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Wolff v. Wolff20 was another PERS case involving a Highway Patrol officer. The community had a 54% interest in the retirement, and the husband became eligible to retire three months after divorce, but elected to keep working. The district court had calculated that the community share of the retirement was worth $1,155.12 per month, and ordered the husband to pay that sum to the wife from his salary until he actually retired. The lower court also apparently held that an "equivalency" must "reflect [the husband’s] obligation to transfer his vested community property interest in [the wife’s] social security benefits" and must "reflect" that the husband was paying taxes on his current salary. The district court concluded that the amount of the wife’s community share of the husband’s retirement, when he was entitled to receive it, would never be less than $578.00, and so awarded $450.00 per month in "Limited Temporary Spousal Support" until the husband retired, as a "reasonable equivalency," further ordered that the payments would not terminate upon her remarriage or her death, and ordered that the support was taxable to her and deductible to him. Apparently, the pay centers threw out paperwork related to former spouse collections whenever the spousal share was completely eliminated, so those former spouses whose payments dropped to zero (because the disability award consumed the entire disposable retired pay) are required to re-apply for payment of benefits.1 Others should see automatic, incremental restoral of the payment stream ordered in the documents previously submitted to DFAS, as the retired pay is slowly restored. The parties had a prenuptial agreement whereby the husband agreed to pay to the wife $200 for each month the parties were married. The husband contended that any obligation that he might have for spousal support (temporary or otherwise) was settled by the prenuptial agreement. The Supreme Court held that temporary spousal support payments do not apply toward a post-divorce obligation to pay alimony per a property settlement agreement. The prenuptial agreement is a contractual obligation, devised to provide for the wife after divorce, and is separate entirely from the order for temporary support issued by the court during the divorce proceedings. Effective April I, 1995, revised regulations" allowed use of formulas under certain circumstances, most commonly so a pre-retirement divorce decree could specify that the denominator in a time-rule calculation was to be the total service time. The parties were married 21 years. At the time of the marriage, the husband had a half-interest in a lawn business. Seven years after marriage, the lawn-care segment was sold, and the business name was changed to show it was a nursery. At the time of the divorce, the total value of stock in the nursery was between $581,000 and $589,000. The wife was 44 years old in which she had stayed home to raise two children. The district court awarded the wife $1,500 per month in alimony "until she completes her undergraduate degree or for a maximum of two years, whichever comes first." Hague Convention judgments by either state or federal courts ordering or denying a return of a child are afforded full faith and credit.3 However, full faith and credit is only to be accorded a decision if a Hague Convention claim was actually adjudicated in the action in accordance with both the Hague Convention and ICARA.4 Thus, a Hague determination should not be considered either precluded or implied from a state court custody decision. PAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Times New Roman; FONT-SIZE: 14pt"> The Court noted that the locatoin of the buildings on the ranch property were incidental only in the consideration of all of the factors going to make up the residence. The Court noted residence was synonymous with domicile and it was "consonant" with the many decisions of it and the fact of presence together with intention comprise bona fide residence for divorce jurisdiction citing to Whise v. Whise, 36 Nev. 16, 131 P. 967 (1913); Fleming v. Fleming, 36 Nev. 135, 134 P. 445 (1913) and Tiedemann v. Tiedemann, 36 Nev. 494, 137 P. 824 (1913) and other cases. All of the evidence pointed to the fact that the parties were Nevada residents. The Court noted that there was nothing in any of the records that spoke of any intention to give up their residence as Nevadans to acquire that of any other state. The Court noted that Nevada had a legitimate interest in the adjudication of the marital status of these parties as their primary interests were located in Nevada. The Court held that notice to the attorneys is notice to the client. The Court concluded that it could not accept the wife’s assertion that her Nevada counsel’s appearance was without authorization, for the contrary was conclusively presumed, and was well as established by the record. The Court held that the jurisdictional findings in the divorce proceeding by the district court were proper. The court nevertheless found no difficulty in turning aside the military member’s attack on the Arizona rule of finality of property distributions, finding the spouse’s rights to the This Court has always given substantial deference to legislative enactments, and has held that "Legislation is presumed constitutional absent a clear showing to the contrary."1 The Court has apparently considered the question of equal protection in the context of divorce cases only once, in a challenge to the Nevada durational residency statutes, many years ago.2 The wife gave the husband only 24 hours notice prior to a prove-up hearing on a default decree. The husband’s attorney entered a special appearance protesting the lack of sufficient notice. The district court proceeded forward and entered the judgment sought by the wife. The Supreme Court reversed and held that when a defendant has made an appearance in an action, the failure to give notice prescribed by NRCP 55(b)(2) rendered a subsequent default judgment void. Accordingly, the district court should have set aside the judgment. The Court further held that for NRCP 55(b)(2) purposes, a formal appearance in the case was not necessary. If this hypothetical member had a standard longevity military retirement (or any other standard defined benefit plan2) the above wage history would make his average monthly salary during his last three years¡¯ service $4,014.21, and the military retirement formula3 would make his retired pay $2,007.11. 