Legal Authority For Use in Requesting Fees in a Pro Bono Case An attorney for a pro bono litigant can seek attorneys fees UP> In light of the family support regulations, often a letter to the commanding officer of the member can initiate at least some support payments pending issuance of a court order. Once an order is obtained, support may be enforced by way of garnishment.1 Accrued arrears may also be recovered if they are specified in the order.2 An "involuntary allotment" can be initiated by an "authorized person" by sending the support order to the DFAS - but such an "authorized person" must be a District Attorney or other person with Title IV-D enforcement authority, not a private attorney.3 Argentena suggested that instead of the summary adjudication process, attorneys file independent legal actions against their clients for fees owed. This suggestion ignored the practical reality that filing suit against a client is essentially prohibited by most policies of malpractice insurance, since many companies ask on their applications whether counsel sues clients for fees, and refuse to offer policies at all, or greatly increase premiums, if the answer is "yes." As a matter of law, it is possible to value the spousal share in at least two ways. The majority of States applying the time rule formula seem to view the "community" years of effort qualitatively rather than quantitatively, reasoning that the early and later years of total service are equally necessary to the retirement benefits ultimately received." The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that district courts have broad discretion concerning child custody citing to NRS 125.510; Culbertson v. Culbertson, 91 Nev. 230, 533 P.2d 768 (1975) and Paine v. Paine, 71 Nev. 262, 287 P.2d 716 (1955).  Given that level of discretion, the Court adopted an adequate cause standard. The Court held that a district court has the discretion to deny a motion to modify custody without holding a hearing unless the moving party demonstrates adequate cause for holding a hearing. SUP> There are enormous variations among the technical requirements of the various administering bodies for valid orders dividing retirement plans, but after the cases of the 1980s, a few unifying principles were clarified that may be useful to the Court in this case. Joint legal custody can exist regardless of the physical custody arrangements of the parties. NRS 125.490(2); Mack, 112 Nev. at 1067, 921 P.2d at 1262 (Shearing, J. concurring). Also, the parents need not have equal decision-making power in a joint legal custody situation. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d at 776. For example, one parent may have decision-making authority regarding certain areas or activities of the child's life, such as education or healthcare. Id. Ifthe parents in ajoint legal custody situation reach an impasse and are unable to agree on a decision, then the parties may appear before the court "on an equal footing" to have the court decide what is in the best interest of the child. Mack, 112 Nev. at 1067,921 P.2d at 1262 (Shearing, L, concurring); Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d at 777 n.24. B> Probably the most obvious variation from place to place is when to stop counting. California, Nevada, and Arizona are three community property states sitting right next to one another, and it is not unusual for cases to involve parties with ties to any two of them. All three claim to apply the time rule to pension divisions, but they do the math differently. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that custody and support of minor children rested in the sound discretion of the district court, and its discretion would not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly abused citing to  Fenkell v. Fenkell, 86 Nev. 397, 469 P.2d 701 (1970); Peavey v. Peavey, 85 Nev. 571, 460 P.2d 110 (1969) and Cosner v. Cosner, 78 Nev. 242, 371 P.2d 278 (1962). The Court noted that in determining custody the court’s paramount consideration should be the welfare of the child citing to NRS 125.140;  Peavey v. Peavey, 85 Nev. 571, 460 P.2d 110 (1969) and Paine v. Paine, 71 Nev. 262, 287 P.2d 716 (1955). The Court further noted that it was presumed the district court properly exercised its discretion citing to Howe v. Howe, 87 Nev. 595, 491 P.2d 38 (1971); Noble v. Noble, 86 Nev. 459, 470 P.2d 430 (1970); Fenkell v. Fenkell, 86 Nev. 397, 469 P.2d 701 (1970) and Cosner v. Cosner, 78 Nev. 242, 371 P.2d 278 (1962).   The Court noted the district court specifically found a significant change of circumstances in the parties, as well as the fact that the conduct of the mother rendered her unfit to have the care, custody and control of the minor children and that a change in custody to the father was in the children’s best interest. The Court concluded that the record could be read to support the findings and conclusions reached by the district court. The Court further concluded that in reaching its decision, the district court had adhered to and applied properly applied the rule concerning child custody. The Court found that the intimate relationship of the mother and her boyfriend in the close proximity of children of tender years could be deemed a harmful influence. The Court found further support for the district court’s conclusion because that had the opportunity to observe the parties and their demeanor on the witness stand, to appraise their relative fitness for custody of the minor children citing to Timney v. Timney, 76 Nev. 230, 351 P.2d 611 (1960).  