In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony Section IV IV A Proposed analytic framework bsp;           a.    Concept of a child’s "home state"- where the child has been for 6 months < action c) If the minority time-share parent is exercising more time than 40% determine what child support would be calculated as being if the parents had exactly equal custody, under the Wright/Wesley offset methodology. The range of potential downward deviation for this factor is the difference between guideline support and support calculated under the Wright/Wesley offset methodology. The third group is made up of members who entered service on or after August 1, 1986. That year, Congress had arranged to provide retirement benefits to those members that were lowered in two different ways. The SBP is funded by contributions taken out of the member’s retired pay. For members entering service before March 1, 1990, premiums are the lesser of the amount computed by two tests. First, 2.5% of the first $5727 of the base amount, plus 10% of the remaining base amount. Second, 6.5% of the base amount. For members entering service on or after March 1, 1990, SBP premiums are 6.5% of the base amount. Premiums continue indefinitely. Beginning October, 2008, however, SBP premiums stop, with benefits still fully payable, bsp;       1.    Some indication in law (Wolff) that debt is to be divided equally, but uncertain, since Malmquist held that debt could be divided in proportion to the relative ability of the spouses to pay it - i.e., in accordance with their respective incomes. An attorney wishing to personally estimate present values can purchase computer programs that do the math involved quickly.2 Such programs often allow the user to plug in the assumptions to be used, such as life expectancy, presumed interest rate, etc. In any event, attorneys handling these cases in States that allow or require trading the present value of the retirement benefit must become well versed in all aspects of valuation, interest rate assumptions, and other factors involved. Failure to do so invites disaster at settlement or in court. Note: Receipt by PERS of an order which for any reason does not comply with NRS Chapter 286 will serve as temporary notice to PERS of a forthcoming order regarding distribution of a member's benefits and any attempts to obtain a refund of contributions or retirement allowance from such Member's account will not be allowed for a period of 90 days. In 1999, the Washington State Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Jennings.5 The court found that a retiree who terminated a stream of payments to a former spouse by electing, post-divorce, to begin taking disability rather than retired pay created such "extraordinary circumstances" that the trial court should take the "justified remedial action" of awarding compensatory spousal support even four years after the divorce in order to "overcome a manifest injustice which was not contemplated by the parties at the time of the 1992 decree." The court noted the reduced stream of payments to the spouse, and held that: The wife obtained a divorce, and the property was divided and she was awarded alimony. The wife appealed claiming that the comparative value of the property awards and alimony were so out of proportion in favor of the husband as to be unfair. The Supreme Court declined to adopt the wife's position and concluded that the property awards and alimony were supported by substantial evidence was not prepared to saythatthe district court abused its discretion. Whether or not the gift is reasonable or unreasonable, is a question to be decided by the courts in each particular instance, and no hard-and-fixed rule can be laid down as to just what proportion of the community interest can be so disposed of by the spouse. A spouse may make a gift of community property reasonable in reference to the whole amount, in the absence of a fraudulent intent to defeat the wife’s claims. B> All of the details discussed in the preceding section, of course, are just that - details. They ignore the theoretical problem that the "presumptive maximum" (both the original $500 number and the CPI-adjusted brackets grossly reduced from inflation in 2001), contradict the basic purpose of the Wisconsin guideline method of figuring support. Second, there is the "default" - what would happen if the court deemed the former spouse to be the SBP beneficiary, at the full base amount, but took no steps to alter the ramifications of that election. The spouse would be "over-secured," to a greater or lesser extent.2 The smaller the lifetime interest of the former spouse happened to be, the larger the share of the premium that the member would pay.3 If the member died first, payments to the spouse would increase from $233.75 to $550. If the spouse died first, payments to the member would increase from $701.25 to $1,000. Some states, such as Texas, which found the USFSPA inadequate by itself to allow the re-opening of gap cases, never passed legislation permitting those divorced during the gap to bring their decrees into conformity with those divorced before McCarty or after the USFSPA. Divorces during the gap that gave 100 percent of the retirement benefits to the memeber because of McCarty remain unalterable in such states for lack of a mechanism through which to litigate them.13 Even where this view has not been reexamined on its merits, courts have allowed the concept of fees based upon "results obtained" or "reasonable value of result achieved" in domestic litigation cases and concluded that such fees do not constitute impermissible contingent fees. See, e.g., Eckell v. Wilson, 597 A.2d 696 (Pa. Super. 1991); In re Marriage of Malec, 562 N.E.2d 1010 (Ill. App. 1990); cf., State ex ref. Okla. Bar Ass 'n v. Fagin, 848 P.2d 11 (Okla. 1992). Practitioners therefore must be careful in all reservist cases; they should be wary in a case involving reserve component service of any calculations that presuppose the typical "years of marriage divided by years of service" formula. Since point accumulation might have been intermittent, significantly different spousal percentages could be obtained by the two methods of figuring. Note that the amended (prior) regulations in 32 C.F.R. § 63.6 specifically directed dividing reservist’s retirements by points accrued during marriage, rather than duty time during marriage. That directive appears to have remained in all subsequent military guidelines, including the 2009 regulations.1 In November 1921, the wife filed for divorce and requested sole custody of their child and for support. In February 1922, the husband bequeathed all of his property to a third person, with the express condition that she pay to his daughter, $50 per month until the daughter should emancipate. The father also bequeathed his automobile to his daughter with the condition that should she or her guardian attempt to break the will she was to receive only $5. In June 1922, the husband died. The mother then filed a petition requesting that  $1,817 in insurance proceeds be collected by the executrix and be declared exempt and set apart for the daughter’s use. The district court ordered that the money be set aside for the daughter.  