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Rivero v Rivero Opinion Section VI
Learn more about Rivero v Rivero Opinion Section VI.
The District Courts award of attorney fees toE. 1. Failure to exercise or exercising more than the number of overnights upon which the parenting time adjustment is based, is a material change of circumstances. nbsp; Other courts have, similarly, found that a court can issue a spousal support award, postdivorce, sufficient to ameliorate the impact on an innocent former spouse whose "economic circumstances have deteriorated through no fault of her own" by reason of the former husband's post-divorce application for disability benefits in lieu of retirement benefits. SPAN> Carr-Bricken v. First Interstate Bank, 105 Nev. 402, 915 P.2d 254 (1996) While the divorce proceedings were pending, the husband died and was replaced as defendant by respondent First Interstate Bank of Nevada as Special Administrator of the Estate of Jules Bricken. The district court denied the wife’s request for temporary support. The Court held that orders for support pendente lite may be granted in the discretion of the district court citing to NRS 125.040(1). The facts of the case drive a number of other factors that might be necessarily addressed in the order, including the possibility of an early or late retirement, or a disability or any other post-retirement reduction in benefits, and whether payments are to begin at eligibility for retirement, and are to be based on the rank and grade at the time of divorce, or at actual retirement. The case was eventually appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which determined that State community property laws conflicted with the federal military retirement scheme, and thus were impliedly pre-empted by federal law. The majority held that the apparent congressional intent was to make military retirement benefits a "personal entitlement" and thus the sole property of individual service members, so the benefits could not be considered as community property in a California divorce. If the marriage overlapped service by less than ten years, the right still exists, but the spouse has to obtain the monthly payments from the retired member rather than directly from the military pay center. E. 1. Failure to exercise or exercising more than the number of overnights upon which the parenting time adjustment is based, is a material change of circumstances. The husband brought an independent action on September 9, 1974 under NRCP 60(b) to set aside the decree on the basis of fraud. After judgment was entered on May 3, 1976, dismissing, with prejudice, all claims and causes of action of husband, the husband moved to reopen the trial to take additional evidence concerning the property agreement; to amend the complaint to seek reformation of the contract; and, to reconsider the question of extrinsic fraud. The motion was denied and judgment was entered on February 1, 1977. All causes of action brought by husband were dismissed with prejudice and the wife was awarded judgment for arrearages under the agreement and it was ordered that the agreement be specifically enforced with costs to the wife. SPAN> Mosley erroneously indicates that the policy of the State of Nevada "encourages both parents to share equally parental responsibilities after separation."6 That statement does not comport with the actual policy of our State, as codified in NRS 125.460, which encourages "parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing." (Emphasis added.) It would be a huge stretch to interpret an apparent misstatement in a footnote to mean that the words "shared" and "equal" are synonymous. They are not. Just as two people may share a pizza without each having exactly equal allotments (one eats three slices of an eight slice pizza while the other consumes the remaining five), parents sharing joint physical custody may not have an equal time share (one parent may have the children three days each week, while the other has them four days). If the Mosley Court intended to define "joint physical custody," it did not accomplish it by means of the incongruous footnote. Retirement benefits are essentially a form of deferred reward for service, and so are generally divisible upon divorce, while disability benefits are conceptualized as compensation for future lost wages and opportunities because of disabilities suffered, and are thus typically not divisible or attachable. When accepting a disability award requires relinquishing a retirement benefit, the interests of the parties as to the proper characterization of the benefits become instantly polarized.1 In the modern world, pensions are typically divided between spouses to the degree accrued during the marriage. Alimony might be seen, in part, truly as "maintenance" - stopgap payments by the employee spouse to the non-employee spouse to provide the ability to live long enough for the deferred compensation portion of the career asset to enter pay status. The "wait and see" approach is defined as ensuring that the spousal share of the pension is based on value of the pension ultimately received by the worker, rather than a portion of the pension that would have been received if the worker retired on the date of divorce. