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Attorneys must anticipate post-divorce status changes and build anticipation in to the decree This can avoid further litigation

If it has been determined that the original State with CEJ lost that jurisdiction, then the question becomes whether there is a new Home State, which becomes the place where further custody litigation should take place.1 Again, until and unless there is a new Home State, the prior Home State is presumptively where any custody-related litigation should proceed. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted the district court could have found these expenditures to be of a community nature, since they either contributed to the housing and other living expenses of the husband or constituted contributions to a community asset. The Court further noted that there was nothing in the record suggested an absolute entitlement on the part of the wife to any portion of those funds. The Court additionally noted that it was well established that the decision whether to award attorneys’ fees to either party lies within the sound discretion of the district court. The Court held that "the district court’s decision, based on the fact that each of the parties held substantial separate property, was clearly a proper exercise of its discretion." Id. at 259. Finally, examine whether the member owns property in the jurisdiction. While not legally determinative of anything, the fact of whether a member has chosen to purchase real estate in the forum often is seen as having a strong correlation with whether the member treats the jurisdiction as "home." Amount of benefits payable- includes safeguard against post-divorce recharacterization by Member of retired pay as disability pay. Note that if a specific dollar sum award is made (instead of a percentage), the COLA provision is ineffective. The first paragraph calls for payments of a specific amount or percentage; the second paragraph contains a formula for determining the sum payable when the Member actually retires. Again, if the spouse dies first, the member gets the full gross military retirement benefits, but if the member dies first, the spouse continues to get only her share of the benefits. Note that under 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1), it is not permissible to pay the former spouse more than 50% The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the district court’s order to distribute the stock as opposed to its value gave due consideration of the business realities involved. Under the original enactment of the USFSPA, which governed all divorce decrees filed prior to February 4, 1991, the military pay center withheld taxes from the gross retired pay, divided the post-tax amount between the member and the spouse pursuant to court order, and sent a check to each.1 At the end of each year, the member was eligible to claim a tax credit for amounts withheld on sums ultimately paid to the former spouse, and the former spouse owed a tax liability for any amounts received. If it has been determined that the original State with CEJ lost that jurisdiction, then the question becomes whether there is a new Home State, which becomes the place where further custody litigation should take place.1 Again, until and unless there is a new Home State, the prior Home State is presumptively where any custody-related litigation should proceed. The parties were divorced October 1990. The mother was awarded primary custody. In April 2000, the mother filed a move motion. The father opposed and a hearing was held. The mother testified that she could earn more money in in New Jersey, working for her sister and brother-in-law’s company as a sales and marketing administrator, and having the potential of qualifying for bonuses and even possibly acquiring a future equity share. The mother and child lived in a 900 square foot trailer, however, if she and the child moved to New Jersey, they would initially live with her sister and brother-in-law in their 3,000 square foot, four bedroom house. The mother testified that she hoped to rent a house. The mother also testified that she planned to enroll the parties’ daughter at a school for gifted children. The mother testified that the school was superior to anything offered where she lived. There was also extended family that lived in the area and there were no relatives where she was currently living. The father opposed the move because he believed that moving the child from regular visitation was not in the child’s best interest. The district court concluded that NRS 125C.200 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found that NRS 125C.200 implicitly restricted a custodial parent's fundamental right to travel and that no compelling state interest was satisfied by the restriction. Because of that the mother did not need the court’s permission to move. The district court also found that even if the statute was constitutional, the mother met her burden for moving. This Court is thus compelled by its holding in Haggerty and other decisions to explore whether there is an interpretation of the words "next general election" that would not enforce one Constitutional provision by means of frustrating another. The fact that literal enforcement of one Constitutional provision would hinder application of another necessarily creates an ambiguity, and among this Court’s rules for statutory construction are the principles that if a statute is ambiguous, courts should attempt to follow the legislature’s intent, and "no part of a statute should be rendered nugatory, nor any language turned to mere surplusage, if such consequences can properly be avoided."3 Second, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by modifying the custody timeshare arrangement without making specific findings offact that the modification was in the child's best interest. The SBP applies automatically to a member who is married or has at least one dependent child at the time the member becomes entitled to retired pay, unless the member affirmatively elects not to participate in the SBP.5 The member’s spouse must be notified of any attempt by a member to not designate a spousal SBP interest,6 and must consent to any election not to participate in the SBP, to provide an annuity for that spouse at less than the maximum level, or to provide an annuity for a dependent child but not for the spouse.7 When the district court refused, Ms. Rivero requested that the district court judge recuse herself. The district court judge denied the request. Ms. Rivero then moved to disqualify the district court judge, alleging that the judge did not seriously consider the facts or the law because she was biased based on the parties' physical appearance. Mr. Rivero opposed the motion and moved for attorney fees. The district court judge submitted an affidavit in which she swore that she was unbiased. After considering Ms. Rivero's motion to disqualify the district court judge, the supporting affidavits, and Mr. Rivero's opposition, the chief judge denied the motion. She did not conduct a hearing, and Ms. Rivero did not file a reply. The chief judge concluded that Ms. Rivero's claims appeared to rely on "prior adverse rulings ofthe judge" and that "[r]ulings and actions of a judge during the course of official judicial proceedings do not establish legally cognizable grounds for disqualification." Thus, the chief judge found that Ms. Rivero's motion was without merit. Finally, and most crass, permitting the paralegal mills to continue cranking out hundreds or thousands of defective domestic relations complaints and orders is bad for business - except for the business of repairing the damage done. The trial court entered a temporary custody order in favor of the other parent, but stayed the remainder of the case, over the objection of the member and the grandmother, who argued that the stay was "automatic" and prevented entry of a temporary custody order. