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Hedlund Amicus Brief Discussion of Issues Requested
Learn more about Hedlund Amicus Brief Discussion of Issues Requested.
III A Whether the District Court can order payments to the former spouse before the member actually retiresIn addition to the conditions and difficulties mentioned above, practitioners should keep in mind (and advise their clients) when dealing with the SBP, that an annuity payable to a widow, widower, or former spouse is suspended if the beneficiary remarries before age 55.3 In other words, the client should be advised to not remarry prior to the relevant age, unless willing to forgo continuing payment of the SBP benefits.4 SUP> There is no published Nevada case squarely addressing the question of whether one party can take advantage of the delay between trial and entry of judgment to assert that the other party (presumably working for a living) is accruing "unadjudicated assets" (or paying down debt) during that pendency which are then subject to further proceedings or division. Saying "no" to that question has been the uniform result in all known Nevada cases, and appears to be the consensus in published cases from other jurisdictions, reflecting a policy choice of encouraging promptness rather than delay.8 There appear to be five separate possible effects of a death on a couple in which one party is or was a member of the armed forces, depending upon whether death is before or after retirement, and before or after divorce, and which of the parties has died. Nothing stated below has any effect on service life insurance, which is discussed separately below. The Supreme Court noted that after the husband and his second wife married, they purchased real estate which they held in joint tenancy, and later sold. The proceeds were put into a certificate of deposit to "Howard F. McKissick, Jr., and/or Dorothy McKissick." The district court found the certificate to be in a form to be paid to the survivor. The Court noted that there was no written agreement between the husband and his second wife with respect to the creation of a joint tenancy in the time certificate of deposit. The certificate itself did not contain language of joint tenancy or survivorship. The Court noted that NRS 111.065(2) provided that "a joint tenancy in personal property may be created by a written transfer, agreement or instrument." The Court further noted that a writing was required citing to Weinstein v. Sodaro, 91 Nev. 638, 541 P.2d 531 (1975). The words "and/or" in the certificate of deposit did not create a joint tenancy. The Court further concluded that oral testimony was insufficient to create a joint tenancy. The Court held that a joint tenancy must be created by a written transfer, agreement or instrument citing to NRS 111.065 (2) and that it may not be created orally citing to Crocker-Anglo National Bank v. American Trust Co., 338 P.2d 617 (Dist.Ct.App.Cal. 1959) and California Trust Co. v. Bennett, 204 P.2d 324 (Cal. 1949). It’s a job I know pretty well; I had the job of a Central Staff Attorney as my first out of law school. But the game has changed, somewhat, since the early 1980s - the Central Staff is much larger than it used to be, and part of the Court’s adaptation to its increased size, huge case load, and lack of an intermediate appellate court has been to rely ever more heavily on Central Staff for substantive expertise in discrete practice areas. The parties married September 1981. On the day of their marriage, the parties signed an antenuptial agreement. Soon after the marriage, the wife began working for the husband’s company. For about three years she worked part-time, mostly trying to speed up or enforce collections. After about one year after the wife began work, she and the husband agreed his company would not pay her a separate salary, but her income would be included in the husband’s income. The husband and his accountant testified that the wife agreed to this means of compensation so his company would not have to pay separate payroll taxes. Throughout the marriage thereafter, this income into the joint checking account, and it was used to pay community expenses. The district court filed the decree in October 1986. The wife was awarded primary physical custody of the child and the husband was ordered to pay $500 a month child support, maintain health insurance for the child, and designate her as beneficiary for a $50,000 life insurance policy. The wife was ordered to execute documents, on a yearly basis, allowing the husband to claim the exemption for the child. The parties had two children. The mother received primary custody and the fther was ordered to pay support fo $250 per month, per child until each child reached the age of 18, was married, or was otherwise earlier emancipated. After the order was entered, NRS 125.510 was amended to extend child support obligations until a child completed high school or reached the age of 19. The statute became effective on July 1, 1985. In October 1987, the mother filed a motion to modify the child support obligation for both children. On November 1, the oldest child turned 18. In March 1989, the district court found that it did not have jurisdiction to modify the support provisions for the eldest child because the motion was filed after the father had formally discharged his support obligation. The district court also found that NRS 125.510(6) operated prospectively only and could not be applied to the eldest child. The district court further determined that pursuant to NRS 125.510(6), the father’s support obligation to the youngest child was extended until she graduated from high school. The organized family law Bar must become more proactive in the legislative process. Too much, we have allowed private lobbying groups to speak for the family law bar. Experience has shown clearly that those organizations, and their representatives, have political and personal agendas considerably beyond looking out for equity, impartiality, and logic in family law. SPAN> Mosley is an appeal from an order modifying a joint custody arrangement to sole custody.Although much of the case is dicta espousing shared custody as an ideal, it does not define the term, nor does it distinguish between legal custody and physical custody. The parties’ son was an infant when their joint custody agreement was first approved by the trial court, and he was only five yearsof age at the time the fourth motion relating to custody, which led to the appeal, was filed by his mother. The original custody order provided that "the parents should have joint custody, with appropriate residential arrangements that would accommodate the child’s age,"4 and that "it was the intention of the parties to reach, when the child is of an appropriate age, a true 50/50 time share."5 In other words, the member essentially has an automatic, cost-free, survivorship benefit built into the law that automatically restores to him the full amount of the spouse's share of the lifetime benefit ifshe should die before him. No matter what any court might order, if the former spouse dies first, the member not only continues to get his share ofthe benefits, but he will also get her share, for as long as he lives. Previously, SBP payments were reduced for a beneficiary who aged 62 or older, although an expensive supplement was developed which, if purchased, eliminated the reduction.5 Continued political pressure resulted in