The executrix appealed. The daughter was living with the father at the time of death. The question for the Court was the daughter a member of the father’s family.  PAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Times New Roman; FONT-SIZE: 14pt"> The Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of joint tenancy, community property, and the Nevada Constitution. The Court noted that a choice of the tenancy had to be made, and it may assume that it will sometimes be made unadvisedly or that later developments may indicate that the choice, seemingly advantageous at the time, has resulted in loss or hardship.  The Court cited and discussed a large number of cases from which it concluded that property acquired in the name of either spouse, or taken by both spouses as tenants in common or as joint tenants may be, by agreement between them, transmuted into community property. The Court noted that no case was provided to it, and they found none through their research in which a transmutation from joint tenancy to community was held to have taken place without proof either that the property was acquired with the intent that it be held in a tenancy different from that indicated from the form of the deed, or that, although acquired without such initial intent, it was later transmuted by agreement of the parties. The Court noted that it was unnecessary for them to determine, and it did not determine, that under no circumstances may the intent of the parties be established through circumstantial evidence and that its affirmance only went to the extent of holding that the use of community funds, earnings and efforts to build up and materially increase the value of the joint tenancy property, without further proof of original intent or subsequent agreement to hold the property as community was insufficient to prove a transmutation from joint tenancy. The third scenario would have the former spouse pay the entire SBP premium. Using the same hypothetical facts, reducing the spousal share from 25% to 19.7861% would free the member from Presume that a couple live together in marriage for ten years before they separate. The parties discuss reconciliation and possible divorce terms, but after six months, it becomes clear that the split is permanent, and one of them files for divorce. The divorce turns out to be a messy, acrimonious matter which proceeds through motions, custody evaluations, returns, etc., for another year and a half, when the parties finally get to trial and are declared divorced. Also presume that the member spouse accrues a military retirement during marriage providing exactly $1,000 after 20 years. The Court noted that the relation of husband and wife is one involving the highest trust and confidence. Under both common law and equitable standards, in any transaction, whereby one spouse seeks to obtain the other spouse’s property without adequate compensation, no duress, coercion, undue influence, imposition or overreaching will be tolerated. If no trust was found, and no consideration was paid for the income paid to the wife and reassigned to the husband, the burden of proof would shift to the husband, and would require him to prove affirmatively that the reassignment was executed without undue influence, and that it was entered into freely and voluntarily, also that it was understood by the wife and was fair and equitable to her. A presumption of invalidity arises, which can only be overcome, if at all, by clear evidence of good faith, of full knowledge, and of independent consent and action. Fern v. United States1 was an unusual case in that the defendant was not a former spouse but the United States itself. The suit sought to have the USFSPA declared invalid to the extent that it entitled the government to reduce the retired pay flowing to the members themselves. In other words, the members contended that, irrespective of any award to any former spouse, the full sum of retired pay should be paid to the members. It alleged unconstitutional "taking" of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment, an unconstitutional impairment of contracts with the United States (by which the members contended that they alone were to receive the entirety of their retirement benefits), and that spousal awards under the USFSPA were due process violations. The need to make some kind of adjustment for shared custody/extended visitation is acute. Families are establishing joint custody arrangements at increasingly higher rates. The 1995 Census Bureau report for the year 1991 showed that 73% of non-custodial mothers and 58% of non-custodial fathers had extensive visitation privileges or joint custody. United States Department of Health and Human Services, Final Report: Also, in 1962, the husband, with two other persons, formed C.B.C. Inc., for the purpose of purchasing, improving and selling parcels of real estate. The husband testified that he used proceeds from the sale of his inherited stock, plus a bank loan secured by more of the same stock, to purchase his interest in the corporation. The husband and wife each received one-sixth interests in the corporation. The sole asset of the corporation was sold in June 1969 for $800,000. Although the wife held in her name a certificate evidencing a one-third interest, the husband personally received $302,779 from the sale, which represented a return of the invested capital plus a share of the profit. The district court awarded the proceeds to the husband and held that the transfer was merely to avoid creditors and that there was an oral agreement to reconvey. Section three provides that any interest created by the court pursuant to this statute terminates at the death of either party unless otherwise provided by agreement or court order. Again, as with section one, that is already the law. And it is hard to make the text