Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Three Section Three

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The second variable What is shared custody

Perhaps the clearest expositions of the reasoning behind the two approaches are found in those cases in which a reviewing court splits as to which interpretation is most correct. The Iowa Supreme Court faced such a conflict in the case of In re Benson.4 The trial court had used a time-rule approach, with the wife¡¯s percentage to be applied to the sum the husband actually received, whenever he actually retired. The USFSPA set up a federal mechanism for recognizing and enforcing State-court divisions of military retired pay, including definitions. One of these was of "disposable retired pay" (the sum that the military pay center could divide between spouses), which was defined as "the total monthly retired pay" minus certain sums, including sums deducted "as a result of a waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38"6 or "equal to the amount of retired pay of the member under that chapter computed using the percentage of the member’s disability on the date when the member was retired" for a member retired under chapter 61.7 spouse (requiring a cash out of the nonemployee spouse’s share), or by a "time rule" division of the benefits themselves, stating that the latter is preferred. Shortly before the wedding, the couple signed a prenuptial agreement drafted by the husband. However, the husband did not attach his schedule until a year after they signed the agreement. The district court concluded the alimony provision was unenforceable. The cost of the Survivor Benefit Plan is deducted from the husband-retiree’s gross pension income of $2200 per month before the net remainder is divided between the parties pursuant to the permanent orders. Thus, the expense is shared equally by both parties.2 While this may all seem perplexing, keep in mind that in child custody situations, domestic violence is also a factor to consider under NRS 125.480 (5). There is a direct correlation between the changes to NRS 33.018 and the best interest factors under NRS 125.480(5). In accordance with the law, our beloved pets could slowly be moving from being recognized as just a piece of property, to being thrown into a category akin to children. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that [FORMER SPOUSE] is awarded an interest in [MEMBER]fs pension and retirement interests with the State of Nevada Public Employees Retirement System (PERS), accrued through employment, as follows: In 1993, the Legislature resolved the potential conflict between the concept of a no-fault divorce on the one hand, and the consideration of marital misconduct on the other, when determining an award of alimony, by deleting the phrase "having regard to the respective merits of the parties" from NRS 125.150(1). The parties were married in September 1973. The husband filed for divorce September 1994. The matter proceeded to trial in January 1996. At the time of trial, the husband was earning at least $75,000 a year. The wife's annual income was approximately $14,000. The district court denied the wife's request for alimony because she had an extramarital affair, had initiated the parties' separation by leaving the family to pursue the extramarital relationship and had taken $10,000 from their adult son's personal injury settlement. The district court also found as significant the husband's responsible conduct. SUP> If a non-alimony resolution is desired, or necessary, it is difficult in most cases to come up with sufficient security for such a lifetime stream of payments. This is a problem in jurisdictions which have formal or informal barriers to establishment of alimony awards. And, of course, all the risks associated with bankruptcy are a factor when the spouse exchanges a pension share for anything else. The Court held that statute empowering courts to set aside default judgments was remedial and should be liberally construed especially in divorce actions citing to Bowman v. Bowman, 47 Nev. 207, 217 P. 1102 (1923) and Blundin v. Blundin, 38 Nev. 212, 147 P. 1083 (1915). Even though the attorney miscalculated the default time, the Court refused to set aside the default. The Court noted there was nothing to show that there was any community property or separate property involved in the proceeding for divorce. On this history, one would figure that the Court would go to great lengths to prevent personal bias from creeping into cases at any level. Unfortunately, other factors have apparently prevented that from being perceived as the most important consideration. There are attorneys in this State who seek out and even hire paralegal staff for the purpose of pumping those paralegals for confidential information obtained during previous employment. The practice is odious, and unethical, and requires a whole lot more attention, condemnation from the bench, and prosecution by the Bar, than it has received to date. Many courts have awarded alimony upon divorce to the spouse, on the basis that the member was enjoying a separate property cash flow from disability benefits applied for before divorce that wouldhave been divisible retirement benefits but for the member’s election. Where VA disability exists at the time of divorce, the court cannot divide those benefits, but they "may be considered as a resource for purposes of determining [one’s] ability to pay alimony."1 Generally, State courts have felt free to make alimony awards where necessary to do substantial justice to the parties in front of them, taking into account the entirety of the actual financial circumstances of the parties. The Supreme Court noted the three years provided by NRS 11.190(3)(d), accruing upon discovery of facts constituting the fraud. The Court found that while the wife had discovered the sham transactions by 1989, that awareness did not, as a matter of law, constitute discovery by wife of facts constituting the fraud by the law firm. The Court held that when a plaintiff knew or in the exercise of proper diligence should have known of the facts constituting the elements of a cause of action is a question of fact. Looking to the five year RICO statute of limitations in NRS 207.470, the Court termed the "injury" to be discovered both the injury itself and the cause of that injury, here the alleged racketeering activity, which should not have been ruled upon below as a matter of law. Those responsible for the decades of delay and millions of dollars of wasted expenditure on NOMADS should be identified and publicly censured. And the Nevada Legislature should direct Welfare to actually collect correctly