Las Vegas family law specialist Both Birnbaum and Enrique M. recognize that disputes over the details of residential timeshare arrangements in cases involving joint physical custody are best settled by the parents, not the courts. Enrique M., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 314 (noting that such adjustments are "not on a par with a request to change physical custody from sole to joint custody, or vice versa"). Thus, they refuse to fuel these disputes by expanding them into full blown custody proceedings, or reviewing them on appeal as if that is what they involve. If the parents cannot agree on the child's schedule, the family court should be held to "possess[] the broadest possible discretion in adjusting co-parenting residential arrangements involved in joint physical custody." Birnbaum, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 216. This rule fosters the policy presuming joint custody to be in a child's best interests and may even "obviate the need for costly and time-consuming litigation to change custody, which may itself be detrimental to the welfare of minor children because of the uncertainty, stress, and even ill will that such litigation tends to generate." Enrique M., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313 (internal quotation omitted). The Court will further enhance the practice of family law by clarifying its definition of "joint physical custody" and by: 1) defining the other custodial terms; 2) setting a minimum standard before "joint physical custody" can be considered; 3) requiring trial courts to take a child-centered view when exercising its discretion; and 4) clarifying that adoption of a given State’s definition of a custodial term does not mean that its accompanying case law is controlling. The FLS believes that the Rivero definition of joint physical custody is appropriate, but will be made more so by adoptionof the clarifications outlined here. Both Birnbaum and Enrique M. recognize that disputes over the details of residential timeshare arrangements in cases involving joint physical custody are best settled by the parents, not the courts. Enrique M., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 314 (noting that such adjustments are "not on a par with a request to change physical custody from sole to joint custody, or vice versa"). Thus, they refuse to fuel these disputes by expanding them into full blown custody proceedings, or reviewing them on appeal as if that is what they involve. If the parents cannot agree on the child's schedule, the family court should be held to "possess[] the broadest possible discretion in adjusting co-parenting residential arrangements involved in joint physical custody." Birnbaum, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 216. This rule fosters the policy presuming joint custody to be in a child's best interests and may even "obviate the need for costly and time-consuming litigation to change custody, which may itself be detrimental to the welfare of minor children because of the uncertainty, stress, and even ill will that such litigation tends to generate." Enrique M., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313 (internal quotation omitted). SUP> Further, NRS 123.140 provides a method by which a spouse may record a written "full and complete inventory of the separate property of a married person, exclusive of money." Recording the inventory serves as notice of that spouse’s separate property title to the property.7 And (with apologies to Shakespeare), only an idol of idiot worshipers* would challenge an order referencing the video record by submitting a competing order based on the clerk’s notes. Yet we have seen attorneys do precisely that - three times - in the past month. B> The Section working group feels constrained to point out that the error corrected above was a result of application of the presumptive maximums set out in NRS 125B.070. The current Nevada presumptive maximum provisions distort and are contrary to the theoretical application of the Nevada child support statutes.1 The California Supreme Court adopted the Court of Appeals decision, with a few changes, as its own. It held that the 1974 case law permitting division of military retirement benefits could be retroactively applied, that actions to partition omitted assets were explicitly permitted under California law, and that McCarty was not to be construed as acting retroactively. Under the FLS proposal, an exactly equal time share is automatically considered to be "joint physical custody." However, it is imperative that if a time share falls within the 40% to 49% range, there should be no automatic or rebuttable presumption that joint physical custody is established. In those circumstances, the trial court must exercise its discretion as to whether a time share of 40% to 49% qualifies as joint physical custody under the specific facts and circumstances of the case before it. died that she received while he remained alive. Notably, it is not possible to similarly restrict the member’s interest; no matter what the court does, the member will retain an automatic reversion of all the money paid to the former spouse, if she dies first.1 In the next four scenarios, then, if the spouse dies first, the member gets the full gross military retirement benefits, but if the member dies first, the spouse continues to get only her share of the benefits. 65279;The true breakthrough came with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.161 Two programs were passed in tandem. First, CRSC was expanded to include all combat-related disabilities or operations-related disabilities,':" from 10% to 100% ratings, effective January I, 2004, and extended to Guard and Reserve members. CRSC payments are explicitly defined as not being "retired pay As a treaty entered into by the United States, the Hague Convention is on par with the Constitution of the United States, and supersedes any conflicting statute, case, or rule. The objectives of the Convention are: under Article 1(a), to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and under Article 1(b), to ensure that the rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.5 NCCUSL went back to work and in 1997 issued revisions of the jurisdictional aspects of the UCCJA in a new act, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, or UCCJEA. The replacement act was intended to provide clearer standards for which States can exercise original jurisdiction over a child custody determination, enunciate a standard of continuing jurisdiction for the first time, and to clarify modification jurisdiction. It also sought to harmonize the law on simultaneous proceedings, clean hands, and forum non conveniens. Next, Jill tried State court. She filed an action for partition of the retirement, adding a State court action for enforcement of the parties’ contract to divide retirement. The Virginia trial court dismissed the action, finding that the German decree did not constitute a written contract because it was not signed by the parties, in accordance with German procedure, and if it was an oral contract, the statute of limitations for enforcement thereof had run. Practitioners must thus have a clear understanding of the definitions applicable in the forum State (and, if two possible jurisdictions are in contest, the definitions in the other State, as well). Then it is a matter of discovery, looking at all the usual indicia, which are briefly discussed here. The essential purpose of the Hague Convention is to return children to their countries of habitual residence, where custody proceedings can then be held. Put into general phraseology of Nevada Domestic Relations Law, the Hague Convention treaty determines - between signatory countries - which court has subject matter jurisdiction to make custody determinations, and the children are sent to that jurisdiction for those proceedings. Nothing more. As of February 4, 1991, the definition of "disposable pay" was altered by Congress to eliminate the pay center’s deduction of income taxes from gross retired pay when calculating the sum paid to spouses.3 The change was explicitly based on the "unfairness" of the effect of the previous phrasing.4 The parties were never married. In the early fall of 1990, the mother decided to accept a job transfer. In September, the father, fearing that the mother might flee with the child, filed a complaint to establish custody. The father requested that he of receive joint legal custody, but that the mother receive primary physical custody. After a hearing, the district court granted the father temporary primary physical custody and ordered a custody evaluation. After a custody hearing, the district court concluded that the father provided the more stable living environment. During the next several months, the mother contended that the father prevented her from having phone contact and in-person visitation.  