The Marren and Page Case List Awad v Wright Lamb v Lamb and Dept of Child a

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In August 1946, a decree entered granting a divorce to the wife and awarding her custody of the children, and ordering that the husband pay support and approving a property settlement agreement. In January 1947, the wife noticed a motion to amend the decree. The wife wanted to amend the decree by having the court adopt as a part of the decree the provisions of the property agreement, and further requested that the amendment be entered nunc pro tunc as of August 1, 1946. The husband consented for amendment. The district court granted the motion. The original decree of August 1, 1946, had provided "It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the property settlement agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant on the 4th day of May 1946, be, and the same is, hereby approved." The amended decree of January 6, 1947, repeated the language and added, among other things, the following: "It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that defendant pay plaintiff until her remarriage, as and for her support and maintenance, the sum of $1,350 per month commencing on August 4, 1946, and thereafter on the 4th day of each month until and including April 4, 1947; and, thereafter on the 4th day of each month commencing May 4, 1947, that defendant pay plaintiff as and for her support and maintenance, a sum equivalent to 36% of his monthly earnings, provided, however, that the monthly payments commencing May 4, 1947, shall not exceed the sum of $1,350 or be less than the sum of $450; that at the end of each year during the term of the aforesaid agreement, defendant shall deliver to the plaintiff a statement of his earnings during the preceding year, said statement to be ertified to be correct." In March 1947, the husband filed a motion to modify. The wife contested the jurisdiction of the court to modify. The district court rejected her contention and modified. Division of the only premium that has to be paid is a superior choice to any other in a community property analysis. Having the member bear the entire premium would only appear to be a correct result if the court determined that such a result was mandated as a matter of disparity of income. Similarly, it would be improper to have the former spouse bear the entirety of the SBP premiums in States (like Nevada) where the courts are required to equally distribute marital property and debts, because the benefit going to the member in the event of the spouse’s death is greater, and there is no cost to that survivorship interest. On July 29, 2009, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause in In the Matter of the Commission of the Honorable Robert W. Teuton, District Judge, Docket No. 54238, ordering that: The parties stipulated the event a divorce is granted the husband shall pay to the wife for her support and maintenance $150 per month. However, if the husband reverted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, the payments would be reduced to $100 per month. The decree was entered August 1943. On March 5, 1946, the husband reverted to the Rank of Lieutenant Colonel and on March 6, 1946, was promoted to Colonel. The district court denied the husband's attempt to reduce his support obligation. the parties divorced in 1972. The district court approved a property settlement agreement. The wife was awarded $15,000 payable in $1,000 quarterly installments. The parties then remarried in 1973. In 1975, the parties divorced a second time. The wife sought to have the property settlement agreement declared void and sought separate maintenance. The district court granted the husband a divorce, refused to declare the property settlement void, and awarded the wife $12,000 payable in $1,000 monthly installments as her share of the community property. The wife argued the property settlement agreement was void because of extrinsic fraud committed by the husband. The wife claimed fraud because she and the husband were in a confidential or fiduciary relationship with her when the agreement was negotiated. The wife also claimed that the husband was much older than her, was more experienced in business and financial matters, had remained on a friendly basis with her during divorce proceedings, and had misrepresented the size of the community alleged to be $1,200,000 and the $15,000 settlement, was claimed to render the agreement unconscionable and presumptively fraudulent. The wife admitted she consulted with an attorney to determine if the agreement was enforceable, but claimed that she was unrepresented as to the substance of the agreement. 4) Upon the request of a court or an eligible spouse or former spouse of a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) in connection with a civil action for the issuance of a court order in the case of that member or former member, the Secretary concerned shall determine and certify the amount of the monthly retired pay that the member or former member would have been entitled to receive as of the date of the certification-- The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that while the wife had consulted with an attorney and was given advice concerning the property settlement agreement, that attorney did not represent the wife in the divorce and the wife signed the property settlement agreement in proper person. The agreement at issue awarded the law practice to the attorney husband; however, no value for the practice was advanced by the attorney husband. The Court held the attorney husband breached his duty for full and fair disclosure to the wife and that