Milender vs. Marcum, 110 Nev. 972, 879 P.2d 748 (1994) A default decree of divorce was entered on October 22, 1990. The decree was filed on December 6, 1990. When the husband did not pay under decree terms, the wife filed motion for order to show cause, resulting in order for husband to pay sums to the wife, plus interest and attorney’s fees. The husband moved to set aside the default decree under NRCP 60(b)(1). The default was set aside on July 29, 1991. The wife sought reconsideration of the costs and attorney’s fees incurred in the original default divorce, resulting in attorney’s fee award to the wife. When the husband failed to pay, the wife again moved for order to show cause, but died before her motion was heard. The district court held that its own order setting aside the default decree was void for husband’s nonpayment of the later-ordered attorney’s fees, and re-instituted original decree.  The CRDP category of pay is "subject to collection actions" for alimony, child support, community property divisions, etc., so the net effect in terms of former spouses should be the gradual erasure of the reduction that the spouses experienced when the retirees elected to take disability awards. We further conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Rivero's motion to modify child support because it did not set forth specific findings of fact to justify deviating from the statutory child support formulas. We therefore reverse and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings to calculate child support and modify the decree if modification is proper under the standard set forth in this opinion. Since there is no difference between that result and the presumptive maximum the minority time-share parent was already paying, there would still be no need to deviate. A) are owed by that member to the United States for previous overpayments of retired pay and for recoupments required bylaw resulting from entitlement to retire d pay; As to both loans and withdrawals, the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board will honor "most" court orders restricting distribution (such as preliminary injunctions prohibiting withdrawals) or safeguarding funds for other purposes (such as child support or alimony awards). Thus, in divorce cases or successive spouse cases, there could be some element of a "race to the courthouse," with the non-employee spouse trying to get a restraining order on file and served on the TSP before the employee can withdraw the funds.4 It is better practice to deal with pensions during the divorce itself, instead of deferring the matter to be dealt with "later." Some states do not clearly permit a spouse  who does not receive a portion of pension benefits to bring a partition action at a later date to divide those benefits.  See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 105 Nev. 384, 775 P.2d 703(1989) (no right at common law to divide an unadjudicated pension); but see Williams v. Waldman, 108 Nev. 466, 836 P.2d 614 (1992) (parties are tenants in common of unadjudicated assets). Decisions resolving both fee disputes were received in the following ten days. Both said that we were entitled to our fees as charged. But the delay had predictable effects. The decision came in two days after escrow closed on the last parcel of real estate from which we might have actually collected the fees owed. As of this writing we are trying to have the money interpled, but it looks like the Bar’s fee-dispute resolution system - again - delayed matters so long that the paper confirming my entitlement to tens of thousands of dollars in outstanding fees has become totally worthless. UP> In light of the family support regulations, often a letter to the commanding officer of the member can initiate at least some support payments pending issuance of a court order. Once an order is obtained, support may be enforced by way of garnishment.1 Accrued arrears may also be recovered if they are specified in the order.2 An "involuntary allotment" can be initiated by an "authorized person" by sending the support order to the DFAS - but such an "authorized person" must be a District Attorney or other person with Title IV-D enforcement authority, not a private attorney.3 SPAN> We are increasingly troubled by the trend of parties to leave divorce court with an agreement that settles property and alimony matters, only to immediately walk down the street to the federal courthouse and attempt to relitigate those issues. Such actions call into question the good faith of the parties and their counsel and raise thorny issues of comity and finality of judgments, to say nothing of attempting to make the bankruptcy court into some type of appellate divorce court. We do not think Congress intended this result when it enacted § 523(a)(5). While we recognize that certain marital debts and obligations are and should be dischargeable, we do not believe that § 523(a)(5) gives one spouse carte blanche to retain marital property at the other spouse’s expense. Ms. Rivero contends that the district court abused its discretion by construing the term "joint physical custody" in the divorce decree to mean an equal timeshare, when the parties defined joint physical custody in the divorce decree as a 5/2 timeshare. She also argues that the district court abused its discretion in finding that she and Mr. Rivero had joint physical custody of their child because she asserts that she had de facto primary physical custody of the child. The parties dated, but never married. They had a child together. After the child was born, the father filed a petition to determine paternity. The father served the petition on the mother after the welfare office sought to recoup funds given to the mother from the father.  