elimination of the Social Security offset, phased in over three and a half years starting in October, 2005, and ending April, 2008.6 The SSBP premiums were phased out; at the end of the adjustment period, all SBP recipients should receive 55% of the base amount indefinitely, regardless of age. In addition to the conditions and difficulties mentioned above, practitioners should keep in mind (and advise their clients) when dealing with the SBP, that an annuity payable to a widow, widower, or former spouse is suspended if the beneficiary remarries before age 55.3 In other words, the client should be advised to not remarry prior to the relevant age, unless willing to forgo continuing payment of the SBP benefits.4 t]he public interest therefore requires that in the securing of professional advice and assistance upon matters affecting one’s legal rights one must have assurance of competence and integrity and must enjoy freedom of full disclosure with complete confidence in the undivided allegiance of one’s counselor in the definition and assertion of the rights in question. It was, and Congress reacted by enacting the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act ("USFSPA") on September 8, 1982.2 The declared goal of the USFSPA at the time of its passage was to "reverse McCarty by returning the retired pay issue to the states."3 Later re-interpretations indicated that this stated declaration of intent might not have totally overruled McCarty after all,4 but in any event treatment of retired pay was again made dependent on the divorce laws of the jurisdictions granting decrees. B> For well over a hundred years, the United States government steadfastly refused to allow retired military members to draw both regular retired pay and disability pay, instead requiring the member to waive retired pay, dollar for dollar, for all disability pay received. That has finally changed, with significant repercussions for divorce cases. Here, in denying Ms. Rivero child support, the district court relied on the divorce decree, in which the parties agreed that neither would receive child support. Substantially identical decisions have come from both State and federal courts. In Neal v. General Motors Corporation,6 the United States Federal District Court for the Western District of North The national AAML has for many years had working groups dedicated to review of the ethical codes governing family law practice, and conceived the idea for what would become known as the "Bounds of Advocacy" in November, 1987. The committee, which canvassed the entire AAML for its collective wisdom and experience, included Gary Silverman of Reno; the proposed text was vetted and reviewed by academics and judicial authorities for years before its publication in 1991. In approximately 1916, the husband purchased a car. The wife testified that the husband gave her the car, and that she traded it in for another car paying the difference, and in 1920 traded in the second car for the car in question a difference of $1,700 in cash. The sheriff, acting under a writ of attachment, attached the automobile in an action to recover a money judgment against the husband. The wife claimed that the major portion of the cash she used in paying the difference in these trades was savings from money her husband gave her with which to run the house. The action was instituted to recover the possession of the car, upon the theory that it was the separate property of the wife. The district court held that the monies advanced by the husband for household expenses were not separate property. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court saw the issue as whether community property had been transmuted into separate property. The Court noted there is presumption that all property acquired by either spouse during marriage is community and that it remains community until clearly shown to have been transmuted into the separate property citing to Laws v. Ross, 44 Nev. 405, 194 P. 465 (1920) and Barrett v. Franke, 46 Nev. 170, 208 P. 435 (1922). The Court concluded that overthrowing the presumption that the car was community property could not be done by simple naked statements that the car was a gift, nor that the money and the car, which were given as consideration for the car in question, were gifts, but it was necessary to present facts from which the conclusion could be reached that they were not community property. Id. at 471. The Court also concluded that fact that the bill of sale was to the wife did not affect the presumption that the car was community property. Yet there are variations around the country in terms of what is counted, and how, leading to very different ultimate results. Courts in different States may not even realize that the "time rule" cases decided elsewhere follow different sets of rules and assumptions. ¡¡ B> 2. Good cause be shown why the Nevada Supreme Court should not issue a writ of mandamus directing the Governor to declare Judge Teuton’s office vacant under NRS 3.080(1). b. The share of the adjusted combined child support obligation for each parent shall then be multiplied by the percentage of time the child spends with the other parent to determine the base child support obligation owed to the other parent. First, we address the district court's finding that the parties had a joint physical custody arrangement. In reaching our conclusion, we clarify that parties may enter into custody agreements and create their own custody terms and definitions. The courts may enforce such agreements as contracts. However, once the parties move the court to modify the custody agreement, the court must use the terms and definitions under Nevada law. In this case, the district court properly disregarded the parties' definition of joint physical custody in the divorce decree and applied Nevada law in determining that an equal timeshare was appropriate. Although it reached the proper conclusion, the district court abused its discretion by failing to set forth specific findings of fact to support its determination. You can find Hedlund Amicus Brief Discussion of Issues Requested The Marren and Page Case List Summers v Summers Death of Member Before Retirement and After Divorce Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section V Value Altering The Marren and Page Case List Boulter v Boulter The Marren and Page Case List Kelly v Kelly Todkill v Todkill Peters v Pete The Marren and Page Case List Abell v Second Judicial District Court Cole v The Marren and Page Case List Lake v Bender Milisich v Hillhouse Jones v Ed military retirement expert lawyer Las Vegas CSRS law expert Public Employees Retirement System PERS Benefits Section II Subsction B divorce lawyer Ely What is Considered Separate Property Including Characterization of Earnings Landreth and cohabitant relationship divisions Las Vegas expert pay child support Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section IV Subsection C The Marren and Page Case List Oren v Deptartment of Human Resources Hedlund Amicus Brief Discussion of Issues Requested available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar The Marren and Page Case List Whise v Whise Fleming v Fleming Presson v Pre Child Support The Marren and Page Case List Renshaw v Renshaw and Wallaker v Wallaker CONCLUSION Disability Benefits and Concurrent Receipt The Marren and Page Case List Slack v Schwartz Adams v Adams and Swan v Swa Ogawa extending time to file under UCCJEA |