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Child Custody
Learn more about Child Custody.
The following paragraph is intended to permanently transfer an Alternate Payee’s benefit under Wolff v. Wolff. However, you can bargain with opposing counsel for reversion of the benefit back to the member. The father had four children; two by one relationship, two by another. The father wanted the district court to apply formula of 31 percent for four children and then divide 31 percent by four to get his "per child rate of support." The father’s request was denied. The district court entered judgment dividing the parties’ real and personal property acquired during the marriage and prior to the marriage while the parties were co-habitating. The Court affirmed the division concluding that division of the property was properly based upon the guidelines of NRS 125.150. What is apparently implied in the ruling is that the Court approved of the district court applying community property principles to property during the period of co-habitation. Where the military member is still on active duty, things are more complicated. An order may be obtained specifying that the military pay center, as opposed to the member personally, is required to pay a child support order,2 including an award of arrearages.3 Military retirement benefits can be treated as property to be divided between the parties, or as a source of payment of child or spousal support, or both. All that is necessary to use military retirement benefits as a source for child support or spousal support payments is In sum, in the absence of anything indicating otherwise, property is to be divided equally. And that "anything," in Nevada, is required to rise to the level of a "compelling reason" for an unequal division. Still, it would appear that judges have significant latitude for finding such reasons, and need only make their findings in writing, and avoid obvious abuse of their discretion, to justify an unequal distribution of property. There are no "survivorship" benefits, per se, for a TSP account, as it is a cash plan like a 401(k). However, plan participants can and should designate beneficiaries to receive the account balance in the event of the participant’s death.1 In the absence of the form, regular intestate succession rules determine the distribution of the TSP account. The parties held a deed to property in joint tenancy. The district court found that the lot was community property and ordered it sold at fair market value with the proceeds divided equally between the parties. The husband never objected to the characterization of the lot as being community property. When the district court refused, Ms. Rivero requested that the district court judge recuse herself. The district court judge denied the request. Ms. Rivero then moved to disqualify the district court judge, alleging that the judge did not seriously consider the facts or the law because she was biased based on the parties' physical appearance. Mr. Rivero opposed the motion and moved for attorney fees. The district court judge submitted an affidavit in which she swore that she was unbiased. After considering Ms. Rivero's motion to disqualify the district court judge, the supporting affidavits, and Mr. Rivero's opposition, the chief judge denied the motion. She did not conduct a hearing, and Ms. Rivero did not file a reply. The chief judge concluded that Ms. Rivero's claims appeared to rely on "prior adverse rulings ofthe judge" and that "[r]ulings and actions of a judge during the course of official judicial proceedings do not establish legally cognizable grounds for disqualification." Thus, the chief judge found that Ms. Rivero's motion was without merit. SPAN> In the Nevada enactment, presumptions of adequacy are set out in NRS 125B.070, which establishes the definition of "gross income," sets forth the percentages to be applied to "gross income" based on the number of children involved, and sets out the presumptive minimum and the brackets at which presumptive maximums apply. PAN style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt"> 4 F. Supp. 2d at 414. In finding that the provisions of state law had been satisfied, justifying the ex parte removal of the children from the mother, the court went on to discuss the application of the "best interests" concept in the provisional remedy setting. Recognizing that the "best interests" standard does not apply to a determination of the merits of the Convention claim, the court held, nevertheless, that the "best interest" standard is applicable to the discrete determination of whether a provisional remedy is proper. Notably, the Nevada laws appear to be a bit contradictory. Providing only for possession, rather than ownership of property by way of a separate maintenance decree seems contradictory to the portion of NRS 123.220(2)2 stating that property could be defined as not community property by way of a decree of separate maintenance. While the statute itself dates to 1873, the "separate maintenance" notation was only added in 1975, during the make-over of Nevada’s community property laws in the wake of the Equal Rights Amendment proposal, to make husbands and wives joint managers of community property, and eliminate gender-specific language. Apparently, there was no action to conform the separate maintenance provisions themselves at the time NRS 123.220 was