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The Marren and Page Case List Christensen v Christensen Peters v Peters and
The Supreme Court held that a partition can be made in either an annulment or a divorce action. The right to partition is one of the rights of a tenant in common. The Court noted that every tenant in common that had the right to the present enjoyment of the property, or the proceeds thereof, and was entitled to demand a partition of the property as a matter of right. The convenience or inconvenience of the parties is not to be considered. The district courts decision of ordering the partition was affirmed as the lot could not be divided without great prejudice to the plaintiff. SPAN> For example, drafting counsel must ensure that the facts make the former spouse eligible for direct collection - which requires satisfaction of the jurisdictional factors, and that the military service of the member overlapped the marriage to the spouse by at least ten years. Whether there is or could be early or late retirement, or a disability or post-retirement civil service employment, etc., all should be dealt with explicitly in the order. Whether the measuring point for the retirement should be the rank and grade at the time of divorce, or at actual retirement, should be addressed. The model language attached below contains clauses to deal with all these contingencies. Most of the States employing a standard qualitative time-rule division of retirement benefits hold that the interest of a former spouse in retired pay is realized at eligibility for retirement, entitling the spouse to collect a portion of what the member could get at that time irrespective of whether the member actually retires.1 Most such holdings have employed some variation of the phrasing used by the California court in Luciano: "The employee spouse cannot by election defeat the nonemployee spouses interest in the community property by relying on a condition within the employee spouses control."1 Presumably, other States could have still different rules for measuring when the community or coverture period started or ended. Such variations could lead to significantly different sums collected by the respective spouses over the course of a lifetime. In view of the result ultimately reached, it apparently would have been perfectly appropriate for the law firm to have contracted for its hourly rate, plus an additional $50,000 if they reached Judy's original target settlement, so long as they phrased the fee as a "results-achieved" bonus rather than a contingency percentage. d) If a prima facie case is made for deviation in either direction. determine whether the benefit that would be enjoyed by the deviation-seeking party and the child is greater, lesser, or the same as the detriment that would be suffered bv the other party and the child. Only where the benefit is greater than the detriment - usually measured by comparison of household income would the deviation be Qranted. In 1907, the husband entered into an agreement to purchase a ranch, with the purchase price being payable in annual installments. The opinion is not specific as to exactly when, but another tract of land was purchased prior to marriage. In 1908, the parties married. A deed was executed in 1910, granting the property to the husband. Later in 1910, the husband and wife entered into an agreement to sell the property. Some of the recitals in the sales agreement indicated that the husband and wife joined in the agreement to sell, that payment was to be made to both parties. The purchase price for the property was paid for in 1911. Subsequently, and prior to the divorce, two tracts of land were purchased. In 1916, the parties divorced. The husband died in 1918 intestate with the tracts of land still in his name. The question for the district court was whether the property was community or separate. The district court ruled that the wife was the owner, of an undivided half-interest in two of said tracts of land, and of an undivided 82/100 interest in one of tracts The Court held that property to which one spouse has acquired an equitable right before marriage is separate property, though such right is not perfected until after marriage. The property would be community property to the extent and proportion that the purchase price is contributed by the community. The decree was filed August 1988. In the decree, the husband agreed to assume responsibility for Visa charge accounts. In September 1988, the husband filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. As a result, the wife was left solely responsible for those debts. Because she was now responsible, the wife filed for spousal support. The district court granted the wife's request for support. The district court specifically found that the husband's promise to hold the wife "harmless" was an obligation "characterized as in the nature of alimony, maintenance and support," and that the wife "would have been inadequately supported" without it. The district court ordered the husband to pay to the wife the amount ofthe debts he agreed to be responsible for in the decree, but tried to discharge in bankruptcy. Lombardi v. Lombardi, 44 Nev. 314, 195 P. 93 (1921)The wife owned a house through inheritance at the time of marriage. During themarriage, the husband spent money constructing a sewer, rebuilding the brick dwelling-house and making other improvements in the amount of $2,900. When the divorce was granted, the district court ordered that the property used during the marriage as the residence was the wifes separate property. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that the husband did not argue that his expenditure of monies in improving his wifes separate property did not operate to change title and that in the absence of any specific agreement to the contrary, title to the improvements followed the land. The Court held that monies paid by the husband to the wifes estate was presumed to be a gift. 1) In cases of shared physical custody, the adjusted basic child support obligation shall first be divided between the parents in proportion to their respective adjusted actual incomes. Social Security has been addressed in some detail by the Nevada Supreme Court, and those discussions are detailed elsewhere. At this juncture, it is enough to note that if a marriage lasts at least ten years, the former spouse is eligible for certain benefits under Social Security upon attaining retirement age, (if not remarried), based upon the spouses own earnings, or those of the wage-earner spouse, whichever are greater. Such Social Security payments are statutory entitlements that do not reduce benefits paid to retirees. Some points are obvious, such as how long the member has been in the jurisdiction, where the member does his banking, and where he sends his children to school. Investing in local businesses, contributing to local charities, or joining voluntary organizations such as church, civil, professional, or fraternal organizations, indicate ties to the community. Getting married, or buying a burial plot in a place might be construed as evidence of residential intent. SUP> In every contested case, there is some period of delay between the close of evidence and the formal entry of a decree, since the paperwork has to be drafted. The Courtfs previous remands have always directed the parties to the valuations and distributions of property made at the close of evidence; the only date referenced in Forrest was the date of trial, although the procedural history reflects that in that case motions were filed which tolled the date of final judgment for some time.7 In the Matter of Parental Rights as to K.D.L., 118 Nev. 737, 58 P.3d 181 (2002) As to failure of parental adjustment, the parent must be shown to be at fault in some manner and cannot be judged unsuitable by reason of failure to comply with the requirements and plans that are impossible to abide by. Incarceration, standing alone, is insufficient grounds to terminate parental rights. The willingness of the father to provide support and desire to maintain contact did not obviate the danger he presented to them by way of his violent criminal history. NCCUSL3 went back to work and in 1997 issued revisions of the jurisdictional aspects of the UCCJA in a new act, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, or UCCJEA. The replacement act was intended to provide clearer standards for which States can exercise original jurisdiction over a child custody determination, enunciate a standard of continuing jurisdiction for the first time, and to clarify modification jurisdiction. It also sought to harmonize the law on simultaneous proceedings, clean hands, and forum non conveniens. SUP> On March 12, 2007, the Senate enacted the bill, which revised NRS 33.018 (1)(e) to include subsection (7). In addition to stalking, harassing, and all the other factors listed under NRS 33.018 (1)(e), the Court can now look at abuse of animals as a factor in domestic violence cases. Section (1) of the new bill expands these factors to include purposely injuring or killing an animal as a violation of an order of temporary protection and requiring further criminal prosecution. B> The Section working group feels constrained to point out that the error corrected above was a result of application of the presumptive maximums set out in NRS 125B.070. The current Nevada presumptive maximum provisions distort and are contrary to the theoretical application of the Nevada child support statutes.1 Libro v. Walls, 103 Nev. 540, 746 P.2d 632 (1987)The parties had a child and the wife filed for divorce. The husband allowed default to be entered against him and was ordered to pay child support. The husband then found out he was not the father. The wife sought to reduce the child support arrears to judgment. The district court ruled that the husband could not raise non-paternity as a defense. The USFSPA is both jurisdictional and procedural; it both permits the State courts to distribute military retirement to former spouses, and provides a method for enforcement of these orders through the military pay center. The USFSPA itself does not give former spouses an automatic entitlement to any portion of members pay. Only State laws can provide for division of military retirement pay in a divorce, or provide that alimony or child support are to be paid from military retired pay.1 Rights granted by State law are limited by federal law, even if State law does not so provide, and even if the courts of the States do not see any such limitations.2 The Supreme Court held that a partition can be made in either an annulment or a divorce action. The right to partition is one of the rights of a tenant in common. The Court noted that every tenant in common that had the right to the present enjoyment of the property, or the proceeds thereof, and was entitled to demand a partition of the property as a matter of right. The convenience or inconvenience of the parties is not to be considered. The district courts decision of ordering the partition was affirmed as the lot could not be divided without great prejudice to the plaintiff. A "Thrift Savings Plan" ("TSP") was created by the 1986 statute creating the "Federal