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An Introduction to Pensions in Nevada Divorce Law Section I
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General Introduction Dealing with pensions and retirement benefits in Nevada divorce casesOver the years, Congress has made numerous changes in the method of COLA computations. This has resulted in persons with identical ranks and lengths of service being paid different sums of retired pay depending upon their dates of retirement. Now the divorce lawyer, who probably thought he had finished his job when he got the waiver put in the Decree, faces a possible malpractice suit from the intended beneficiary for not ensuring that the right form was sent to the plan at the conclusion of the divorce. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that when relocation significantly impaired the other parent’s ability to exercise the responsibilities he or she had been exercising, it constituted substantially changed circumstances which justified a reexamination of custody based upon the best interest of the children, taking into account all relevant factors, including the effects of relocation. The Court noted that an order changing custody if the primary custodian chooses to move after the court denies a motion to relocate appeared to be designed to punish the primary custodian. The Court found that the punitive nature of the order was made clear due the fact that it changed custody without any provision for the mother to have any contact with the children. The Court reiterated that it made it clear that district courts could not use changes of custody as a sword to punish perceived parental misconduct citing to Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 1149, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (1993). I do not believe Garner can fairly be read to create the new restriction. Garner involved a "rogue" attorney, Larry Davidson, who "without the knowledge or approval of his clients, . . . settled their case for $160,000, forged the necessary settlement papers, and disappeared with the money." The district court vacated the stipulated final judgment under NRCP 60(b) for fraud on the court. The hospital appealed, claiming that the Garners should be stuck with the "benefit" of the bargain struck by their criminal/fraudulent attorney. P> Although the agency administering the TSP has proven more flexible than either the military or the OPM, its regulations did spawn yet another acronym for a court order dividing benefits - "RBCO," for "Retirement Benefits Court Order." PART TWO - MATTERS RELATING TO CHILD SUPPORT POLICY AND CALCULATIONS III. The District Court’s Determination of Joint Physical Custody Resulting in an Unequal Timeshare Should Have a Bearing on Its Award of Child Support, in Appropriate Circumstances and this Court Should Revisit the Rivero Formula SUP> Four years after the McNabney decision, the Legislature amended NRS 125.150, eliminating the "respective merits of the parties" language and inserting new directions. After 1993, NRS 125.150(1) provided, in pertinent part, that in granting a divorce, the court: PAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Times New Roman; FONT-SIZE: 14pt"> The cautious practitioner will ensure that the property settlement agreement or divorce decree is crafted with sufficient demonstrations of intent (and reservations of jurisdiction, if necessary) that a later reviewing court would be able to transcend recharacterization of the benefits addressed. The form provided with these materials is intended to provide a statement of such intent. 2) Any property placed in joint tenancy by the parties on or after July 1, 1979, as appears just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits of the parties and to the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, and to the party through whom the property was acquired, and to the burdens, if any, imposed upon it, for the benefit of the children. Jill Prevost married Tom Harms, a career military officer, in 1967. By 1984, when their marriage ended, they were living separately in Germany. Jill filed for divorce in Illinois (Tom’s legal residence) in March, 1984.3 In May, Tom requested a stay pursuant to the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act. Tom filed a new action in the German court with jurisdiction over divorce actions at about that time, and the German court proceeded to judgment on questions of custody, visitation, support, and property division. The Supreme Court issued the writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court found that NRS 125.150 was plain and unambiguous, held that at the time a judgE ment or decree of divorce is entered, the district court must Contemporaneously dispose of the community property of the parties. The Court distinguished from Ellett v. Ellett, 94 Nev. 34, 573 P.2d 1179 (1978) because the parties had stipulated to separate trials on the issues, but no final judgment was entered until the close of all proceedings. 5) A court order under this subsection may provide that whenever retired pay is increased under section 1401a of this title (or any other provision of law), the amount payable under the court order to the spouse or former spouse of a member or former member described in paragraph (2)(A) shall be increased at the same time by the percent by which the retired pay of the member or former member would have been increased if the m ember or former member were receiving retired pa y. PAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Times New Roman; FONT-SIZE: 14pt"> An attorney wishing to personally estimate present values can purchase computer programs that do the math involved quite quickly.34 Such programs often allow the user to plug in the assumptions to be used, such as life expectancy, presumed interest rate, etc. In any event, attorneys handling these cases in states that allow or require trading the present value of the retirement benefit must become well versed in all aspects of valuation, interest rate assumptions, and other factors involved. Failure to do so invites disaster at settlement or in court. Any such argument is improper. The relocation of any party after filing of a motion to modify child support is entirely irrelevant to the jurisdiction of the court. No such argument should ever be made, or entertained. Kansas X Maryland X The private Bar began applying the penalty in late 1995 when it became effective, and the Family Courts uniformly included a penalty assessment per the statute whenever counsel requested (and calculated) it. The calculation was not particularly difficult. The statutory language directed assessing a penalty of "10 percent per annum, or portion thereof, that the installment remains unpaid." Alaska and Wisconsin attempt to have it both ways ¨C creating a precise mathematical formulation, and then building in subjective modification