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The Marren and Page Case List City of Las Vegas v Las Vegas Municipal Court
Learn more about The Marren and Page Case List City of Las Vegas v Las Vegas Municipal Court.
Domestic Violence jurisdiction65279;These cases collectively stand for the proposition that actual division of the retired pay at divorce was limited to disposable pay, with any shortfall to the spouse to be compensated by other means. Once an award was made, however, in post-decree enforcement, the spouse could be compensated for any action taken by the member that lowered sums payable to the spouse. Courts sometimes differ as to what constitutes "consent"; for most it is any general appearance, but some have required consent to litigation of that particular asset SUP> The confusion was eliminated in McNabney v. McNabney,3 which clarified that as of that time, the applicable statutes should be so construed as to verify that Nevada was an "equitable distribution" jurisdiction, rather than an "equal distribution" jurisdiction, and that (the prior) NRS 125.150 did not mandate an "essentially equal" division of community property.4 To be entitled to a "year" of creditable service, the reservist must obtain at least 50 "retirement points." A point is awarded for each day of active service, or for full-time service while performing annual active duty for training or attending required training. A point is awarded for each drill performed adequately, or for each three hours of military correspondence or extension courses that are successfully completed. There are various other ways of acquiring points. A maximum of 365 points may be earned each year. Any year in which the 50-point minimum is not reached does not count toward retirement, although the points earned in such years eventually factor into the retired pay paid. Finally, examine whether the member owns property in the jurisdiction. While not legally determinative of anything, the fact of whether a member has chosen to purchase real estate in the forum often is seen as having a strong correlation with whether the member treats the jurisdiction as "home." SPAN> In other words, the dollars per month that the spouse would eventually collect only increases very slightly and slowly, and in the meantime, the spouse is NOT receiving the entire spousal interest accumulated up to that time. Given the realities of finite life expectancies, the spouse would usually not live long enough to realize any benefit to waiting for collection. This is even more certain when the time value of money is added to the calculation (i.e., investment/interest/present value calculations). If you have been through a separation and it is time to find a divorce lawyer Ely, call on us for assistance with all your divorce planning needs. If you are worried about child custody laws and you need a child support lawyer, our divorce lawyer Ely will be able to help. The Supreme Court reversed. There was a substantial revision of Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 812 P.2d 1268 (1991). The Court held a district court may not deny a removal petition solely to maintain the existing visitation pattern. The enhancement test was replaced by a showing that the moving party’s quality of life will not decrease by the move. The Court rejected the request of movant to adopt a presumption in favor of removal. However, the Court stated: A division of the benefit "in-kind," also called an "if, as, and when" division, may be the preferable form of dividing retirement benefits. It has the advantages of fully and fairly dividing the actual benefit received without speculation as to actuarial valuation, inflation, life expectancies, etc. Preferred or not, such a division may be necessary if the "present value" of the retirement is so large that there is no other asset that could be traded for the spousal share. The down-side to such an arrangement for the former spouse is risk of further litigation - some members have sought court orders revoking such bargained-for "irrevocable" awards, usually based on the changed circumstances of one party or the other. Even when the former spouse prevails, there is a substantial expense.1 It makes little sense to spend time or money arguing about the merits of cases when the court lacks jurisdiction to act on the subject at all. Lawyers should always focus on the existence or non-existence of jurisdiction as to the subject sought to be brought before the court when initiating (or responding to) any new matter. B> The Hague Convention analysis is not a determination of custody rights. Under Article 19 of the Hague Convention and 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4), "a United States district court has authority to determine the merits of an abduction claim, but not the merits of the underlying custody claim."1 Nevada has an uncomfortable relationship with the law of waiver. Our case law generally favors the honoring of agreements, including waivers. See, e.g., Barelli v. Barelli, 113 Nev. 873, 944 P.2d 246 (1997) (enforcing alimony waiver); State of Montana v. Lopez, 112 Nev. 1213, 925 P.2d 880 (1996) (enforcing child support waiver by conduct); McKellar v. McKellar, 110 Nev. 200, 871 P.2d 296 (1994) (even right to child support can be waived by express agreement); Parkinson v. Parkinson, 106 Nev. 481, 796 P.2d 229 (1990) ("the devil’s bargain"; same). SUP> The bottom line is that the face of the statute requires jurisdiction under its terms for a valid custody order to be entered. Under the facts set out above, the parties would be required to either get a child