Employees Retirement System," or FERS, which replaced the older Civil Service Retirement System," or CSRS. It first accepted contributions on April 1, 1987. FERS employees get matching federal contributions up to a certain level. While the program is open to CSRS employees, there are no matching contributions for them. The TSP is a defined contribution type of plan for federal employees; like a private employer's 40 l(k) plan, it is a mechanism for diverting pre-tax funds into retirement savings. Even in non-family law matters, this new residency law could alter legal relationships, liability to suit, and enforceability of judgments in a host of contractual and tort matters. B> There was a twenty month "gap" between the McCarty decision and the congressional enactment. The USFSPA was expressly made retroactive to the start of the gap period, but the language used left some room for interpretation.10 Some states, such as Washington, found the federal law sufficient to allow their courts to address those persons who had been divorced during the gap under common law and statutory procedures.11 In those states, motions could be brought to divide the retirement benefits if they had been omitted, or to divide the benefits if they had been awarded solely to the member while McCarty was the law of the land. The property in question was Lucini & Associates, a closely held subchapter "S" corporation. When the parties were married in 1966, the husband was president and majority stockholder of the company. During the marriage, the husband, together with the other stockholders and employees, were paid salaries. All excess capital was dispersed annually. Also, during the marriage, the husband decreased his ownership in the company from 51 percent to 30.08 percent. The district court determined that the husband received full value in salary, profit distributions and fringe benefits, and that there was no community interest. The Court noted that it had previously adopted the Pereira and Van Camp methods of apportionment. The Court acknowledged that in Cord v. Neuhoff, 94 Nev. 21, 26, 573 P.2d 1170, 1173 (1978), it held that the preferred method was that suggested in Pereira "unless the owner of the separate estate could establish that a different allocation was more likely to accomplish justice." The Court also acknowledged that in Wells v. Bank of Nevada, 90 Nev. at 195, 522 P.2d at 1017, that it held apportionment pursuant to the Van Camp method was proper to achieve substantial justice, when "the community was fully compensated for the . . . community labor through [the husbands] annual salary and related benefits." Id. at 214-15. The Court held the district court did not abuse its discretion is using the Van Camp method of apportionment as the record supported the court finding that community was compensated through the husbands annual salary and benefits. B> At least nothing happened in the 2007 resetting of the presumptive maximums that made matters worse for children receiving support. But the entire episode provides an opportunity to think through why we do things the way we do things. While courts have been uncertain how to characterize the nature of the SBP,3 those squarely addressing the question have concluded that a spouse is "to be awarded a proper share of both the former husbands military retirement plan and the survivor benefit plan," because of the "´potential unfairness to the wife should her former husband predecease her, thereby extinguishing pension rights."4 Scenario six therefore is the same "default" as set out in scenario two, the only difference being that the base amount is lowered, from the entire retirement benefit, to only that portion of which 55% would equal the former spouses lifetime interest, in this hypothetical case, $454.55.8 Since the 6.5% premium is reduced to only $29.55, the members 75% of the $970.45 of remaining "disposable retired pay" yields $727.84, and the spouses 25% yields $242.61. The member effectively pays $22.16 toward the premium cost, and the spouse pays $7.39. You can find The Marren and Page Case List Christensen v Christensen Peters v Peters and Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Question of Outright Prohibition Support Flow An Introduction to Pensions in Nevada Divorce Law Section I Subsection B Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection An Introduction to Pension in Nevada Divorce Law Section III Subsection C The Marren and Page Case List Carlson v Carlson The Marren and Page Case List Milender v Marcum Cook v Cook and Guerin v Gu Las Vegas public employees retirement lawyer Coping with COLAs Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section III Subsection Nevada ERISA lawyer The Marren and Page Case List Christensen v Christensen Peters v Peters and available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map Ogawa extending time to file under UCCJEA Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar Any Reimbursment to Separate Property for Monies Expended and Mandatory Dis Status Divorce Partial Decrees or Bifurcated Divorces Allowed In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony Section IV Legal Authority for Use in Requesting Fees in a Paid Case Rivero v Rivero Opinion Section VI Reciprocal Links: The Marren and Page Case List Christensen v Christensen Peters v Peters and The Marren and Page Case List Christensen v Christensen Peters v Peters and The Marren and Page Case List Christensen v Christensen Peters v Peters and The Marren and Page Case List Christensen v Christensen Peters v Peters and |
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