65279;As a strategic point, any former spouse facing a challenge from the member to the jurisdiction of the Court to divide a previously-omitted retirement on jurisdictional grounds (as with the Tucker case discussed in footnote 41) would probably be well-served by a contemporaneous partition action in the jurisdiction of the member's residence. Both sides would then be faced with an equivalent waste of time and resources, which might result in a stipulation to resolve the entire case in one jurisdiction, as would have been most reasonable in the first place. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that in determining alimony, a district court is to look at the duration of the marriage; the husband’s income, his earning capacity, his age, health and ability to labor; and the wife’s age, health, station and ability to earn a living, citing to Buchanan v. Buchanan, 90 Nev. 209, 523 P.2d 1 (1974). The Court further noted that there was no abuse of discretion as the district court followed the Buchanan guidelines. Where the military member is still on active duty, things are more complicated. An order may be obtained specifying that the military pay center, as opposed to the member personally, is required to pay a child support order,2 including an award of arrearages.3 Wolff v. Wolff20 was another PERS case involving a Highway Patrol officer. The community had a 54% interest in the retirement, and the husband became eligible to retire three months after divorce, but elected to keep working. The district court had calculated that the community share of the retirement was worth $1,155.12 per month, and ordered the husband to pay that sum to the wife from his salary until he actually retired. The lower court also apparently held that an "equivalency" must "reflect [the husband’s] obligation to transfer his vested community property interest in [the wife’s] social security benefits" and must "reflect" that the husband was paying taxes on his current salary. The district court concluded that the amount of the wife’s community share of the husband’s retirement, when he was entitled to receive it, would never be less than $578.00, and so awarded $450.00 per month in "Limited Temporary Spousal Support" until the husband retired, as a "reasonable equivalency," further ordered that the payments would not terminate upon her remarriage or her death, and ordered that the support was taxable to her and deductible to him. The mother was arrested on a probation violation and she and the father gave temporary guardianship of their child to the maternal grandparents. The mother spent a year in custody and upon her release began living in an apartment and regularly visiting her child in the home of her parents. She also divorced the father. The mother remarried a year later and had a second child with her new spouse. They obtained a home in a quiet residential neighborhood and stepfather had a stable job as a mechanic. The maternal grandparents denied mother overnight visits with the child or visits in her home during the day. The mother moved to terminate the guardianship and for overnight visitations. Experts found the child was well adjusted and had a close relationship with all of the parties. The grandparents’ expert found the child perceived his maternal grandparents were his parental resource. The district found the parental preference doctrine was one of several factors but the most important factor was the best interests of the child. The district court awarded joint legal custody to mother and the maternal grandparents and primary physical custody to the maternal grandparents. The mother was awarded reasonable rights of visitation. SPAN> For example, drafting counsel must ensure that the facts make the former spouse eligible for direct collection - which requires satisfaction of the jurisdictional factors, and that the military service of the member overlapped the marriage to the spouse by at least ten years. Whether there is or could be early or late retirement, or a disability or post-retirement civil service employment, etc., all should be dealt with explicitly in the order. Whether the measuring point for the retirement should be the rank and grade at the time of divorce, or at actual retirement, should be addressed. The model language attached below contains clauses to deal with all these contingencies. 65279;There are lump-sum distribution options from the plan (if $3,500 or less, the full fund balance is automatically distributed at the time of separation from service). More importantly, hardship loans up to $50,000 are available against the plan balance, and a specific category of hardship for loan purposes is "unpaid legal costs associated with a separation or divorce." Presumably, a developing disability would likewise qualify as a "hardship." Family court has too often been treated by the rest of the bench and Bar as a red-headed step-child of lesser standing. It is probably time for any conceivable rationalization for such treatment to be purged from the statutes. SUP> Most courts find that Mansell calls on them to essentially take a snapshot at the time of divorce, when the award to the spouse is made. Any disposable retired that was already waived in favor of disability pay up to that point is not divisible, but no post-divorce recharacterization of sums already awarded to the spouse are permitted. This includes cases where there was some disability in place at the time of divorce, but the member seeks to increase the disability award after divorce.13

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