "significant but not necessarily equal." 7 The FLS suggests that the meaning of "joint physical custody" may be improved by the following clarifications. First, by way of "direct tracing." Second, to show that there was "exhaustion" of all potential funds of the opposite character in the source account at the time of the payment in question. Requiring counsel to choose between having malpractice coverage and getting paid for work done is no choice at all. The real "choice" resulting was between refusing to work for clients who do not have money on retainer at all times, or continuing to do work knowing that there was no practical way to get paid after the end of the case if the client did not wish to voluntarily pay the bill. UP> In 1986, the California Supreme Court had held in Casas1 that the USFSPA direct payment limitation on state courts was strictly procedural. At least one California case went further, declaring that where the original divorce decree predated McCarty (i.e., June 26, 1981), the existence of a disability is simply irrelevant to the divorce court’s equal division of retirement (and disability) benefits.2 The 1989 United States Supreme Court decision in Mansell,3 discussed in detail above, made all such prior authority questionable. The district court entered a partial decree of divorce in January 1976, which terminated the marriage, however, it expressly reserved jurisdiction to issue a subsequent decree regarding the division of community property and community debts, and the award of alimony. That supplemental decree was entered May 1976. B> The standard "time rule" formula seems simple enough - the spousal share is determined by taking the number of months of service during marriage as a numerator, and the total number of months of service as a denominator, and multiplying the resulting fraction by first one-half (the spousal share) and then by the retirement benefits received. With repeal of 32 C.F.R. § 63.6, look for current regulations (in flux, but start with Dept. of Defense Financial Management Regulation Volume 7B, Chapter 3 (October, 2000» Other courts hearing these cases have indicated a desire to reach the economic merits, and have not seemed any more impressed with semantics than were the Tennessee courts. For example, in Janovic v. Janovic,25 the member waived a portion of retirement benefits in favor of VA disability benefits less than a year after divorce. The trial court ordered him to pay reimbursement. On appeal, the member claimed that the former spouse was only entitled to a share of "disposable retired pay," and his application for disability had eliminated the disposable pay and created "disability pay," which he alone was entitled to receive. The following paragraph is a safeguard paragraph intended to allow relatively painless discovery from the military pay center in the event further information is necessary to come up with an enforceable order. It is probably only necessary in cases in which the Member is still in service on the date of divorce, so that some information is not known at that time. SUP> On March 12, 2007, the Senate enacted the bill, which revised NRS 33.018 (1)(e) to include subsection (7). In addition to stalking, harassing, and all the other factors listed under NRS 33.018 (1)(e), the Court can now look at abuse of animals as a factor in domestic violence cases. Section (1) of the new bill expands these factors to include purposely injuring or killing an animal as a violation of an order of temporary protection and requiring further criminal prosecution. The wife gave the husband only 24 hours notice prior to a prove-up hearing on a default decree. The husband’s attorney entered a special appearance protesting the lack of sufficient notice. The district court proceeded forward and entered the judgment sought by the wife. The Supreme Court reversed and held that when a defendant has made an appearance in an action, the failure to give notice prescribed by NRCP 55(b)(2) rendered a subsequent default judgment void. Accordingly, the district court should have set aside the judgment. The Court further held that for NRCP 55(b)(2) purposes, a formal appearance in the case was not necessary. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that NRS 18.010(2)(b) permitted an award of attorney’s fees only when the court found that the movant’s claim was brought without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party. The Court approved the rationale of a Florida case which determined the fact a claim becomes frivolous after filing will not support an award of attorney’s fees if it was initially filed in good faith. As a matter of logic and math, where the member has a free survivorship interest in the spouse’s life, in addition to his own benefits, it seems most appropriate to either have the parties There are mechanisms for dealing with members who legitimately have custody of dependent children outside the United States, but fail or refuse to return the children to the U.S. pursuant to a court order.3 The various services have their own implementations of the directive, but the purpose and effect is to obtain compliance with court orders requiring the return to the United States of minor children who are the subject of court orders regarding custody or visitation.4 NCCUSL3 went back to work and in 1997 issued revisions of the jurisdictional aspects of the UCCJA in a new act, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, or UCCJEA. The replacement act was intended to provide clearer standards for which States can exercise original jurisdiction over a child custody determination, enunciate a standard of continuing jurisdiction for the first time, and to clarify modification jurisdiction. It also sought to harmonize the law on simultaneous proceedings, clean hands, and forum non conveniens. As noted above, the home state of a child is given priority in making an initial custody proceeding, but it is still possible for a state that is not the home state to make such an order. The remaining bases are in declining order of priority. B> At least nothing happened in the 2007 resetting of the presumptive maximums that made matters worse for children receiving support. But the entire episode provides an opportunity to think through why we do things the way we do things. Fortunately, on this point, PERS has not been stating that such orders are invalid, and has interpreted the statutory provision as only addressing what the system can and cannot honor. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that ex-stepparent has standing to seek guardianship as a concerned person citing to NRS 159.044(1). The Court further noted that a guardian, except as otherwise ordered by the court, "has the care, custody and control of the person of the ward, and has the authority and . . . shall perform the duties necessary for the proper care, maintenance, education and support of the ward. . . ." citing to NRS 159.079(1). The Court believed it obvious that the stepfather sought to obtain legal recognition of his relationship with the daughter so that he might properly execute the duties that his physical custody of the daughter required. The Court reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions. The Court found that the common theme to all of those cases was attention to the facts and a primary emphasis upon the best interest of the child. The Court ordered that the district court should conduct an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of adjudicating the guardianship petition. On June 26, 1981, the United States Supreme Court focused the debate by issuing its opinion in McCarty v. McCarty The husband in a California divorce had requested that his military ?retirement benefits be "confirmed" as his separate property. In 1977, the California trial court refused, finding that the military retirement benefits were quasi-community property,' and therefore ordered the normal "time rule'" division of the benefits. As explained elsewhere in these materials, the military system does not permit the creation of a divided interest to the spouse, but only a divided payment stream. As detailed in the section immediately below, there is an automatic reversion of the spousal share of those payments to the member, should the spouse die first. And only a bureaucrat could say that going to the Legislature, asking to amend a statute to match how Welfare’s computer is able to do calculations, and having that amendment rejected, somehow constitutes an endorsement just because the Legislature did not also publicly chastise the Welfare Division. The second time, different opposing counsel in a post-divorce matter actually took the deposition of a prior paralegal from this office (who had taken notes during our client’s consultation). When we found out, we immediately moved for disqualification and sanctions. Immediately before the hearing on our sanctions motion, the opposing party fired opposing counsel - and hired his former partner and good friend. The district court judge declined to issue any sanctions, pretending that the confidential information would not simply be handed over from the fired opposing counsel to his good friend, new opposing counsel. You can find The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to Q L R What Almost Happened to Child Support in Nevada and Why We Still Need to Fi Nevada prenuptial agreement attorney Las Vegas QDRO expert Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection The Marren and Page Case List Foster v Marshman Rivero v Rivero Opinion IV A Subsection One The Marren and Page Case List Engebretson v Engebretson The Marren and Page Case List In re Wilsons Estate and Burdick v Pope Las Vegas child visitation attorney Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Part Two The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to Q L R available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map The Marren and Page Case List Hedlund v Hedlund Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Part Two Subsection III C The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to K D L Las Vegas divorce lawyers Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar The Marren and Page Case List Renshaw v Renshaw and Wallaker v Wallaker Some Practical Points to Actual Collection of Child Support Alimony and Pro Reciprocal Links: The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to Q L R The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to Q L R The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to Q L R The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to Q L R |