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that an SCRA stay does not "freeze" a case, leaving it in limbo indefinitely and allowing no authority for the trial court to act. Rather, the court found that a trial court could properly entertain the issue of temporary custody, even if the stay was in place when the issue was considered, on the basis that a child’s life cannot be put in "suspended animation" awaiting the member’s return. For the same reason, the trial court was able to consider issues such as support.4 Thus, if there was no previous order giving a right to the former spouse to be the SBP beneficiary, the one-year deemed election period runs from the date of a post-divorce order concerning the SBP.21 This is true for orders that issued prior to the effective date of the SBP deemed beneficiary law, as well as orders that inadequately attempted to provide for the SBP, or omitted all mention of the benefit.22 Some states, such as Texas, which found the USFSPA inadequate by itself to allow the re-opening of gap cases, never passed legislation permitting those divorced during the gap to bring their decrees into conformity with those divorced before McCarty or after the USFSPA. Divorces during the gap that gave 100 percent of the retirement benefits to the memeber because of McCarty remain unalterable in such states for lack of a mechanism through which to litigate them.13 In the absence of a provision explicitly permitting a retiree to recharacterize retired pay as disability pay and so divert money awarded to his former spouse back to himself, the retiree is required to reimburse the former spouse for all sums diverted, according to the highest courts to consider the question in Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,2 Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.3 Alaska and Nebraska, while not requiring direct compensation, have indicated that other property should be distributed, or post-divorce alimony should be awarded, to compensate the former spouse in such situations. The third group is made up of members who entered service on or after August 1, 1986. That year, Congress had arranged to provide retirement benefits to those members that were lowered in two different ways. The Court made a number of holdings. The Court held that whenever property nominally held in joint tenancy is determined to be community property the right of survivorship is destroyed and is brought within the laws of descent and distribution. Here, the fact that title to all the real property of the parties was in joint tenancy, clear and convincing proof was needed to overcome the presumption that it was not community property. The burden was on the party making the community property claim to show by clear and convincing evidence that the property which was held in joint tenancy had been transmuted into community property. The Court held that the fact that the property was purchased with community funds, standing alone, was insufficient to rebut the presumption created by the form of the deed. The Court also approvingly cited to Mullikin v. Jones, 71 Nev. 14, 278 P.2d 876 (1955) for the proposition that even though community funds, earnings and efforts were used to build up and increase the value of the joint tenancy property without further proof of an original intent or subsequent agreement to hold the property as community, would not prove a transmutation from joint tenancy. very little to do with "the means of the obligor." Support as actually awarded in Nevada is the doling out of a relatively trivial sum by wealthy obligors (compared to the sum that would be spent on the same child in an intact household), having been reduced to that level to guard against any possibility that the custodial parent might derive some side benefit from the funds paid for the support of the child. The problem is with the hypocrisy of pretending that our child support statute actually awards support based rationally on the means of the noncustodian. As put by the Court in Moore: "Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent, and is considered to have ´notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’" The Court noted if the daughter was a member of the family of the deceased, it was the duty of the court on proper application, by force of the foregoing statutes, to set the insurance money apart for her use. The executrix urged that by awarding the custody of the daughter to the divorced wife, had the same effect as to the daughter, that it established her legal family status separate and apart from the father. The Court rejected the claim. The Court held that the father’s interest in his child was in no way affected, nor was his natural and legal obligation of support relieved by the decree. The Court further held that mother’s right of custody was merely a personal privilege, which she might at any time waive, and actually did waive. th the override of Governor Jim Gibbons’ veto, Nevada has adopted a law allowing for the registration of domestic partners. A close review of the language in S.B. 283 indicates that the intent of the legislature was to create an institution that applies to both different-sex and same-sex couples that mirrors marriage without calling it that. For many years, members of Congress introduced "concurrent receipt" bills of various sorts seeking to repeal, to a greater or lesser extent, the requirement of waiver of longevity retired pay in order to receive disability pay. Of course, any such program would cost the government the entirety of the additional VA payment, which is why it was resisted so strenuously for so long. Range of potential upward deviation is $0 (support was not reduced by the presumptive maximum amount). However, the Court could increase support based on a determination of the increased costs being incurred in the majority time-share parent's household by virtue of the lack of the minority-time share parent's visitation. The parties were divorced in July 1963. Temporary physical custody of the two children, a boy and a girl, was given to the mother. In June 1964, the temporary physical custody of the children was given to the father. Over three years later, in November 1967, the mother moved for return of custody to her. In February 1968, after a hearing, the custody was again given to the mother. At that time, the boy was 12 years old and the girl was 10 years old. The district court conferred with the children in chambers. The Court commented that the children had no parental preference and loved both parents. In spite of that statement, the district court found in its findings of fact that the children preferred their mother. The Court noted that the conflict could not be resolved by because the interview in chambers was not preserved for appellate review. The district court also found that both parties were fit to have custody. From the member’s point of view, it will appear (and actually be) that upon actual retirement, the spousal share is growing faster than the member’s share each year, whittling away at what the member is receiving while increasing what the spouse is receiving. The Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s decision to restrict the father’s ability to visit the child upon payment of all child support and being current in all continuing payments. The decision is somewhat limited because the appellant father did not provide a transcript from the lower court proceedings. Absent a transcript, the Court will presume that the evidence warranted the limitations and that they were reasonable in light of the factual circumstances presented to the court. Note: Receipt by PERS of an order which for any reason does not comply with NRS Chapter 286 will serve as temporary notice to PERS of a forthcoming order regarding distribution of a member's benefits and any attempts to obtain a refund of contributions or retirement allowance from such Member's account will not be allowed for a period of 90 days.

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