The Marren and Page Case List Alba v Alba Community Property valuation The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted where part of the purchase price of one spouse’s separate property is paid with community funds, the community acquires a  pro tanto interest in the property, citing to Barrett v. Franke, 46 Nev. 170, 208 P. 435 (1922).  The Court held that there was no apparent justification for ignoring the community property interest in the home. As to the house which was built on the lot, the Court noted that the labor and skills of a spouse belong to the community citing to Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 297, 217 P.2d 355, 467 (1950) and held that the husband’s labor was a community asset even if it occurred after his regular job ended.  65279;The Court concluded that the Frye doctrine of equitable adoption, and "the myriad of other psychological theories of parentage that the parties mention in order to determine paternity" were inapplicable.Id. at 1406. The Court noted that NRS 126.051 provided for a rebuttable presumption, and was the statute to be applied. The Court reversed the order finding the husband to be the father of the child, and remanded for further proceedings, noting that the joint legal custody order was also reversed. bsp;       2.    Under NRCP 60(b), the distribution of disclosed property can be changed due to fraud, mistake, etc. This provides a nice "bright line" for practitioners, and highlights the cautions expressed in these materials. First, if there has been any waiver of divisible benefits by a member, counsel for the spouse should consider whether an alimony or other award to compensate the spouse is appropriate. Second, counsel for the spouse must safeguard any award made to allow for compensation in the event the member attempts to reduce the benefits by post-divorce recharacterization. atutory and case law throughout the country now recognizes pension benefits as marital property with near uniformity.  Stated rationales for that recognition include that the benefits accrued during marriage, that income during marriage was reduced in exchange for the deferred pension benefits, and that the choice was made to forego possible alternative employment which would have paid more in current wages, in order to have the pension. West Virginia                                                                          X In the meantime, the community property statutes require a presumptive equal division of such property, absent a "compelling reason" for an unequal division and the trial court "sets forth in writing the reasons for making the unequal disposition." NRS 125.150(1). The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted where part of the purchase price of one spouse’s separate property is paid with community funds, the community acquires a  pro tanto interest in the property, citing to Barrett v. Franke, 46 Nev. 170, 208 P. 435 (1922).  The Court held that there was no apparent justification for ignoring the community property interest in the home. As to the house which was built on the lot, the Court noted that the labor and skills of a spouse belong to the community citing to Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 297, 217 P.2d 355, 467 (1950) and held that the husband’s labor was a community asset even if it occurred after his regular job ended.  The full history of the dual compensation rules are beyond the scope of these materials.2 The short version is that military retired pay was reduced for members who retired from the military and began civilian work for the federal government. Obviously, any reduction in the amount of retired pay payable to a member affected the spousal interest as well. Court decisions did not appear to follow any clear theoretical model. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that the Schwartz factors were applicable even for a temporary relocation. In considering such a request, a district court should first determine whether the custodial parent wishing to leave Nevada demonstrated good faith reasons for relocating citing to Hayes v. Gallacher, 115 Nev. 1, 972 P.2d 1138 (1999). The Court further noted that once the custodial parent makes the threshold good faith showing, the district court should then apply the factors outlined in Schwartz to determine whether the custodial parent has demonstrated that an actual advantage will be realized by both the parent and the child by moving to the new location. Once the custodial parent has met that burden, the district court must go through the Schwartz factors. The Court rejected the suggestion that the mere demonstration of reasonable alternative visitation ends the inquiry under Schwartz. The Court noted that the child’s and the mother’s quality of life would remain essentially the same. The child’s lifestyle would not be enhanced by the move. The Court held that the district court did not err in applying the Schwartz factors to the case and did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother’s relocation motion. The Court found that the district court conducted a three day evidentiary hearing, analyzed the facts throughly, correctly applied the Schwartz factors and determined that relocation would not be in the child’s best interest. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court rejected the district court’s conclusion that the motion was untimely, and held that when such a motion is filed at any time within the six months allowed by NRCP 60(b), alleging fraud or mutual mistake, and seeks for the first time to address the fairness of the decree of divorce, the motion should be considered on its merits (i.e., the fairness of the distribution of property should be explicitly examined by the reviewing court).  