calculated interest and penalties on child support judgments, neither front-loading, nor later ignoring, statutory penalties. Welfare should be discouraged from continuing the gamesmanship of looking for legal cover with which to paper over its deficiencies, and discouraged from trying to amend the law to match their inaccurate and backward approach. The district court failed to divide a horse breeding partnership. The Supreme Court remanded with the direction to make certain that all of the assets were divided. Perhaps the clearest expositions of the reasoning behind the two approaches are found in those cases in which a reviewing court splits as to which interpretation is most correct. The Iowa Supreme Court faced such a conflict in the case of In re Benson.4 The trial court had used a time-rule approach, with the wife¡¯s percentage to be applied to the sum the husband actually received, whenever he actually retired. Specifically, the "time rule" approach appears to be the majority view in the states, and it comes closest to providing equity to successive spouses. Two consecutive spouses, during the first and last halves of a participant’s career, would be treated equally under the qualitative approach, but very differently under any approach that freezes the spousal share at the level of compensation being received by the worker at the time of divorce. P> During the same hearing, the district court also addressed the custody timeshare arrangement because the parties had been unable to reach an agreement in mediation. Although the divorce decree provided Ms. Rivero with custody five days each week and Mr. Rivero with custody two days each week, the district court concluded that the parties actually intended an equal timeshare. The district court noted that it was "just trying to find a middle ground" between what the divorce decree provided and what the parties actually wanted regarding a custody timeshare. Further, the court found that the decree's order for joint physical custody was inconsistent with the decree's timeshare arrangement because the decree's five-day, two-day timeshare did not constitute joint physical custody. In its order, the district court concluded that the parties intended joint physical custody and ordered an equal timeshare. PAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Times New Roman; FONT-SIZE: 14pt"> The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that the proceeds of the loans received by the husband from his parents must be presumed to be community property citing to Jones v. Edwards court’s finding that the stock was the husband’s separate property, 49 Nev. 299, 245 P. 292 (1926). The Court also noted that when the husband purchased stock with the borrowed funds, the stock was presumed to be community property citing to Lake v. Bender, 18 Nev. 361, 384, 4 P. 711, modified, 18 Nev. 402, 7 P. 74 (1884). The Court additionally noted the fact that the stock was issued only in the name of the husband did not affect the presumption that it was community property citing to Milisich v. Hillhouse, 48 Nev. 166, 228 P. 307 (1924). The Court concluded whether the evidence was clear and convincing and sufficient to overcome the presumption that the stock acquired during marriage was community property, was a question for the district court and, further concluded under the facts of the case there was substantial evidence in support of the district court’s finding that the stock was the husband’s separate property. Dagher v. Dagher, 103 Nev. 26, 731 P.2d 1329 (1987) In 1990, the parties divorced agreeing that they would share joint legal and physical custody of the child. In March 1991, the father filed a motion, requesting primary physical custody, alleging among other things, that the mother left their daughter home alone. The referee recommended that custody remain with the mother, however, the referee found that the child was spending time alone after school for one or two hours per day on frequent occasions and that a ten-year-old child is too young to be left alone without supervision." The referee recommended that an adult had to be present with the child at all times, and the child is not to be left alone for even 5 minutes and that the child be in sight of a responsible adult at all times. The referee further recommended that if it found the child was still being left alone, custody be changed to the father. The district court adopted the referee’s findings and recommendations. In February 1992, the father renewed his motion because the mother had been leaving the child alone for several hours. The child was ill and left alone while the mother went to work. The child was interviewed and expressed to stress of being left alone. The referee concluded the mother violated the prior orders, could not be trusted to follow future orders, that it was reprehensible that the child was left alone when ill and recommended that the father be awarded primary physical custody. The district court adopted recommendation. B> IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this decree does not provide any capacity for the Member to designate a subsequent spouse as beneficiary of a portion of the survivorship interest in the Plan up to all survivorship interests less those awarded to the Alternate Payee. The court intends to permit the Member to make such an allocation of remaining survivorship, but is unable to exercise that intent due to the limitations of the current law. The court expressly reserves jurisdiction to enter such future orders as may be necessary to carry this intention into effect, by modification of this Decree as required to do so, should the law allow.

You can find Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Three Section Three The Marren and Page Case List Milender v Marcum Cook v Cook and Guerin v Gu The Marren and Page Case List Nixon v Brown and Schmanski v Schmanski The Marren and Page Case List Harris v Harris Libro v Walls and Love v Love Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar Substantive Issues The Childs Habitual Residence at the Time of Removal or Service Members Life Insurance The Marren and Page Case List Truax v Truax Rivero v Rivero Opinion IV Hearing on the Petition for Return The Marren and Page Case List Sprenger v Sprenger How to Allocate the SBP Premium Cost-Shifting The Rivero Formula Exhibit Three Public Employees Retirement System PERS Benefits Section I Subsection B Family Law and Contingency Fees Time to Reconsider Section III Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Three Section Three available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above.

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