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The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to J L N
A law firm which was owed over $6,000 in attorneys fees sought an assignment of proceeds from a personal injury case which were owed to its client. The firm called the client and advised her to pick up her file. The district court heard the firms request by telephone; the client did not participate. The district court granted the firms motion and two days later the client picked up the file from the firm. In granting the motion, the district court ordered the client to either execute a partial assignment of the personal injury suit proceeds to the firm or provide security for payment in lieu of the attorneys retaining lien held by the firm. The client failed to exercise either option and the district court ordered the county clerk to sign the partial assignment on the clients behalf. The rationales are the doctrines of comity and abstention,3 and the Nevada Supreme Courts repeated admonitions against bifurcating divorce actions.4 Where actions are pending in courts of different states, whether to stay or dismiss one action or the other should be raised by motion.5 A ruling on whether to stay or dismiss must take into consideration matters outside the pleadings, such as the seriousness of the threat of multiple and vexatious litigation, the convenience of the parties, the status of the foreign actions, and the competing interests of the two forums.6 Considerations of Here, in denying Ms. Rivero child support, the district court relied on the divorce decree, in which the parties agreed that neither would receive child support. NRS 125.155(2)(b) actually does something - it explicitly permits a court to order private life insurance to make up for the lack of any "pre-retirement survivor annuity" in the PERS system.2 The Fifth Circuit has simply held that an award to a former spouse of a portion of the retired pay as property made it her separate property from that day forward, leaving no "debt" to be discharged or otherwise addressed by the bankruptcy court. See In re Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987). The Ninth and Eighth Circuits have generally agreed with this principal, although their opinions diverge on the question of arrearages. These legislative changes are possible examples as to how the law is evolving to ensure animals are not treated as just another piece of property. If you kick your television, it may be broken, but there is no threat that anyone will take it away from you. If you kick "Fluffy," however, he will be taken away, never to return. Additionally, if youre a domestic violence victim who decides to remain with your abuser, you will never see "Fluffy" again either. B> As noted by the FLS in its February 28, 2008, Amicus Curiae Brief ("First Brief"), Missouri defines a time share as "joint physical custody" based on the vague and subjective basis of whether the time share is "significant but not necessarily equal." 7 The FLS suggests that the meaning of "joint physical custody" may be improved by the following clarifications. Although joint physical custody must approximate an equal timeshare, given the variations inherent in child rearing, such as school schedules, sports, vacations, and parents' work schedules, to name a few, an exactly equal timeshare is not always possible. Therefore, there must be some flexibility in the timeshare requirement. The question then becomes, when does a timeshare become so unequal that it is no longer joint physical custody? Courts have grappled with this question and come to different conclusions. For example, this court has described a situation where the children live with one parent and the other parent has every- other-weekend visitation as primary physical custody with visitation, even when primary custody was changed for one month out of the year and the other parent would revert back to weekend visitations. Metz v. Metz, 120 Nev. 786, 788-89, 101 P.3d 779, 781 (2004). In Wright, 114 Nev. at 1368, 970 P.2d at 1071, this court described an arrangement where the parents had the children on a rotating weekly basis as joint physical custody. Many courts have awarded alimony upon divorce to the spouse, on the basis that the member was enjoying a separate property cash flow from disability benefits applied for before divorce ty exists at the time of divorce, the court cannot divide those benefits, but they "may be considered as a resource for purposes of determining [ones] ability to pay alimony."18 Generally, State courts have felt free to make alimony awards where necessary to do substantial justice to the parties in front of them, taking into account the entirety of the actual financial circumstances of the parties. On the other hand, the court held that if a doctor, even a solo practitioner, was willing to leave her name on the practice, even though she herself did not continue to practice, there arguably could be some reputational reliance that she would stand behind the quality of the practice which could have some pecuniary value. should be noted that this new law is only applicable within the state of Nevada, although other States with similar laws could choose to recognize domestic partnerships entered into here, as Nevada has chosen to do with such partnerships entered into elsewhere. As of this time, the Federal Government does not recognize domestic partnerships, which means your partner will not be eligible for Social Security benefits based upon the valid partnership entered into in Nevada, and federal taxes must continue to be filed as if both parties were single. South Carolina X Both parties agree that, after much motion practice, Father did file an Answer and Counterclaim in the district court on or about May 16, 2006.1 Not only did he not deny the district courts jurisdiction over him or any (or all) issues, as he might have done,2 but Father actually sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the court over all issues presented in the case. As with custody cases, the requirement of changed circumstances in child support cases prevents parties "[from filing] immediate, repetitive, serial motions until the