The qualifications for admission are sufficiently exacting that when the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Nevada approved Standards for Certification of Family Law Specialists in February, 2005, it recognized the existing Nevada Fellows of the AAML as certified specialists. This created a group able to draft standards and create a specialist certification test for other family law practitioners in Nevada. Once it is determined that a non-custodial parent does, indeed, have "custody," the next step is to determine whether the parents have "shared custody" or "extraordinary visitation." The various guidelines have addressed this question in basically three ways: (1) substantially equal time, (2) time greater than a threshold amount of somewhere between 20% and 40%, or (3) shared custody/extraordinary visitation as a deviation factor. The father relinquished custody to the mother. The mother and paternal grandparents stipulated to change the decree to award custody to the mother and paternal grandparents.  The mother made periodic trips to Texas to visit her daughter. In December 1971, the mother married her present husband. Soon thereafter, she traveled to Texas, picked up her child and removed her to Las Vegas. The grandparents the filed a habeas corpus proceeding.  No notice to the father was given.  For example, without clear definitions, how are litigants, attorneys and courts to know what it means to award or be awarded "primary physical custody" or "sole physical custody," or whether any difference exists between the two terms. Although we now know what "joint physical custody" is supposed to mean, there is no real clarity in the law until we are able to compare it to all other well-defined and understood types of custody. Therefore, the FLS renews its request that the Supreme Court take this opportunity to define all types of custody available under Nevada law. Another variant, found in Europe, considers property individual until divorce or death, at which time it is essentially treated as though it were community property.5 SUP> In general, if the increase in the value of the separate property during the marriage is the result of the normal, or expected, appreciation in the asset (such as interest earned in a savings account), the increased value belongs to the owner-spouse as his separate property.10 On the other hand, if the asset has increased in value during the marriage as the result of the spouse’s labor and skills, the increase in value belongs to the community.11 However, in the latter situation, an allowance is made for the natural increase in the value of the asset which would be expected from a reasonable return on the separate property investment.12 Furthermore, because of the statutory presumption that rents, issues and profits from separate property are also separate property, the burden is on the spouse claiming that an increase is due to the labor and skills of the other spouse to rebut this presumption.13 The parties each requested custody of their children. After hearing evidence, the master made and filed his report, recommending that a divorce be granted to the husband and the custody of the children be awarded to their mother. The district court awarded custody of the children to the father during the school months and to the mother during the summer vacation months of each year, and provided for alternate custody on certain holidays.  years ago, while writing the original "Military Retirement Benefits in Divorce" book for the ABA, I included a chapter on Survivor’s Benefit Plan premium-cost-shifting (i.e., providing that he pay it, or she pay it, in any way other than the default percentages).  This is extremely difficult in the military system because DFAS will not honor a court order that says, for example, "split the retired pay 50/50, and then deduct the cost of the SBP from the member’s [or spouse’s] portion." To initiate a "deemed election," the former spouse must file a written request with the appropriate Service Secretary requesting that the election be deemed to have been made. The written request must be filed within one year of the date of the court order. There are various technical requirements. The husband obtained a divorce October 1955. The following day, he remarried. In May 1957, the first wife’s attorney called the court’s attention to the transcript of the testimony in the divorce action indicating a questionable residence to support the divorce.  The district court advised that upon the filing of a satisfactory stipulation, it would sign an order setting aside the decree. In June 1957, a stipulation was signed by the new attorneys for the parties and was filed, along with an affidavit executed by the husband wearing that his former testimony as to his residential intent was false. In June 1957, without notice to the new wife, the court entered its order vacating the decree. The husband and his new wife were still living together as husband and wife in Massachusetts. In November 1957, the new wife, learning that the decree had been set aside, filed a complaint against the first wife and her husband alleging fraud and asking that for a judgment vacating the order setting aside the decree. The husband and the first wife answered. In March 1958, the district court filed a decision granting the second’s wife’s motion for summary judgment and setting aside the order vacating the divorce decree and restoring such decree. P> Obviously, real-time order generation will not always be possible. If the matter is taken under advisement, for example, the order cannot be written until a decision is reached. And if detailed or technical findings have to be drafted, attorney involvement in order-drafting may still be necessary. For a spouse - or former spouse - to continue receiving money after death of the member or participant, there must be specific provision made for payments after the death of the member, by way of a separate, survivorship interest payable to the former spouse upon the death of the member. 