the agreement was fundamentally unfair. The Court discussed the case of Williams v. Waldman, 108 Nev. 466, 836 P.2d 614 (1992) and noted similarities and differences between the two cases. In August 1946, a decree entered granting a divorce to the wife and awarding her custody of the children, and ordering that the husband pay support and approving a property settlement agreement. In January 1947, the wife noticed a motion to amend the decree. The wife wanted to amend the decree by having the court adopt as a part of the decree the provisions of the property agreement, and further requested that the amendment be entered nunc pro tunc as of August 1, 1946. The husband consented for amendment. The district court granted the motion. The original decree of August 1, 1946, had provided "It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the property settlement agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant on the 4th day of May 1946, be, and the same is, hereby approved." The amended decree of January 6, 1947, repeated the language and added, among other things, the following: "It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that defendant pay plaintiff until her remarriage, as and for her support and maintenance, the sum of $1,350 per month commencing on August 4, 1946, and thereafter on the 4th day of each month until and including April 4, 1947; and, thereafter on the 4th day of each month commencing May 4, 1947, that defendant pay plaintiff as and for her support and maintenance, a sum equivalent to 36% of his monthly earnings, provided, however, that the monthly payments commencing May 4, 1947, shall not exceed the sum of $1,350 or be less than the sum of $450; that at the end of each year during the term of the aforesaid agreement, defendant shall deliver to the plaintiff a statement of his earnings during the preceding year, said statement to be ertified to be correct." In March 1947, the husband filed a motion to modify. The wife contested the jurisdiction of the court to modify. The district court rejected her contention and modified. The state high court concluded that the result reached by the trial court was "fair and equitable and within its authority." The court went on to approve prior holdings stating that whenever a retiree has a choice of electing retirement or disability benefits, and chooses the latter, for whatever reason, he "could not by electing to take a disability award rather than a regular retirement eliminate the community interest in the award."2 The court shall consider each case individually before granting either the basic visitation or shared responsibility adjustment to insure that the adjustment does not place an undue hardship on the custodial parent or have a substantial negative effect on the child's standard of living. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court began by noting that Nevada clearly prohibited retroactive modification of a support order, citing to Day v. Day, 82 Nev. 317, 320-321, 417 P.2d 914, 916 (1966) ("payments once accrued for either alimony or support of children become vested rights and cannot thereafter be modified or voided."). While it is unclear from the opinion, it appears the district court mathematically calculated the increased support the father would have paid if he had paid at the formula rate and gave that to the mother as an offset against her prospective child support obligation. The court noted the mere fact that a child support obligor made regular payments of the amount ordered by the court showed a sense of responsibility and good faith which was unfortunately lacking in many noncustodial parents. It was pointed out that the father had been complying with a valid court order. The mother’s remedy for (the father’s) alleged underpayment would have been to move for modification of the support order, based on changed circumstances (i.e., the father’s increased income) or based on the periodic review provided by statute. Id. at 377-78. The Court held that Nevada clearly required that child support awards must conform to the statutory guidelines and that Nevada also prohibited the retroactive modification of a support obligation. Id. at 378. Thus, if there was no previous order giving a right to the former spouse to be the SBP beneficiary, the one-year deemed election period runs from the date of a post-divorce order concerning the SBp240 This is true for orders that issued prior to the effective date of the SBP deemed beneficiary law, as well as orders that inadequately attempted to provide for the SBP, or omitted all mention of the benefit. For example, in In re Marriage of McGhee,11 the court approved compensation to the former spouse by means of alimony, as set out in the agreement between the parties, when it was imposed by the dissolution court after the member halted the flow of military retirement benefits to former spouse after the McCarty decision. The court termed use of such "back-up" clauses to be making the property award "supportified." Similarly, in deciding In re Marriage of Sheldon,12 the court noted the "close relationship between the amount of a property division and the entitlement, if any, of a spouse to spousal support." In In re Marriage of Mastropaolo,13 the court reversed an alimony award "on condition" that the court’s affirmance of the retirement division became final. B> 2. The benefit to be payable to the Alternate Payee shall be calculated by means of a formula as follows: All service credits accrued by Member through and including [DATE OF DIVORCE OR TERMINATION OF SERVICE], as the numerator, and all service credits accrued as the denominator, multiplied by one-half. Any withdrawals