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The Marren and Page Case List Carlson v Carlson
Learn more about The Marren and Page Case List Carlson v Carlson.
Pensions fraudFinally, examine whether the member owns property in the jurisdiction. While not legally determinative of anything, the fact of whether a member has chosen to purchase real estate in the forum often is seen as having a strong correlation with whether the member treats the jurisdiction as "home." The district court denied a motion for a reduction in child support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an affidavit, by itself, in support ofa request ofa reduction of child support was insufficient, citing to Green v. Green, 75 Nev. 317, 340 P.2d 586 (1959) (held that spouse's affidavit which alleged that she had insufficient funds was legally insufficient.) Deviation would probably be granted, because the detriment suffered in the household where the child spent 57% of his time, with $10,000 income for that household, would presumably be less than the benefit that the party making $5,000 per month could get from having support lowered from $664. The potential deviation would be enormous under this analysis, where the minority time-share parent has less income than the majority time-share parent ¨C between paying $664 if considered "secondary custodian" and receiving $664 under the Wright/Wesley analysis if considered a "joint physical custodian."3 This is where the district court must exercise its discretion to provide adequately for the child in both households. The short answer is "yes." The only fair reading of NRS 125.155(2) is permissive,1 and obviously, if a court "may" do something, it can just as easily not do it. A secondary issue is raised by the issuance of the Sertic and Wolff opinions after the effective date of the statute, however. Finally, examine whether the member owns property in the jurisdiction. While not legally determinative of anything, the fact of whether a member has chosen to purchase real estate in the forum often is seen as having a strong correlation with whether the member treats the jurisdiction as "home." II. The Supreme Court’s Adoption of the Missouri Definition of "Joint Physical Custody" Is Appropriate, but the FLS Requests Guidance as to What Constitutes a "Significant but Not Necessarily Equal" Time Share and to Define All Forms of Custody The State high court concluded that the result reached by the trial court was "fair and equitable and within its authority." The court went on to approve prior holdings stating that whenever a retiree has a choice of electing retirement or disability benefits, and chooses the latter, for whatever reason, he "could not by electing to take a disability award rather than a regular retirement eliminate the community interest in the award."7 c) A parent's failure to regularly exercise the court-ordered or agreed time-sharing schedule not caused by the other parent which resulted in the adjustrnent of the amount of child support pursuant to subparagraph (a)10. or paragraph (b) shall be deemed a substantial change of circumstances for purposes of modifying the child support award. A modification pursuant to this paragraph shall be retroactive to the date the noncustodial parent first failed to regularly exercise the court-ordered or agreed time-sharing schedule. This is an essential concept, which practitioners ignore at their considerable peril in malpractice. As noted at the beginning of these materials, there are malpractice dangers in all retirement-related cases; they most severe relating to survivorship matters. The potential losses to the client are catastrophic, and the resulting risks to counsel are enormous.2 Ms. Rivero argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for child support by not reviewing the parties' affidavits of financial condition and noting the discrepancies in the parties' incomes. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Rivero's motion for child support because it did not make specific findings of fact supported by substantial evidence. In reaching our conclusion, we first address the circumstances under which the district court may modify a child support order and discuss the calculation of child support in primary physical custody and joint physical custody arrangements. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that the litigation was between the father and the mother and that the maternal grandparents were not parties to it, have never enjoyed legal custody of their grandchildren, and have never asserted a claim to such custody. The grandparents court as witnesses and apparently were amenable to the responsibilities of custody should the court decide such a course to be the desirable one. The Court further noted that it was reluctant to approve an award of custody to nonparties. The Court then looked at the legislative history. The Court concluded that the custody statute and the guardianship statute, when read together, created a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent is to be preferred over nonparents with respect to custody. The Court further concluded that the best interest of the child is usually served by awarding his custody to a fit parent citing to Peavey v. Peavey, 85 Nev. 571, 460 P.2d 110 (1969), where we ruled that as between fit parents, a child of tender years should be awarded to the mother. Here, there was no finding that the father was unfit to have custody. The Court concluded that the father was entitled to the custody of his daughters. Whether everyone is living happily together or not, if the member dies before a divorce is final,1 the spouse is the recipient of certain benefits made available for the survivors of active duty military personnel, under 38 U.S.C. § 1311(a), which created a program called Dependency and Indemnity Compensation ("DIC"). DIC payments have been payable to the survivors of any veteran who died after December 31, 1956, from a service-connected or compensable disability.2 DIC payments are not made to persons divorced from members.3 In sum, in the absence of anything indicating otherwise, property is to be divided equally. And that "anything," in Nevada, is required to rise to the level of a "compelling reason" for an unequal division. Still, it would appear that judges have significant latitude for finding such reasons, and need only make their findings in writing, and avoid obvious abuse of their discretion, to justify an unequal distribution of property. In August, the district court conducted a three-day hearing and found that the woman’s testimony "was motivated by animus toward [the man] and that [the man’s] testimony was credible." Finding that the son called the man "daddy," the lower court found the woman’s corrections of the child to be "further indicia of both [the woman’s] animus and of [the man’s] position as a father." The district court found that the man had "equitably and constructively adopted" the son, supporting this decision by a finding that the man had placed himself in loco parentis and that it would be "devastating" to the son to have the man treat him any differently than the daughter. This Brief also asks this Court to announce decisions as to definitions, and a couple of policypoints (such as whether the flow of child support to minority time share parents is permissible). The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that a change of custody is warranted only when the circumstances of the parents have been materially altered and the child’s welfare would be substantially enhanced by the change citing to Ferguson v. Krepper, 83 Nev. 408, 