Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section I Dealing with The U.S. Supreme Court majority reversed, holding that the USFSPA did not constitute a total repudiation of the pre-emption it had declared in McCarty. Since the statute defined "disposable pay" as what was divisible, and excluded disability pay from that definition, the Court concluded that state courts could divide only non-disability military retired pay.1 The dissent echoed the conclusions reached earlier by the California Supreme Court in Casas v. Thompson - that the gross sum of retirement benefits was available to the state divorce court for division.2 For example, presume the member-spouse is the defendant, served in Nevada, but he expressly refuses consent to the court’s jurisdiction, claims that his presence in Nevada is solely by reason of assignment, and that his State of residence and domicile are elsewhere, say in Florida. The spouse could then file a parallel action in Florida, and serve that action on the member, with the claimed intention of letting the two jurisdictions figure out which action should proceed. B> The standard "time rule" formula seems simple enough - the spousal share is determined by taking the number of months of service during marriage as a numerator, and the total number of months of service as a denominator, and multiplying the resulting fraction by first one-half (the spousal share) and then by the retirement benefits received. Sometimes, this focus is revealed in contempt cases, as in the 1995 Texas Court of Appeals rejection of a retiree’s claim that federal law made him "exempt" from contempt sanction after he waived retired pay in favor of disability benefits.2 This is one of the cases that have labeled a post-divorce recharacterization of benefits as an improper "collateral attack on a final unappealed divorce decree."3 Where the statute specifies the threshold amount of custody that must be met before the shared custody formula is applied, it is error for the court to apply that formula in the absence of evidence that the threshold has been met. In re Marriage of Redford, 776 P.2d 1149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); In re Marriage of southwell, 119 Or. ApP· 336, 851 P.2d 599 (1993). It is also error for the court not to apply the formula when the evidence indicates that the formula should be applied. Wright v. Gregorio, 855 P .2d 772 (Alaska 1993); Eddie v. Eddie, 201 Mich. ApP. 509, 506 NW .2d 591 (1993); Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P .2d 345 (Wyo. 1994); see also Molstad v. Molstad, 193 Wis. 2d 602, 535 NW .2d 63 (1995) (court should consider fact that one parent has custody 30% of time). Judgment was entered February 1972. The husband was ordered to pay the wife a sum of money. The husband wrote the wife a check for $1,209.01 with the notation written in the memo portion, "acceptance by you of this check shall constitute total discharge of obligation under such Judgment and Decree." The check was immediately cashed and the proceeds were retained. No Notice of Entry of Order was ever filed. In December 1972, the husband filed a motion to change custody. In May 1973, the district court ordered  custody changed. The wife then appealed not only from the Order changing custody but also from the Order from February 1972, concerning the judgment. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, if a court order provides for extended visitation between an obligor and a child living with an obligee, the support obligation presumed to be the correct child support amount due on behalf of all children of the obligor living with the obligee must be determined under this subsection. Obviously, either approach could be better, or worse, for either party, depending on how much time passes, and whether the account balance increases or decreases during that time. But in either case, it should be dealt with one way or the other in the decree (preferably) and in the order dividing the plan benefits (definitely) to avoid what could be considerable litigation as to which possible way to divide benefits was impliedly intended to be done. Court noted that a district court could have required the father to maintain or purchase life insurance upon his life, with the children as beneficiaries, or require that a trust be set up for the benefit of the children citing to NRS 125.140.  The Actuary also produces disability and non-disability retirement life expectancy tables, from which a good estimate of present value for a military retirement can be independently calculated. A convenient annual source for much of this information is the annual "Retired Military Almanac" (Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., P.O. Box 4144, Falls Church, VA 22044; (703) 532-1631). In 2006, Congress altered the longevity rules.9 As of April 1, 2007, the military retired pay of retirees with more than 30 years of service is not limited to 75% of basic pay. Rather, new basic pay tables (to 40 years) are applicable for retirements on and after that date. Additionally, various enlisted and officer ranks had their basic pay increased for service longevity from a maximum of over 28 years to a maximum of over 36 years; in other words, monthly pay that used to "top out" at a certain point continued increasing with continued service. The Wisconsin joint-custody provisions create a mathematical construct that appears to be similar to the original Rivero formulation. It is triggered at 25%, and like Alaska, usually (but not always) counts overnights as its measure of time, with the trigger-number being 92. Like Alaska, once the formula is activated, total support is increased to 150% to account for redundancy of expenses in the two households. If the former spouse dies first, then the member automatically gets back the entirety of the monthly spousal share, for the rest of his life. There are nine basic possibilities, however, as to what the spouse should receive in the event that the member dies first. Each carries with it a different weighing of equities, rights, and responsibilities. In a flurry of opinions immediately following the federal pronouncement, several courts issued opinions detailing why they would not allow the inequity of allowing post-divorce status changes by members to partially or completely divest their former spouses, where the original divorce decree had been issued prior to the Mansell decision.9 While this conclusion seems to be universal,10 the situation is more complex for divorce decrees issued after 1989.11 The U.S. Supreme Court majority reversed, holding that the USFSPA did not constitute a total repudiation of the pre-emption it had declared in McCarty. Since the statute defined "disposable pay" as what was divisible, and excluded disability pay from that definition, the Court concluded that state courts could divide only non-disability military retired pay.1 The dissent echoed the conclusions reached earlier by the California Supreme Court in Casas v. Thompson - that the gross sum of retirement benefits was available to the state divorce court for division.2 This is a discretionary (as opposed to strictly legal) decision, but it does not seem reasonable for a trial court to get dragged into a dispute as to which of the two potential beneficiaries is most "deserving" of the SBP - a dispute that would almost certainly devolve into a conflict over the causes of the original divorce, with all of the fault-based overtones that modern divorce practice tries to avoid. Further, in the years since Mansell, reviewing courts have gone from examination of the decree to see if there was a specific savings clause by which the spousal share could survive the retiree’s recharacterization, to examining the underlying decree for a specific provision permitting the retiree to retroactively reduce the award to the former spouse. The following paragraph is a safeguard paragraph intended to allow relatively painless discovery from the military pay center in the event further information is necessary to come up with an enforceable order. It is probably only necessary in cases in which the Member is still in service on the date of divorce, so that some information is not known at that time. default, the military pay center ("DFAS") will always take the premium "off the top," and then split what remains according to the percentages set out in the order.  