changed, and there is no legislative history showing the reason for the change. Disputes over the family pets are becoming more common, and these disputes are often dirtier than custody disputes over children. Perhaps it is because the law places upon us a presumption that the parties involved in litigation are expected to share custody of the kids, if neither party is unfit. There is no clear cut way to handle custody of "Fluffy" though, and both parties are often dumbfounded when they feel they should have a right to access their family pet after divorce, only to discover they truly have no legal right. Only in the peculiar situation that such other State does not issue any order on the subject within the time specified in the Nevada order would it either continue, or expire, as it provides. PAN style="FONT-SIZE: 14pt"> Not all bankruptcy courts are blind to the damage caused to equity by uncritical application of traditional bankruptcy principles to the domestic relations field. One bankruptcy court has commented: The parties have agreed that a pension equalization shall proceed between the parties by way of the law of obligations (contracts). A regulation under U.S. law that possibly put the wife into a better position is specifically reserved to the wife. This agreement is appropriate and reserves to the parties their rights for pension equalization, it therefore was agreed to by the Family Court. The parties purchased the house in 1977, and held title as joint tenants. The wife claimed that she should be reimbursed for one-half of the $69,000 down payment she made. The district court divided the house 60/40 in favor of the wife. The district court rebuffed the wife’s claim for reimbursement. SPAN> Where the court will not do so, the attorney for the spouse has something of a dilemma. Most courts permit almost any stipulated settlement reached during "arm’s-length" negotiations, however, and it might be in the interests of both the member and the former spouse, given the certain costs and uncertain results of trial, to trade a few percentage points of value for a stipulated award of irrevocable alimony (or secured stream of payments characterized in some other way). The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that the law favors hearing cases on the merits, if possible. The Court further noted that this policy is heightened in cases involving termination of parental rights. In considering a motion per NRCP 60(b)(1) asking to set aside an order terminating parental rights without appearance of a party, the district court must analyze whether the movant: (1) promptly applied to remove the judgment; (2) lacked intent to delay the proceedings; (3) demonstrated good faith; (4) lacked knowledge of procedural requirements; and (5) tendered a meritorious defense to the claim for relief. This conclusion is supported by footnote four, noting that when a different district court judge in another case found that Davidson had acted within the scope of the authority granted him (i.e., "fraud on the court" had not been made out), the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that decision, as well. Finally, we address Ms. Rivero's motions for recusal and disqualification, and the district court's award of attorney fees to Mr. Rivero arising from those motions. The following paragraph is intended to permanently transfer an Alternate Payee’s benefit under Wolff v. Wolff. However, you can bargain with opposing counsel for reversion of the benefit back to the member. 6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of liability for th e payment of alimony, child support, or other payments required by a court order on th e ground s that payments made out of disposable retired pay under this section have been made in the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (8) of paragraph (4). Any such unsatisfied obligation of a member may be enforced by any means available under law other than the means provided under this section n any case in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1 )has been paid and under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) in any case in which the maximum am aunt permitted under subparagraph (8) of paragraph (4) has been paid. 65279;The three Tennessee courts all rejected arguments that recharacterization by the member was silently allowed by orders that did not prohibit (or mention) disability pay. They rejected all arguments regarding "implied federal pre-emption." Hillyer involved a 1986 divorce decree, while Johnson construed a decree issued in 1996; the fact that the decrees at issue were issued after passage of the USFSPA, or Mansell, was considered irrelevant. The trial court entered a temporary custody order in favor of the other parent, but stayed the remainder of the case, over the objection of the member and the grandmother, who argued that the stay was "automatic" and prevented entry of a temporary custody order. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that an SCRA stay does not "freeze" a case, leaving it in limbo indefinitely and allowing no authority for the trial court to act. Rather, the court found that a trial court could properly entertain the issue of temporary custody, even if the stay was in place when the issue was considered, on the basis that a child’s life cannot be put in "suspended animation" awaiting the member’s return. For the same reason, the trial court was able to consider issues such as support.2 b) Shall, to the extent practicable, make an equal disposition of the community property of the parties, except that the court may make an unequal disposition of the community property in such proportions as it deems just if the court finds a compelling reason to do so and sets forth in writing the reasons for making the unequal disposition. For a spouse - or former spouse - to continue receiving money after death of the member or participant, there must be specific provision made for payments after the death of the member, by way of a separate, survivorship interest payable to the former spouse upon the death of the member. Shortly before the wedding, the couple signed a prenuptial agreement drafted by the husband. However, the husband did not attach his schedule until a year after they signed the agreement. The district court concluded the alimony provision was unenforceable. 3and children did move between Japan and Nevada several times with one or both parents, the last matrimonial domicile was apparently in Japan from May of 2002 to January, 2003. B> In Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 970 P.2d 1071 (1998), the Nevada Supreme Court decried the Legislature's failure to set forth an "objective standard' for determining the appropriate amount of alimony: stating that "absent such a standard, there appears to be a disparity in the awards for spousal support on similar facts even greater than for child support.' The Legislature has ignored the invitation to provide such a standard for a decade, and the Court itself has done little to solve the problems with consistency and predictability that it noted. If the court declines to allow a stay of proceedings, it is required to appoint counsel to represent the member,4 but the SCRA is silent as to the duties of the appointed attorney, or how such a lawyer should get paid, if at all. Several years after their divorce, the wife asked the district court to order the husband to increase child support payments. On grounds of need, the wife also asked for fees to pay her attorney. The district court increased child support and awarded the wife $2,500 in fees. to two (relatively small)1 categories of retirees: those with 20 or more years of service who were receiving disability compensation for which they also received a Purple Heart medal; and those with 20 or more years of service who were receiving disability compensation rated at 60% or higher as a result of injuries suffered in combat or "combat-like" training.2 c) If the parents have split custody but no current written parenting time agreement or court order providing for parenting time, each parent will be attributed 365 days for the minor child(ren) in the parents physical custody. The mother received primary custody and support of $450 per month. The mother consulted a lawyer, and upon discovering NRS 125B.070 and the 18 percent formula moved for an increase, alleging nonconformity with statute, and based on the father's $6,000 per month income. The district court increased support to $1,000. Cases consolidated for disposition only ("Gandee" and "Montelione"). In Gandee, the father wanted to move to Oregon with two daughters (ages four and five, with elder physically disabled) to accept a promotion. The mother refused consent to move, and the father filed a move motion per NRS 125A.350. The district court found that only actual advantage to move was a "few thousand dollars" that would "be eaten up on forfeited child support or transportation costs." In the second case, the district court denied a request to relocate primarily based on the fact the non-primary parent had custody of the child at issue two days each week in addition to holiday and school recess time. The Supreme Court reversed both. You can find Child Custody Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar In Search of a Theoretical Model for Alimony CONCLUSION Public Employees Retirement System PERS Benefits Military Retired Pay and the Danger of REDUX The Marren and Page Case List Gepford v Gepford The Marren and Page Case List Renshaw v Renshaw Public Employees Retirement System PERS Benefits Section III Subsection B C The Marren and Page Case List Schwartz v Schwartz Jones v Jones Trent v Tre Las Vegas CSRS expert lawyer Death of Member After Retirement and Before Divorce The Marren and Page Case List Lombardi v Lombardi Giorgi v Giorgi Hopper v Rivero v Rivero IV C Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Discussion Why the Nevada Welfare Division is Calculating Interest and Penalties Incor The Marren and Page Case List Grey v Grey Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection The Marren and Page Case List Petersen v Petersen Williams v Waldman and Co Interactions Between Military and Civil Service Retirements The Marren and Page Case List Wiese v Granata The Marren and Page Case List Lake v Bender Milisich v Hillhouse Jones v Ed Nevada separate maintenance expert Child Custody available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section V Subsection D Joint Titling Gift or Separate Claims Still Allowed Tracing Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Four D The Marren and Page Case List Chesler v Chesler and Prins v Prins Introduction to Nevada Law of Child Custody and Visitation in Divorce Getting the Kids Home What to File |