following subsection (b) make any linguistic sense with the first half of the paragraph. There has never been a case, apparently, in which a court has ordered a bond to secure payment of a spousal share ordered not paid at eligibility, in accordance with NRS 125.155(2)(a). It is difficult to conceive how such an order might work, as such a bond would require a dollar sum certain to secure an unknown future performance to begin on an unknown future date. 2) If the minority time-share parent is exercising less time than 20%, determine if guideline support was reduced by the presumptive maximum set out in NRS 125B.070. If so, the range of potential upward deviation for this factor is the difference between the presumptive maximum and the percentage of income for support set out in NRS 125B.070(1)(b). If not, the range of potential deviation for this factor is based on the trial court’s determination of the increased costs incurred in the majority time-share parent’s household by virtue of the lack of the minority time-share parent’s visitation. The USFSPA is both jurisdictional and procedural; it both permits the state courts to distribute military retirement to former spouses, and provides a method for  enforcement of these orders through the military pay center. The USFSPA itself does not give former spouses an automatic  entitlement to any portion of members’ pay.  Only state laws can provide for division of military retirement pay in a divorce, or provide that alimony or child support are to be paid from military retired pay. Rights granted by state law are limited by federal law, even if state law does not so provide, and even if the courts of the states do not see any such limitations.7 In 1989, the Nevada Legislature added NRS.125.150(8), requiring a court granting a divorce to "consider the need to grant alimony to spouse for the purpose of obtaining training or .. education relating to a job, career or profession." This provision did add some language indicating what such an award would encompass, and at least two factors to consider in making such an award (whether the obligor obtained job skills or education during the marriage, and whether the recipient provided financial support while the obligor did so). As put by the Court in Moore: "Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent, and is considered to have ´notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’" Put another way, the legitimate insurable interest to be secured is much higher for the former spouse. If the retirement was worth $1,000 per month, then the former spouse would have an insurable interest of $375 per month for her lifetime to secure, while the interest of the later spouse was only $100. It would thus be much easier for the member (and he would typically be much more inclined) to provide substitute security for the later spouse than for the former spouse. Marshal S. Willick is the principal of the Willick Law Group in Las Vegas, a Family Law firm in which Bob Cerceo has been a Senior Attorney. Detailed information can be found at www.WillickLawGroup.com. After a long and fruitful association, Mr. Willick is pleased to announce that Mr. Cerceo will be joining the Northern Nevada Lawyer correspondent, Mary Anne Decaria, in practice with Silverman Decaria and Kattelman in Reno. Most reviewing courts have either found or simply assumed that Mansell is applicable in litigation concerning post-divorce recharacterizations by retirees, and attempted to apply it to resolve the cases before them. Nevertheless, those appellate courts have almost uniformly reached the same ultimate destination as the court in Krempin, by means of a longer analysis. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court found that pursuant to NRS 125.140(2) there was a proper exercise of the district court’s discretionary powers in denying the the father’s motion to modify citing to Goodman v. Goodman, 68 Nev. 484, 236 P.2d 305 (1951); Schmutzer v. Schmutzer, 76 Nev. 123, 350 P.2d 142 (1960); Adler v. Adler, 80 Nev. 364, 394 P.2d 350 (1964);  Edwards v. Edwards, 82 Nev. 392, 419 P.2d 637 (1966). Id. at 428-29. The Court also quoted MacDonald v. Superior Court in and for San Mateo County, 104 P.2d 1071 (Cal.App. 1940) wherein that court stated "[n]o party to an action can with right or reason, ask the aid and assistance of a court in hearing his demands while he stands in an attitude of contempt to the court’s legal orders and processes."  bsp;           a.    Concept of a child’s "home state"- where the child has been for 6 months < action You can find In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony Section IV The Marren and Page Case List First National Bank v Wolff Lam v Lam Canul v Less is More and More is Less More or Less Public Employees Retirement System PERS Benefits Section II Subsection C Public Employees Retirement System PERS Benefits Section I Subsection B The Marren and Page Case List Davis v Davis Primm v Lopes and Mason v Mason Notable Domestic Relations Cases Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section II Subsection C Hedlund Amicus Brief Discussion of Issues Requested The Marren and Page Case List Champagne v Welfare Divorce Geeson v Barnes I Checklist for Military Retirement Benefits Cases Ogawa Amicus Brief CONCLUSION Death of Member Before Retirement and Before Divorce Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Approaches Relating to Unequal Joint Custody In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony Section IV available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Four B Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section IX Subsection B The Marren and Page Case List Johnson v Johnson Pereira v Pereira Van Camp The Marren and Page Case List City of Las Vegas v Las Vegas Municipal Court Some Polotics in Attempted Service to the Poor The Service Members Civil Relief Act of 2003 Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section X Reciprocal Links: In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony Section IV In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony Section IV In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony Section IV In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony Section IV

In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony Section IV In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony Section IV In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony Section IV In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony Section IV