432 P.2d 668 (1967); Lyerla v. Ramsay, 82 Nev. 250, 415 P.2d 623 (1966); Sisson v. Sisson, 77 Nev. 478, 367 P.2d 98 (1961), and Osmun v. Osmun, 73 Nev. 112, 310P.2d 407 (1957). The inquiry made in a Hague proceeding therefore splits into three questions: Where was the child’s habitual residence? Did the parent who had the child in the other contracting state have a right of custody under the law of the State of the child’s habitual residence, which was actually being exercised (or would have been but for the removal or retention)? If so, did the removing or retaining parent’s actions violate those rights? The Court noted, that when the parties divorced, they entered into a property settlement agreement which the court approved and made part of the decree. In the agreement, the husband was required to maintain a life insurance policy with the wife being made the irrevocable beneficiary with the apparent purpose to provide for future support and education of the children. At the time of the husband’s death, his second wife was the beneficiary of the policies he did have. The Court concluded that it was permissible for the district court to conclude that the property settlement agreement expressed an intention on the part of husband to provide life insurance for the benefit of his first wife and the children and to conclude otherwise would attribute to the husband an intention to defraud the first wife and the children. The Court found the husband violated the agreement and decree when he designated his second wife as the beneficiary of the insurance policies. The Court held that in such circumstances it was permissible to conclude, that the second wife held the insurance proceeds in a constructive trust for the first wife. The Court believed the district court erred by limiting the constructive trust to $50,000. The Court held that the first wife and the children were entitled to the proceeds of that insurance including the increase in amount by reason of the husband’s accidental death since such increase properly belongs to the person or persons for whose benefit the insurance was required to be carried. When community funds are used to pay mortgage payments on separate property, the community acquires an interest to the extent and in the proportion that the purchase price is contributed by the community, citing to Sly v. Sly, 100 Nev. 236, 679 P.2d 1260 (1984). 1 For example [using strictly illustrative numbers], if MEMBER was eligible to receive $1,000 in monthly retired pay when he was first eligible to retire, but he continued in service and SPOUSE received a spousal percentage 0[40%, she would receive $400 per month. If MEMBER continued in service for some time, during which cost of living adjustments increased the sum payable to SPOUSE to $440, and then M EM BER retired, and received $1,500 in actual monthly retired pay, then SPOUSE's portion would be recalculated by dividing the sum SPOUSE was receiving by the sum MEMBER received upon retirement (in this example, 440 -7- 1,500), yielding 29.3333%. SPOUSE would then receive future cost of living adjustments to the recalculated percentage to wh ich she was entitled of M EM B ER's actual retired pay. In fact, Tomkins itself is such a case - the first fee dispute panel found that the straight hourly value of the time put in by Marquis & Aurbach was $23,000, but that a "reasonable fee" would be $75,000. The only reasonable construction of the $50,000 additur was that it was added under the "novelty, difficulty, and skill," and "amount involved and results achieved" subsections of RPC 1.5. The parties separated and entered into a property settlement agreement which provided for the payment of child support and spousal support. After the husband filed for divorce, he stopped making payments. The district court ordered support pendente lite and at a level lower than required in the agreement. The wife sought to reduce the arrears to judgment. The Court held the district court was without discretion to modify those arrears for support that had accrued to the time the court made its own support order when the decree of divorce was entered. By treating the "career asset" as just one more thing to divide, alimony can be analyzed almost as readily as property. Looked at this way, any alimony award outliving the income stream thrown off by the career would not be compensatory to the former spouse, but a transfer of wealth from one party's separate property to that of the other. Where the property accrued during the marriage is divided, presumably equally, alimony awards reaching beyond the exhaustion of the career asset can be seen as unfair. For example, drafting counsel must ensure that the facts make the former spouse eligible for direct collection, if possible - which requires satisfaction of the jurisdictional factors, and that the military service of the member overlapped the marriage to the spouse by at least ten years. The uniform acts go a long way toward avoiding a "Catch-22" of an obligor by providing limited immunity - a party participating in a UIFSA proceeding has immunity from both accidental appearance and from service of civil process while litigating the UIFSA proceedings or while physically present to participate in them.8 A similar provision is included in the UCCJEA,9 so it should not be possible to "boot-strap" a child custody case onto a child support case, or vice-versa; rather, it is necessary to have independent jurisdiction under the respective statute to conduct proceedings on that subject. On April 20, 2009, Respondent, Hon. Robert W. Teuton, filed an Opposition to Motion to File Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto and for Other Related Relief. Presumably, other States could have still different rules for measuring when the community or coverture period started or ended. Such variations could lead to significantly different sums collected by the respective spouses over the course of a lifetime. The lower court eventually dismissed Jill’s petition, finding that it had no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a claim for division of a military retirement, because in the absence of a current existing marriage, it had no provision under State law permitting it to hear a case between these persons. In other words, the court found that the fact of a completed (German) divorce prevented the State court from acting. At the time of the divorce, the parties had a residence, a lot in Fallon, a nine acre parcel by the river, two secured promissory notes, some small bank accounts, cars and other personal property. The wife had the residence from a prior marriage and title remained in her name during her marriage. Title to the rest of the real property and securities was placed in joint tenancy. The residence was remodeled and improved with separate funds the husband received from an inheritance. The remaining realty and promissory notes were also acquired with these funds. The district court made an equal distribution of all of the property. You can find The Marren and Page Case List Carlson v Carlson The McCarty gap Chaos in Wonderland Rivero v Rivero Opinion Section II A Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act Introduction to Nevada Law of Child Custody and Visitation in Divorce The Marren and Page Case List Lewis v Second Judicial Dist Court The Marren and Page Case List Mullikin v Jones Neumann v McMillan Waldman v Rivero v Rivero Opinion Pickerings Opinion Domestic Torts in Nevada The Marren and Page Case List Carlson v Carlson available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. 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