from the retirement system shall be divided between the Member and the Alternate Payee in accordance with the same formula. Social Security has been addressed in some detail by the Nevada Supreme Court, and those discussions are detailed elsewhere. At this juncture, it is enough to note that if a marriage lasts at least ten years, the former spouse is eligible for certain benefits under Social Security upon attaining retirement age, (if not remarried), based upon the spouse’s own earnings, or those of the wage-earner spouse, whichever are greater. Such Social Security payments are statutory entitlements that do not reduce benefits paid to retirees. P> We are asked to resolve several custody and support issues on appeal. Preliminarily, the parties dispute the definition of joint physical custody. Additionally, Ms. Rivero challenges the following district court rulings: (I) the court's determination that the parties had joint physical custody, (2) the court's modification of the custody arrangement, (3) the court's denial of her motion for child support, (4) the district court judge's refusal to recuse herself and the chief judge's denial of Ms. Rivero's motion for disqualification, and (5) the court's award of attorney fees to Mr. Rivero for defending against Ms. Rivero's disqualification motion. The Court further clarified that "actual division" under the "wait and see" approach (which may be done at trial) is not the same as present distribution of the pension asset itself. Further, for the first time the Court clearly stated that the normal distribution of a spousal share of a retirement is to be upon the employee spouse’s first eligibility for retirement, and that if a worker does not retire at first eligibility, the worker must pay the spouse whatever the spouse would have received if the worker did retire at that time. The hypothetical correctly notes the presumptive maximum of the $5,000-earning, minority time-share parent as $664, but the Wright/Wesley offset yields $785 in the reverse direction, not $664. The range of potential deviation is even larger than indicated, between paying $664 if considered a "secondary custodian," to receiving $785 under the Wright/Wesley analysis if considered a "joint custodian." Still, however, the district court is required to exercise its discretion to provide adequately for the child in both households. When Congress next amended the Act in 1990, it did nothing to address the Mansell holding. Thus, Mansell is often read to stand for the proposition that the subject matter jurisdiction of the state divorce courts is limited to division of"disposable retired pay." This may be less important than was thought at the time, however, since courts have widely expressed a willingness to consider the impact of disability or other benefits not included in the definition of"disposable retired pay" when dividing assets between spouses. The husband claimed and the wife admitted that she had personal property that belonged to the husband prior to marriage. The district court ordered that "each party shall have their [sic] own personal property, which is in their [sic] possession, as their [sic] sole and separate property." The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted while NRS 125.150(4) provided that the separate property of a spouse may be awarded to the other spouse for support, there is no indication that the district court intended to make such an award in this instance. The Court held that it was error for the district court to fail to order that the personal separate property of each party be returned, absent some finding that the property must be awarded as support. To initiate a "deemed election," the former spouse must file a written request with the appropriate Service Secretary requesting that the election be deemed to have been made. The written request must be filed within one year of the date of the court order.3 There are various technical requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held the fact that the wife was named as the grantee in the deed was insufficient to show a gift from the husband to her. The Court noted that even if the husband knew that the deed was made to the wife, the presumption would still be that it was community property citing to Milisich v. Hillhouse, 48 Nev. 166, 228 P.307 (1924). The Court further held that the true test of the separate or community character of property acquired during the marriage ordinarily lies in whether it was acquired by community funds and community credit or by separate funds. Property could be vested in either spouse, but the true character of the property is to be determined by the nature of the transaction under which it is acquired without reference to who retains the title. The Court concluded that generally, property purchased by either husband or wife during the existence of the community is community property, the determinative consideration in any case being whether the purchase was made with community or separate funds. All of these withdrawals presume that the TSP Board had not previously been served with a valid court order awarding a portion of a TSP account to a current or former spouse or one that requires payment for enforcement of child support or alimony obligations. If such an order was served on the TSP Board, it will comply with the court order before permitting purchase of an annuity or other withdrawal. The Court affirmed the district court’s order terminating the parental rights of the mother on the grounds of abandonment and failure of parental adjustment. The Court found that abandonment was proved by the fact the mother did not contact the custodial agency for over