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that a district court may order alimony pursuant to NRS 125.150(8) for reeducation and retraining to reenter the work force. The Court further noted that an award of rehabilitative alimony pursuant to subsection (8) required the court to establish a time frame for obligee to begin retraining. Because the district court did not set a time frame the Court reversed as to that issued and required the district court to set one. Both of the later cases remain pending at this writing; if there are significant further developments in the area, they will be related in a future posting. Pierce is something of an orphan, standing on its own odd facts, and has no following. The only known case to cite it approvingly was subsequently reversed on appeal.2 All other citations appear to be to note it as an aberration, in decisions holding that a former spouse must be compensated for a member’s post-divorce recharacterization of her property.3 B> NRS 125.040 authorizes Nevada courts to make orders for "temporary maintenance for the other part during the pendency of an action. No standards a provided. NRS 125.150(1) authorizes the court award alimony at the conclusion of a divorce case "as appears just and equitable." No standards are provided there either. If a person happens to be a recipient of both DIC payments and payments under the Survivor’s Benefit Plan ("SBP") explained below, all DIC payments are subtracted from the SBP payments.4 However, certain supplements to the DIC benefits, for support of a dependent child or because of certain disabilities, do not get offset against SBP.5 DIC payments are not taxed, and are therefore more valuable than the (taxable) SBP payments that would otherwise go the survivor. COMMUNITY PROPERTY, using husband’s separate funds or community funds to improve separate property Lombardi v. Lombardi, 44 Nev. 314, 195 P. 93 (1921)The wife owned a house through inheritance at the time of marriage. During the marriage, the husband spent money constructing a sewer, rebuilding the brick dwelling-house and making other improvements in the amount of $2,900. When the divorce was granted, the district court ordered that the property used during the marriage as the residence was the wife’s separate property. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that the husband did not argue that his expenditure of monies in improving his wife’s separate property did not operate to change title and that in the absence of any specific agreement to the contrary, title to the improvements followed the land. The Court held that monies paid by the husband to the wife’s estate was presumed to be a gift. For the purposes of this credit, "days" means overnights spent caring for the child. Failure to exercise court-ordered visitation may be a basis for modification. The credit for extraordinary visitation shall not reduce a child support obligation below the minimum amount required by the guidelines ($50 for one child, $75 for two children, $100 for three children, or $125 for four or more children). The Courts of Appeals and State Supreme Courts have been split for some years as to whether to recognize waivers by spouses of pension plan benefits in divorce decrees, where (as is usually the case) the decrees do not qualify as QDROs. Not unexpectedly, the Court permitted the convenience of plan administrators to trump any need to do equity, and held that when a plan has rules, procedures, and forms through which a participant may alter a beneficiary designation, the plan documents control over any attempted waiver of any interest in the pension plan by an ex-spouse in a divorce decree. You can find Rivero v Rivero Opinion Section VI Service Members Life Insurance The Marren and Page Case List Braddock v Braddock Some Practical Points to Actual Collection of Child Support Alimony and Pro Thrift Savings Plan for Military Members Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Part One Hedlund Amicus Brief Statement of Facts Civil Service Th Marren and Page Case Lisst The Marren and Page Case List Los Angeles and Salt Lake RR Co v Umbaugh Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section V Subsection B Family Law and Contingency Fees Time to Reconsider Section IV The Marren and Page Case List Steward v Steward and Wallace v Wallace Rivero v Rivero Opinion Pickerings Discussion The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to K D L Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section IX Subsection A Public Employees Retirement System PERS Benefits Section II Subsction B The Marren and Page Case List In re Swall The Basics of Jurisdiction a Remedial Course Rivero v Rivero Opinion Section VI available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map Hedlund Amicus Brief Discussion of Issues Requested The Marren and Page Case List Harris v Harris Libro v Walls and Love v Love retirement benefits Schwartz and alimony Public Employees Retirement System PERS Benefits Section II Subsection B Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Subsection II A What Almost Happened to Child Support in Nevada and Why We Still Have to Fi |