In other words, the parties bear the premium cost in proportion to whatever share of the military retirement benefits they are receiving. 1. Good cause be shown why Judge Teuton’s commission and service in office beyond January 4, 2009 should not be declared invalid under Nevada Constitution Article 6, Section 20(2), and correspondingly, Second, by way of Concurrent Receipt (also called "Concurrent Disability Pay," or "CDP," but later re-titled "Concurrent Retirement and Disability Pay" or "CRDP"),3 all retirees with 20 years of service and VA disability ratings of 50% or higher, had their retired pay offsets phased out over a ten year period. In other words, the military retired pay previously waived for disability pay would be slowly restored, until the retirees were receiving both their full retired pay and the VA disability payments. Because the restored money is the fully-divisible longevity retired pay that was waived for VA benefits in the first place, it is "retired pay." As with the custody statutes, establishment of jurisdiction to modify a child support order is a matter of a "snapshot" taken at the moment of commencement of proceedings.2 As stated by the Nevada Supreme As a matter of logic and math, where the member has a free survivorship interest in the spouse’s life, in addition to his own benefits, it seems most appropriate to either have the parties SPAN> In the Mattter of Parental Rights as to K.D.L., 118 Nev. 737, 58 P.3d 181 (2002) As to the best interests of the children, the father failed to overcome the presumptions enunciated in NRS 128.109(2) that if a child has resided outside of his home pursuant to that placement for 14 months of any 20 consecutive months, the best interests of the child must be presumed to be served by the termination of parental rights. NRS 128.109(2) and NRS 432B.553(2), taken together express the general public policy to seek permanent placement for children rather than have them remain in foster care.   In marked contrast to the multiple line-drawing and subtle distinctions discussed above regarding the death of a member, the death of a spouse has a very simple effect - the member is freed from all relevant restrictions, claims, and costs. The need to make some kind of adjustment for shared custody/extended visitation is acute. Families are establishing joint custody arrangements at increasingly higher rates. The 1995 Census Bureau report for the year 1991 showed that 73% of non-custodial mothers and 58% of non-custodial fathers had extensive visitation privileges or joint custody. United States Department of Health and Human Services, Final Report: That court had defined "goodwill" as the value of a business or practice that exceeds the combined value of the net assets used in the business. And it specifically contemplated that the goodwill in a professional practice might be attributable to the business enterprise itself by virtue of its existing arrangements with suppliers, customers or others, and its anticipated future customer base due to factors attributable to the business. However, the May court also found that such goodwill might be attributable to the individual owner’s personal skill, training or reputation. B> As noted by the FLS in its February 28, 2008, Amicus Curiae Brief ("First Brief"), Missouri defines a time share as "joint physical custody" based on the vague and subjective basis of whether the time share is "significant but not necessarily equal." 7 The FLS suggests that the meaning of "joint physical custody" may be improved by the following clarifications. The 40-percent joint physical custody test the majority adopts today, when tied, as intended, to eligibility for a child support offset under Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 970 P.2d 1071 (1998), creates law indistinguishable from that Barbagallo says courts should abjure.[2] As a near-contemporaneous judicial interpretation of a controlling statutory scheme; Barbagallo should control. See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1996) (giving "great weight to stare decisis in the area of statutory construction" because the legislature "is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation"; the Legislature, not the courts, "has the responsibility for revising its statutes"; and "[w]ere we to alter our statutory interpretations from case to case, [the Legislature] would have less reason to exercise its responsibility to correct statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair") (internal quotation omitted). You can find Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section I Dealing with Court Ordered Divisions of the TSP The Marren and Page Case List Braddock v Braddock The Marren and Page Case List Peardon v Peardon Rush v Rush Applebaum v App Legal Authority for Use in Requesting Fees in a Paid Case The Marren and Page Case List Engebretson v Engebretson Partition Actions Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section IX Subsection A Less is More and More is Less More or Less The Marren and Page Case List Lake v Bender Milisich v Hillhouse Jones v Ed Time to distinguish enterprise and personal goodwill The Marren and Page Case List Weeks v Weeks and Graham v Graham The Marren and Page Case List Sly v Sly and York v York The Marren and Page Case List State of Montana v Lopez The Marren and Page Case List Alba v Alba The Marren and Page Case List In re Wilsons Estate Burdick v Pope and Fick CONCLUSION Child Custody Jurisdiction in Nevada Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit One Child Support Modification Jurisdiction Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Part Two Subsection III A Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section I Dealing with available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map Ogawa Amicus Brief CONCLUSION Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section III Subsection The Marren and Page Case List Barbash v Barbash Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section VII An Introduction to Pensions in Nevada Divorce Law Conclusion The Marren and Page Case List Hedlund v Hedlund CONCLUSION Disability Benefits and Concurrent Receipt Reciprocal Links: Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section I Dealing with Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section I Dealing with Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section I Dealing with Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section I Dealing with

Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section I Dealing with Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section I Dealing with Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section I Dealing with Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section I Dealing with