a year. As to failure of parental adjustment, the Court noted a 1995 revision of NRS 128.109(l)(b) which provided that a parent’s failure to comply substantially with the terms of a case plan was evidence of failure of parental adjustment as defined by NRS l28.105. The court found that mother had not complied with her case plan for more than two years. While acknowledging mother had experienced a catastrophic trauma witnessing the murder of her husband and the father of the children, the Court concluded that too much time had passed without significant progress by mother and that the future of mother was too uncertain to sustain the maternal bond. B)are deducted from the retired pay of such member as a result of forfeitures of retired pay ordered by a court-martial or as a result of a waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38; The spouse might be able to extend the period within which he or she can request a deemed election by returning to court after the divorce and obtaining an order stating that the spouse is to be deemed the SBP beneficiary. This is because the member is obliged to make the election "within one year after the date of the decree of divorce, dissolution, or annulment,"9 whereas the former spouse must make the request "within one year of the date of the court order or filing involved."10 Libro v. Walls, 103 Nev. 540, 746 P.2d 632 (1987)The parties had a child and the wife filed for divorce. The husband allowed default to be entered against him and was ordered to pay child support. The husband then found out he was not the father. The wife sought to reduce the child support arrears to judgment. The district court ruled that the husband could not raise non-paternity as a defense. Although Mosley makes many references to the partiesf agreement and intent to have an equal time share, and to the district court orders of joint custody, the Opinion makes no finding as to the actual amount of time the child spent with each parent, and it is unclear as to whether the parties ever followed an exact 50/50 time share. Where a trade-off of the spousal retirement share is contemplated in a contested case, each party must usually hire an actuarial expert. Such an expert must become familiar with the military retirement system, and perhaps change certain assumptions applicable in other cases. In Mississippi, pretty much the opposite approach to the mathematical construct of Alaska is directed, again by statute. There, courts are simply directed to deviate downward upon findings that expenses in the primary household have been "actually reduced" by the level of visitation/shared custody exercised by the other party. They are also directed to deviate upward upon findings that the non-custodial parent has no involvement with the child and so makes no direct contribution to the child’s expenses. The second category of problem paralegals involve attorneys who have virtually relinquished control of their offices to paralegal staff, who have arrogated tasks and responsibilities far beyond their proper limits. But the Welfare view of how the statute should be construed has already been rejected by the Nevada Legislature within the past two years, would be counterproductive and illogical in application, and would be poor public policy if implemented. It simply makes no sense to read the words "per annum" and "remains unpaid" out of a statute intended to assess penalties at 10% per annum on the sum of arrears that remains outstanding. Calculation of both interest and penalties in accordance with the length of time installments of support remain outstanding is logically and legally correct, and serves the purpose for which the statutory provisions were implemented. The meaning and effect of the savings clause is discussed above in the introduction to the USFSPA, which discussion is not repeated here. Similarly, there does not seem to be much to say about disability benefits already received and used for the increase of account balances or the acquisition of assets, all of which apparently have no kind of special or protected status.7 NCCUSL3 went back to work and in 1997 issued revisions of the jurisdictional aspects of the UCCJA in a new act, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, or UCCJEA. The replacement act was intended to provide clearer standards for which States can exercise original jurisdiction over a child custody determination, enunciate a standard of continuing jurisdiction for the first time, and to clarify modification jurisdiction. It also sought to harmonize the law on simultaneous proceedings, clean hands, and forum non conveniens. SPAN> Such a deal provides an award to the former spouse of irrevocable, unmodifiable alimony in an amount measured by the military retirement benefits, in exchange for a waiver by the former spouse of any property interest in the retirement benefits themselves. Payments can then be made by the pay center. There is no reason that cost of living adjustments, etc., cannot be included in such an award, and there is no difference to the tax impact. ong with the privileges that are granted with the new law, obligations and responsibilities also are considered and contemplated. Nevada’s "divorce" laws, which are found in the Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) Chapters 125, 125A, 125B, and 125C all apply to the parties that seek a dissolution of the partnership. A good portion of NRS Chapter 123 - "Rights of Husband and Wife" - is also applicable, even though the law does not ever use these terms. (The word "spouse" appears in the law but only as a descriptor of the rights enjoyed.)

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