custody order in the children¡¯s Home State, or obtain an order of the courts of that State declining to exercise jurisdiction. Absent the latter, the Nevada action should not include child custody. Finally, the Alaska formulation contains a "look-back" provision under which courts are to eliminate the joint-custody offset if it was set up based on a custodial schedule that was not in fact followed by the minority-time-share parent, restoring full guideline support. It is for this reason that both state law and the facts of the case are relevant. If the law did not allow such ex parte orders, or the facts indicated no danger of flight, the order would not be appropriate. See Tsalafoas v. Tsalafaos, 34 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D.C. Md. 1999) (when state law does not provide for ex parte procedures to cause the arrest or taking into protective custody of a child, the provisions of ICARA do not confer jurisdiction to obtain such relief); Klam v. Klam, 797 F. Supp. 202 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (facts were insufficient for ex parte relief transferring immediate custody of children, where there was no indication of likelihood of flight and both parties had extensive ties to the area and had participated in litigation there). C. Parenting time adjustments are not mandatory, but presumptive. The presumption may be rebutted in a case where the circumstances indicate the adjustment is not in the best interest of the child or that the increased parenting time by the noncustodial parent does not result in greater expenditures which would justify a reduction in the support obligation. Primary physical custody arrangements may encompass a wide array of -circumstances, As discussed above, if a parent has physical custody less than 40 percent of the time, then that parent has visitation rights and the other parent has primary physical custody. Likewise, a primary physical custody arrangement could also encompass a situation where one party has primary physical custody and the other party has limited or no visitation. See Metz, 120 Nev. at 788-89, 101 P.3d at 781 (describing In 2001, the Arizona Court of Appeals again dealt with the contract theory, federal law supremacy assertion, and claims of "involuntariness" that appeared in several of the cases discussed above, in Danielson v. Evans.29 Because the divorce at issue occurred after Mansell, the prevailing former spouse in Danielson was held to the "higher standard of clarity" in the underlying decree (discussed above) to protect her interests. SUP> Some critics complain that such a formula gives the non-employee former spouse an interest in the employee spouse’s post-divorce earnings, at least where the divorce occurs while the employee is still working. They argue that the spousal share should be frozen at the earnings level at divorce. This approach, however, undervalues the spousal interest by giving no compensation for deferred receipt, and also contains a logic problem, at least in a community property analysis, of treating equally situated persons differently. We’ve noted some disturbing trends relating to paralegals in Nevada, which are worthy of greater attention by lawyers generally, and the Bar disciplinary office in particular. PAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Times New Roman; FONT-SIZE: 14pt"> If a future in-kind distribution of the retirement benefits is made, the same level of attention to detail should be given as if the distribution was immediate. Failure to do so enhances the chances of further litigation upon the member’s eligibility. The simple failure of attorneys to think about deferred retirement issues at the time of divorce is probably the principal cause of post-divorce pension litigation. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court determined that "except for consideration of the economic consequences of spousal abuse or marital misconduct, evidence of spousal abuse or marital misconduct does not provide a compelling reason under NRS 125B.150(1)(b) for making an unequal disposition of community property. If spousal abuse or marital misconduct of one party has had an adverse economic impact on the other party, it may be considered by the district court in determining whether an unequal division of community property is warranted." Id. at 1190. The case was remanded to determine whether there had been such an economic impact. Upon separation from service, a tangle of other rules spring into effect. First, TSP accounts of less than $200 are automatically distributed at the time of separation. If between $200 and $3,500, the sums may be left in the TSP, or withdrawn in a single payment or multiple payments (cashed, or rolled over into an IRA or other retirement account). For accounts containing more than $3,500, the TSP balance can be partially or fully withdrawn in a single payment, or by way of a series of monthly payments, or by way of a life annuity. Any combination of the full withdrawal options is called a "mixed withdrawal." 