factors. We think this provides the worst of both worlds, both increasing the effort and cost of calculating guideline support in a large number of cases, and having too much doubt of the ultimate bottom line to ensure either predictability or consistency from court to court, which has the effect of increasing litigation. Mississippi avoid the "transactional cost" by having no formula for such cases, but leaves the outcome to the effectively unbridled discretion of judges, at the expense of predictability and consistency, and probably increasing litigation by parties willing to take a shot at altering their support obligations. The "presumptive maximum" never did make theoretical sense, and artificially reducing child support so that children don’t share in the income of both their parents violates the principle on which our child support statute is based. The entire "presumptive maximum" structure should be tossed. In its place, Nevada should enact a Wisconsin- like universal application of a percentage of income to everyone (up to an income level high enough to encompass most of the population), with a permissive percentage application above that threshold for the relatively few extraordinary-income earners. If and when concurrent receipt under CRDP has been fully implemented in a given case, totally eliminating the required waiver, a retiree’s application for and receipt of regular VA disability benefits would have no effect on a pre-existing division of military retired pay between the retiree and his former spouse; he would just get additional benefits. The Governor signed the bill on July 5, 1995, still containing the non-retroactivity provisions, which is why arguments relating to the legislation do not appear in the record of this Court’s opinion in Wolff in 1996. The district court awarded joint legal custody of Russo's boy and Gardener's daughter because Gardner had placed himselfin a position of "loco parentis, "and that would be "devastating" to the boy to have Gardner treat him differently than his sister. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted its opinion in Hermanson v. Hermanson, 110 Nev. 1400,887 P.2d 1241 (1994), and its holding therein that "the doctrine of equitable adoption enunciated in [Frye], and the myriad of other psychological theories of parentage that the parties mention in order to determine paternity are inapplicable." ld. at 288. The Court further noted that "Frye was rejected by Hermanson as inapplicable for determining legal parentage in a custody proceeding." [citations omitted]. ld. at 288. The Court noted the man's claim that he never knew he was not the biological father, but also that he was not listed on the birth certificate, and the woman's claim that she told him he was not the son's father while she was pregnant. Over the years, Congress has made numerous changes in the method of COLA computations. This has resulted in persons with identical ranks and lengths of service being paid different sums of retired pay depending upon their dates of retirement. No matter what any court orders, the military pay center can only take the premium "off the top" of the monthly payments of the regular retirement.5 Unfortunately, and counter-intuitively, that results in the parties each bearing a portion of the survivorship premium in exact proportion to their shares of the retirement itself. In other words, if the retirement is being split 50/50, then the parties share the cost of the SBP premium equally, but if the spouse is entitled to only 25% of the monthly retired pay, then the member effectively pays 75% of the SBP premium. PAN style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt"> (1) the child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and Jones is also in the group of cases explaining that Mansell calls on courts to essentially take a snapshot at the time of divorce, when the award to the spouse is made. Any disposable retired pay that was already waived in favor of disability pay up to that point is not divisible, but any attempt by the member at post-divorce reduction in retired pay by recharacterization is seen as attempting a "de facto modification" of a final property award, which community property law does not permit.4 The father obtained custody in a 1987 divorce. On December 30, 1993, the mother obtained Temporary Protective Order, alleging physical abuse eight years earlier, coupled with recent receipt of "bizarre" letters, alleged inquiries by the father into the car being driven by the mother, and the mother’s sighting of the father stalking her so that she felt in danger. The mother sought extension of the Temporary Protective Order in January 1994, seeking alteration of visitation with child, but not modification of custody, with a hearing set in April. The father did not appear at the TPO extension hearing; the record on appeal did not specify what occurred, but the district court issued an order five days later granting the mother physical custody. The father requested an emergency stay; there was a 30-minute hearing, five days after which the court denied the stay request and reaffirmed its change of custody. Specifically, the majority time rule approach comes closest to providing equity to successive spouses. Two consecutive spouses, during the first and last halves of an employee’s career, would be treated equally under the qualitative approach, but very differently under any approach that freezes the spousal share at the level of compensation being received by the employee at the time of divorce. You can find An Introduction to Pensions in Nevada Divorce Law Section I The Marren and Page Case List Renshaw v Renshaw The Marren and Page Case List Lewis v Second Judicial Dist Court Legal Separation Allowed Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Four Concurrent Receipt this Entire Issue Is Destined to Go Away The Marren and Page Case List McMonigle v McMonigle Hooper v Hooper and Cas Hedlund Amicus Brief Statement of Facts Withdrawal and Borrowing of Money from the TSP After Retirement Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section II Subsection C Las Vegas PERS expert lawyer The Marren and Page Case List Trubenbach v Amstadter Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar An Introduction to Pensions in Nevada Divorce Law Section I available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map Th Marren and Page Case Lisst Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section B Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Three Section Three Rivero v Rivero Subsection 1 Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Four Elko divorce family law expert Reciprocal Links: An Introduction to Pensions in Nevada Divorce Law Section I An Introduction to Pensions in Nevada Divorce Law Section I An Introduction to Pensions in Nevada Divorce Law Section I An Introduction to Pensions in Nevada Divorce Law Section I |