right circumstances or the right judge allows them to achieve a different result, based on essentially the same facts." Ellis, 123 Nev. at 151, 161 P.3d at 243 (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, a court cannot modify a child support order if the predicate facts upon which the court issued the order are substantially unchanged. Mosley v. Figliuzzi, 113 Nev. 51, 58-59, 930 P.2d 1110, 1114-15 (1997) (discussing custody orders). Also, the modification must be in the best interest of the child. NRS 125B.145(2)(b). t]he public interest therefore requires that in the securing of professional advice and assistance upon matters affecting ones legal rights one must have assurance of competence and integrity and must enjoy freedom of full disclosure with complete confidence in the undivided allegiance of ones counselor in the definition and assertion of the rights in question. SPAN> NRS 5.050 plainly grants the municipal court jurisdiction to entertain criminal actions charging a misdemeanor violation of the terms of a TPO. The Legislature has not limited the municipal courts jurisdiction over misdemeanor violations of the terms of TPOs. The municipal court thus has jurisdiction to entertain a criminal action charging the misdemeanor violation of a TPO. See McKay v. Las Vegas, 106 Nev. 203, 205, 789 P.2d 584, 585 (1990) (the Legislature defines the jurisdiction of the municipal court). Nevada switched from being an "equitable distribution" to an "equal distribution" State in 1993. Prior to that year, NRS 125.150 required the court to make such disposition of: The Court noted that the only evidence which supported the daughters contention that the property was her mothers separate property was the recitation in the deed that it was conveyed to her as "her sole and separate property." The Court cited to the usual cases that properties acquired is presumed community property and the presumption can only be overcome by clear and certain proof and cited to Todkill v. Todkill, 88 Nev. 231, 495 P.2d 629 (1972); Carlson v. McCall, 70 Nev. 437, 271 P.2d 1002 (1954) and Lake v. Bender, 18 Nev. 361, 7 P. 74 (1884). The Court found that the daughter presented no authority and the Court found none which supported her contention that the words "her sole and separate property" written in the deed were sufficient to overcome the presumption that the parcel was community property. The Court held that the phrase "her sole and separate property" by itself, without supporting evidence, was not clear and certain proof required to overcome the presumption. When it comes to experience in family law, Las Vegas lawyer Marshall Willick can´t be beat. Las Vegas lawyer Marshall Willick has earned a reputation as a diligent trial and appellate court lawyer. We can handle contested divorce, mediation, jurisdiction, penalties and pension problems. A law firm which was owed over $6,000 in attorneys fees sought an assignment of proceeds from a personal injury case which were owed to its client. The firm called the client and advised her to pick up her file. The district court heard the firms request by telephone; the client did not participate. The district court granted the firms motion and two days later the client picked up the file from the firm. In granting the motion, the district court ordered the client to either execute a partial assignment of the personal injury suit proceeds to the firm or provide security for payment in lieu of the attorneys retaining lien held by the firm. The client failed to exercise either option and the district court ordered the county clerk to sign the partial assignment on the clients behalf. The matter of "deemed elections" and former spouse eligibility for SBP payments presents the single biggest malpractice trap in this area, at least when it is attempted without the members cooperation. B> It makes little sense to spend time or money arguing about the merits of cases when the court lacks jurisdiction to act on the subject at all. Lawyers should always focus on the existence or non-existence of jurisdiction as to the subject sought to be brought before the court when initiating (or responding to) any new matter. The parties had been married seven years. The district court ordered the husband to pay the wife a sum of $1,000 per month as rehabilitative alimony for three years to permit her to obtain education in the field of graphic arts. The former husband appealed contending the former wife was not entitled to rehabilitative alimony pursuant to NRS 125.150(8). The Supreme Court affirmed stating: "[i]n considering other factors [in addition to those contained in NRS 125.150(8)], the trial judge in the case at bar specifically found that the earning potential of the [husband] as a general contractor, was much higher than that of [the wife], as a blackjack dealer." Id. at 428. The Court found that the district court making those findings justified an award of alimony pursuant to NRS 125.150(8). Substantially identical decisions have come from both State and federal courts. In Neal v. General Motors Corporation,6 the United States Federal District Court for the Western District of North When these notes go out, I sometimes get a lot of feedback, including inquiries as to how developing matters played out. As its been most of a year since they started, it seemed appropriate to update prior items. A spouse seeking to divide retired pay should NEVER take default against an out-of-state military member; the order will probably be unenforceable and may not be "fixable" in any court anywhere The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court again noted that all property acquired after marriage is presumed to be community property, and the burden of proof is upon the person claiming it to be separate property citing to Lake v. Bender, 7 P. 74, 18 Nev. 402 (1884). Conversations about reconciliation continued thereafter, but at the same time, Abigail filed a motion to alter and amend the decree based on Miltons statements at the reconciliation dinner, in part requesting a new trial. The district court denied her motion in its entirety, and Abigail appealed. At some unspecified point in this process, Milton