Some points are obvious, such as how long the member has been in the jurisdiction, where the member does his banking, and where he sends his children to school. Investing in local businesses, contributing to local charities, or joining voluntary organizations such as church, civil, professional, or fraternal organizations, indicate ties to the community. Getting married, or buying a burial plot in a place might be construed as evidence of residential intent. The mother wanted to move to Florida. The mother also had a history of frustrating visitation. The district court denied the request for relocation. The Court affirmed and held that the frustration of the nonmoving parent’s parental relationship may be part of the calculus of the final Schwartz factor, that being whether, assuming all of the other factors have been considered, and reasonable alternative visitation is available. The parties married in 1977. They had two children. The parents each requested primary physical custody. On August 14, 1990, after nearly two years of hearings and, the district court decree of divorce. The district court indicated that the custody provisions, as set forth in the decree, were temporary and that custody would be reevaluated one year later.  In addition, the district court ordered both parties were to submit a report showing  specific efforts made to create a better environment for the children. The parties filed their respective May 1991. Several months later, the parties filed a "Request for Submission of Motion" pursuant to the local rules. In March 1992, evaluations of the father, the father’s new wife, the parties’ children and the new wife’s daughter. The mother received a letter from the evaluator inviting her to meet with him at her convenience and advised her that he would be submitting his report to the court during the first half of May. The mother failed to respond.  Approximately two months later, the mother’s attorney sent a letter to the evaluator advising that the mother would be "quite willing to interview . . .to assist in any way possible." By that time, the report had already been submitted to the court. In July 1992, the district court filed its order which modified the temporary custody order of August, 1990, and provided that the father would have primary physical custody. The mother appealed claiming the district court failed to provide notice and a hearing prior to determining the issue of custody which violated her constitutional due process rights. The mother further contended that the district court’s reliance on the reports, which were not provided to the parties, prevented her from testing their validity by cross-examining the individuals who prepared them. The mother also alleged that the judge reviewed a ´phantom and/or fugitive report’ that in some way caused to him have bias requiring his disqualification. The private Bar, by contrast, calculates the penalty in accordance with how much of a year has passed, so that the penalty imposed on an obligation due in January, is less in February than it is in March, and continues to be assessed for however many years an installment remains outstanding, giving meaning to the statutory phrases "per annum" and "remains unpaid." Figuring reserve retirement pay is complex. The total retirement points earned is divided by 360 to yield "years of service" for retired pay purposes. That figure is multiplied by 2½ percent; the resulting percentage is multiplied by the active duty basic pay payable to an active duty member with the same grade and number of years creditable for retirement. As with active duty members, there is a distinction between reservist retirees depending on the date they entered service. For members who first entered service before September 8, 1980, the figure for "base pay" in the above calculation is the active duty basic pay in effect for the retiree’s grade and years of service in effect when the retired pay begins. For members who first served after September 8, 1980, "base pay" is the average basic pay for the member’s grade in the last three years that the member served. The antidote to this kind of post-judgment food fight? Get the QDRO approved/entered at the time of the divorce and don’t defer it for 15 years of after-the-fact litigation. Many of the jurisdictional rules for modification of a child support order are the same as those discussed above for initiation of such a case - such as the permissible bases for exercise and application of the long-arm statute. SUP> The next year, in Putterman v. Putterman,9 the Nevada Supreme Court held that both the husband’s financial misconduct in the form of refusing to account to the court concerning earnings and other financial matters, and his lying to the court about his income, provided compelling reasons for an unequal disposition of community property.10 The Court also noted, in dicta, that other possible "compelling reasons" for an unequal division of community property could include negligent loss or destruction of community property, unauthorized gifts of community property, and even, possibly, compensation for losses occasioned by marriage and its breakup.11 With repeal of 32 C.F.R. § 63.6, look for current regulations (in flux, but start with Dept. of Defense Financial Management Regulation Volume 7B, Chapter 3 (October, 2000» While there are some variations around the country in both the discretion of courts and the role of fault in dividing property, the great majority of States today perform a division of assets in accordance with the property accrued during the marriage, whether described as community property or equitable division. Most member-defendants, faced with the near-certainty of an identical result (at much greater expense, through two divorce actions) will relent and permit litigation of all claims in the court hearing the other property/debt/custody/support issues - almost always, the jurisdiction where he is living. Good news: they got divorced in 1995. Bad news: the language of their agreement was ambiguous regarding division of retirement assets. Worst news: by 2005, they still had no QDRO entered after 7 years, thus requiring the next 5 years of trial and appellate litigation. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that under NRS 125.150(7), the district court's jurisdiction is "co-existent with the alimony order itself," so an alimony award can be modified until the time for making the final payment passes, whether or not the husband prepays. The fact that the original alimony award had expired was "unpersuasive," since the period of extension was caused by the husband's failure to make payments and wife's obtaining an arrearage order. Where the supporting spouse is in arrears at the expiration of the original alimony term, modification of the alimony award is proper after the expiration of the original alimony term. 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