65279;These cases collectively stand for the proposition that actual division of the retired pay at divorce was limited to disposable pay, with any shortfall to the spouse to be compensated by other means. Once an award was made, however, in post-decree enforcement, the spouse could be compensated for any action taken by the member that lowered sums payable to the spouse. The Court applied the requirements of Hill v. Sheriff, Clark County, 85 Nev. 234, 452 P.2d 918 (1969) to juvenile cases. Hill requires a party seeking continuance of a preliminary examination to submit an affidavit listing the names of the absent witnesses and their residences, if known; the diligence used to procure their attendance; a brief summary of the expected testimony of the absent witnesses and whether their evidence could be adduced through other witnesses; when the affiant first learned the witnesses would not attend the hearing; and that the motion is made in good faith and not for delay. The Supreme Court found that the district attorney’s office could have complied with Hill given the two weeks they had to comply. It would be an error to directly compare post-Mansell cases with those concerning divorce decrees issued prior to Mansell. Courts that have reviewed decrees issued after 1989 have often held the language used in the decree to a higher standard of clarity. This is reasonable, since after Mansell it would be at least theoretically possible for a divorce court to anticipate the question, and issue an order specifically intending to permit or forbid a post-divorce recharacterization of retirement benefits into disability benefits. The private Bar began applying the penalty in late 1995 when it became effective, and the Family Courts uniformly included a penalty assessment per the statute whenever counsel requested (and calculated) it. The calculation was not particularly difficult. The statutory language directed assessing a penalty of "10 percent per annum, or portion thereof, that the installment remains unpaid." UP> In a few places, however, cases indicate that a service member may "un-consent" to court jurisdiction over the retirement issue alone.1 Except in those locations, there generally is not a jurisdictional issue in dealing with the retirement benefits in the divorce action so long as the member is the plaintiff - or a defendant who does not raise the issue. Client agrees that these fees are reasonable on the basis of Attorney’s ability, training, education, experience, professional standing and skill, and the difficulty, intricacy, importance, and time and skill required to perform the work to be done. The parties were married July 1934. In April 1963, the parties entered into a separation agreement. The husband agreed to pay $225 per month for support so long as the wife did not remarry, and $87.50 per month for the support of two of their children. The agreement also provided, that if the husband failed to perform his obligation, the wife could, sue for breach of the contract, or seek such other remedies in law or equity as might be available to her. The agreement also permitted either party to sue for absolute divorce in any competent jurisdiction, to require the agreement to be offered in evidence, and if accepted by the court incorporated by reference in the decree. The agreement provided that notwithstanding incorporation of the agreement into the decree, it was not to be merged in the decree but was to survive and be enforceable as a contract binding upon the parties for all time. The husband then moved to Nevada and obtained a divorce. The agreement was not offered in the action nor did the Nevada court acquire personal jurisdiction over the wife. Rather than paying the wife support, the husband began depositing $75 of the $175 per month he was supposed to in a bank in Las Vegas as an educational fund. The wife then initiated a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act proceeding in New York against the husband. In Nevada, the district attorney, on behalf of the wife, entered into a stipulation with the husband's counsel, which was approved by the court, under which the husband agreed to send $100 per month to the wife for support and continue to accumulate $75 per month as an educational fund. The husband then stopped paying alimony. The wife then commenced an action in Nevada to enforce the agreement claiming that $4,050 was due for alimony and $3,150 was due for child support. A trial was held and the district court reduced the child support to $75 per month and the alimony to $50 per month. On appeal, the husband sought to have court find the parties remained married so that wife’s property transferred to him. The Court held that the district court could modify property or alimony terms without vacating the divorce itself, under the concept of divisible divorce, without violating NRS 125.130. The majority opinion reversed the property provisions of the default decree but left the divorce itself in place. The Court held this result was compatible with Gojack v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 95 Nev. 443, 596 P.2d 237 (1979). The Court appeared to base much of its result in equity by stating: ". .. Wayne now desires to posthumously confer the status of a deceased wife upon Kathleen in order to retain her share of the community property. To permit him to do so would engage the judicial process in an affront to equity. This we refuse to do." Id. at 976-77. The Court also noted that "equity considers as done that which ought to be done." Id. at 978. Partial dissent by Young and Rose, who would have held that setting aside a default decree of divorce did leave the parties married, along with providing a variety of quotable dicta on the oppressiveness of attorney’s fees. As to improvements to real estate, the Court found that "usually" simple reimbursement without interest is the proper measure, unless the party making the claim can establish that appreciation of the property was due to the improvements, not the market, in which case the trial court may apportion appreciation to the contribution of the party making the claim. 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