died. The wife was awarded temporary support. The statute provided that in any suit for divorce the court "may, in its discretion, . . . require the husband to pay such sums as may be necessary . . . for the wifes support . . . during the pendency of such suit" citing to NRS 125.040. The husband contended that under the statute an allowance for temporary alimony was based on the necessity of the wife, and that the evidence showed that the wife did not have necessitous circumstances. The wife contended that the law did not require her to finance her divorce case from her own separate funds while the husband paid for his litigation out of the joint or community properties of the parties. The Court held that the statute did not limit awards for temporary alimony to those cases where the wife was destitute or practically so. The Court held that the statute contemplated such awards when, the facts, circumstances, and situation of the parties, are such that in fairness to the wife she should be given financial assistance for her support during the pendency of the action. The Court concluded that temporary alimony should not be denied because the wife possessed a separate estate where the income therefrom was not sufficient for her support, and she need not resort to the body of her estate before calling on that of her husband. The public-policy disconnect is even more visible where the SCRA meets matters of child custody. Matters involving active-duty military personnel and custody proceedings are inherently problematic. The husband and wife met sometime in October of 1956, and during the first part of 1957 seriously considered marriage. In May 1957, at the offices of husbands attorney located in Columbus, Ohio, the husband and wife executed a prenuptial agreement. At the time, the husband was living in Washington Court House, Ohio, and the wife was living in Columbus, Ohio. The Supreme Court held that the validity of a prenuptial agreement is construed in accordance with the law of the state in which it was entered, citing to Jones v. Jones, 86 Nev. 879, 478 P.2d 148 (1970), and Davis v. Jouganatos, 81 Nev. 333, 402 P.2d 985 (1965). b) Support to be paid. The shared support need of the shared child or children shall be calculated pursuant to subdivision G 3 (a) (iii). This amount shall then be multiplied by the other parent's custody share. To that sum for each parent shall be added the other parent's cost of health care coverage to the extent allowable by subsection E, plus the other parent's work-related child-care costs to the extent allowable by subsection F. This total for each parent shall be multiplied by that parent's income share. The support amounts thereby calculated that each parent owes the other shall be subtracted one from the other and the difference shall be the shared custody support one parent owes to the other, with the payor parent being the one whose shared support is the larger. Unreimbursed medical and dental expenses shall be calculated and allocated in accordance with subsection D. Partition actions, to be enforceable, must be brought with both sufficient "federal jurisdiction" under 10 U.S.C. 1408 and adequate State court jurisdiction. When the partition action is brought in a different State than the one which granted the divorce, some courts have applied the partition law of the former matrimonial domicile,4 while others have elected to use the law of the forum where the suit is heard.5 The USFSPA now only allows partition (or any other post-divorce order affecting the retirement benefits) if the issuing court has proper federal jurisdiction over both the member and the former spouse in the action.6 This is a most dangerous situation for a former spouse. As noted in the section above, spouses lose DIC eligibility upon divorce. And as set out below, there is normally no SBP coverage until after retirement. In other words, the former spouse risks total divestment if the member dies during the period between divorce and the memberfs actual retirement. B> While a bit outside the scope of this seminar, practitioners should be aware that as of October 1, 2007, Nevada adopted the Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act of 2006 (UCAPA), enacted as new chapter 125D of NRS. Jurisdiction to make an order under the statute is present so long as the Court would have had jurisdiction to make a child custody determination under the UCCJEA, including the emergency jurisdiction provision of that act.1 You can find The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to J L N Las Vegas expert pay child support The Marren and Page Case List Weeks v Weeks and Graham v Graham The Marren and Page Case List Emerich v Emerich Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section IV Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar The Marren and Page Case List Bush v State Department of Human Resources Nevada domestic violence specialist lawyer In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section X Subsection B Some Practical Points to Actual Collection of Child Support Alimony and Pro Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section V Subsection F The Marren and Page Case List Arnold v Arnold How Low Does the Bar Go Rivero v Rivero Opinion CONCLUSION Rivero v Rivero Opinion III A Rivero v Rivero Subsection 1 Model Decree of Divorce Clauses Dividing MRB The Tail Wags the Dog The Marren and Page Case List Renshaw v Renshaw and Wallaker v Wallaker The Marren and Page Case List Johnson v Steel Inc Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to J L N available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map Division 50 50 or other Nevada Supreme Court Rivero v Rivero Opinion Section VI Ogawa extending time to file under UCCJEA Less is More and More is Less More or Less Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section XI Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Four A Reciprocal Links: The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to J L N The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to J L N The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to J L N The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to J L N |