2) If the court or administrative law judge determines actual parenting time exercised by a parent is different than what is provided in a written parenting plan or court order, the percentage of parenting time may be calculated using the actual parenting time exercised by the parent. In 1995, it seems clear that the Assembly Judiciary Committee was fed misinformation by people purporting to represent organizations, but actually appearing in their own personal (but undisclosed) self-interest, who attempted to manipulate the legislative process for their personal enrichment at the expense of their ex-spouse, their spouse’s ex-spouse, and their client’s ex-spouse, respectively. By the time word was leaked to the Family Law Section just before the session ended, it was impossible to kill the pending bill, although the great majority of the harm it would have done in its original form was deflected. We further conclude that the district court judge properly refused to recuse herself, and the chief judge properly denied Ms. Rivero's motion for disqualification. We therefore affirm the district court's orders regarding the recusal and disqualification. An important consideration in making this choice is the petitioner’s belief as to which court would likely be able to hear the matter in the shortest period of time. Checking the dockets of the various potential courts can help determine which court can hear the matter soonest. It is also wise to investigate the manner in which Convention cases are heard. Federal courts, for instance, tend to treat Hague return petitions as petitions for writs of habeas corpus, a procedure designed to provide virtually immediate relief. The Supreme Court rejected the mother’s claims. The Court noted that the record was clear that the court was considering appointing a custody evaluator. The parties were also clear that the report would be submitted directly to the court. The Court discussed the doctrine of "invited error." The doctrine hold to the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the  opposite party to commit."  Id. at 297. The Court noted that "error induced or invited by the mother was not a proper subject of review on appeal has been applied, in both civil and criminal cases, to a large variety of trial errors, including claimed misconduct of the judge, or alleged error having to do with the jury." Id. at 297. Because the party, through her attorney, filed the form requesting submission she should not be allowed to complain of the decision which resulted from her own request. The Court, however, reversed for other reasons. Because of the seriousness of issues of custody of children and the fact that the mother did not previously take advantage of seeking a hearing prior to the court’s decision and because of the inadequate representation received, the Court remanded so that she would be able present her position prior to a permanent custody determination. The Court noted that it was reluctant to remand given the mother’s failure to participate in the evaluation. The matter is somewhat more complicated, however, as detailed in the Thrift Savings Plan section of these materials. For now, it is probably sufficient to state that any disability presents an opportunity for a sum of cash, which could be substantial, to disappear during or after the divorce. If the divorce precedes separation from service, it is probably a good idea to get a court order on file just as early as possible either prohibiting any withdrawals, or at least sheltering the sum to which the former spouse is to assert a claim. B> There are two forms of disability awards, under chapters 38 and 61 of the United States Code, distinguishable by whether they are granted at or after retirement, by whether or not the Veteran’s Administration ("VA") is involved, and whether the benefits are taxable. The same percentage rating has different dollar values from one to the other. PAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Times New Roman; FONT-SIZE: 14pt"> Very few courts have reached the opposite result.  See McLure v. McLure, 647 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). Others have reached that opposite result, just to be reversed on appeal or upon narrow findings of special circumstances.  See Kelson v. Kelson, 647 So.2d 959 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994) (VSI held not divisible in split opinion);  overruled, 675 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1996); Baer v. Baer, 657 So.2d 899 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995) (where service member given ultimatum to accept VSI or be immediately involuntarily terminated, VSI payments were severance pay rather than retirement pay, and not divisible); In re Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr. 644 (Ct. App. 1986) (pre-SSB/VSI case; separation pay received upon involuntary discharge pre-empted state court division). You can find The Marren and Page Case List Alba v Alba Las Vegas PERS expert lawyer Las Vegas attorney Marshall Willick Las Vegas annulment Las Vegas spousal law expert Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Part One Subsection II Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section II Subsection C A Brief Aside Regarding Disability and the TSP Rivero v Rivero Opinion II B Ogawa Amicus Brief Statement of Facts The Marren and Page Case List Alba v Alba available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map The Concept of Divisible Divorce Rivero v Rivero Opinion Section VI B Public Employees Retirement System PERS Benefits Section II Subsction B Section II Subsection C Major Cases Termination of Parental Rights Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section IV Subsection B The Marren and Page Case List Wiese v Granata Reciprocal Links: The Marren and Page Case List Alba v Alba The Marren and Page Case List Alba v Alba The Marren and Page Case List Alba v Alba The Marren and Page Case List Alba v Alba

The Marren and Page Case List Alba v Alba The Marren and Page Case List Alba v Alba The Marren and Page Case List Alba v Alba The Marren and Page Case List Alba v Alba