The father also sought joint physical custody. Pro bono counsel represented the mother, and the father appeared in proper person, but later obtained counsel. The district court awarded the parties joint legal custody and awarded the mother primary physical custody and child support. The district court also awarded the mother’s attorney $3,000 in attorney fees pursuant to Sargeant v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 495 P.2d 618 (1972).  3)(A)ln the event of effective service of conflicting court orders under this section which assert to direct that different amounts be paid during a month to the same spouse or former spouse of the same member, the Secretary concerned shal1-- The Nevada State PERS retirement system is, for the most part, a reasonably straightforward defined benefit plan. It does, however, have peculiarities and limitations, and it is incumbent on all divorce practitioners who represent PERS members (or their spouses) to learn the details of the system, and to deal with division of the retirement benefits themselves, and the related survivorship, sick and vacation leave issues that are necessarily implicated whenever any member of the system is divorced. There is not much published authority regarding the divisibility of the CSB/REDUX payment, but both the trial-level cases that have appeared, and analogous precedent, indicate that the cash should be divisible precisely as the retirement benefits for which it partially replaces. The analogy is to the lines of authority concerning "early-outs" and disability benefits. In 1956, the parties entered into a written agreement settling maintenance and property rights. Each party was separately represented by counsel. The agreement specifically provided that the husband was obligated to the wife for her support and maintenance until she died or until she remarried, whichever occurred first. The agreement further provided that it could not be altered or modified except "in writing and executed with the same formality of this agreement by both parties." The agreement provided if a divorce proceeding was initiated, the agreement and its provision would be incorporated by reference and made a part of any decree granted. The agreement then stated that "notwithstanding the incorporation of this agreement in any such decree or judgment, this agreement shall not be merged in such decree or judgment, but shall survive the same and shall be binding and conclusive on the parties hereto, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns for all time." Id. at 226-27. The wife came to Nevada and filed for divorce. The district court entered a decree which provided that "the certain property settlement agreement entered into by and between the parties hereto on the 21st day of March 1956 be ratified, approved and confirmed to survive this decree of divorce." Id. at 226-27. When the husband asked that the alimony award be modified, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to do so. You can find Legal Authority For Use in Requesting Fees in a Pro Bono Case Mathematical Mechanics of the SBP Who Gets How Much If the Other Party Dies The Marren and Page Case List Cooley v Cooley Checklist for Military Retirement Benefits Cases The Marren and Page Case List Milender v Marcum Divorce Jurisdiction Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection The Left Behind Parents Rights of Custody The Analogous Cases Involving Early Outs The Marren and Page Case List Sogg v Nevada State Bank Fick v Fick Dimick v Divorcing the Military and Serving Civil Service Section II Subsection B An Introduction to Pensions in Nevada Divorce Law Section II New Developments in Jurisdiction military spouses FERS expert lawyer Public Employees Retirement System PERS Benefits Section III Subsection B Legal Authority For Use in Requesting Fees in a Pro Bono Case available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map The Marren and Page Case List In the Matter of Parental Rights as to J L N Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Five Hearing on the Petition for Return divorce lawyer Ely Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Three Section Three The Marren and Page Case List Christensen v Christensen Peters v Peters and Reciprocal Links: Legal Authority For Use in Requesting Fees in a Pro Bono Case Legal Authority For Use in Requesting Fees in a Pro Bono Case Legal Authority For Use in Requesting Fees in a Pro Bono Case Legal Authority For Use in Requesting Fees in a Pro Bono Case

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